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PREFACE

The GHI is a scholarly institution dedicated to historical research, but its programs are not limited to scholars and are not without bearing on present-day concerns. The three feature articles in this issue of the *Bulletin* grew out of talks that were open to the public, and each touches upon an issue of profound contemporary resonance. It would be hard to think of a political leader more qualified to comment on the sensitive—and pressing—issue of international migration than Professor Rita Süßmuth, who chaired the independent commission that drafted a series of proposals to reform Germany’s immigration policies. Thanks to the generous support of the ZEIT Foundation, the GHI was able to invite Professor Süßmuth to Washington to deliver the third Gerd Bucerius Lecture. In her lecture, “People on the Move: The Challenges of Migration in Transatlantic Perspective,” Professor Süßmuth calls attention to some of the differences in how the United States and the countries of Western Europe have handled immigration. Noting that there are many positive things that Germany and its neighbors could learn from the American experience, Professor Süßmuth also voices concern that recent discussions of immigration in the United States have taken an unfortunate turn as a result of the heightened attention to domestic security since the September 11 terror attacks.

Another area where divergences between European and U.S. policies have provoked much discussion is the environment. Whether those divergences are rooted in historical experience was the subject of a public program at the GHI in late 2002. Joachim Radkau, one of Germany’s leading environmental historians, makes the case for a distinctive European approach to interacting with nature in his paper “Exceptionalism in European Environmental History.” In his “Theses on Radkau,” John McNeill, whose work is as formidably wide-ranging as Radkau’s, weighs the evidence Radkau presents and offers evidence of his own in affirming some aspects of Radkau’s argument and challenging others.

A. James McAdams’s essay “Transitional Justice After 1989: Is Germany So Different?” was originally presented as the public keynote lecture of a groundbreaking conference held at the GHI this past spring. “Historical Justice in International Perspective: How Societies are Trying to Right the Wrongs of the Past” brought together twenty-five scholars from nearly a dozen countries. The diversity of the academic disciplines represented by the participants—which included philosophy, sociology, and literary studies as well as history, political science, and anthropology—was matched by the diversity of the individual cases they dis-

cussed—which ranged from the treatment of the Maori in New Zealand to the call for reparations for slavery in the United States. Several of those cases are mentioned in McAdams’s essay, which uses the experience of post-unification Germany to elucidate the complex series of issues associated with the notion of “transitional justice.”

In the “GHI Research” section of this *Bulletin*, GHI deputy director Dirk Schumann reports on his ongoing research on “Authority in the ‘Blackboard Jungle’: Parents and Teachers, Experts and the State, and the Modernization of West Germany in the 1950s.” Schumann joined the GHI in the summer of 2002, following a three-year term as DAAD Visiting Professor of History at Emory University. Not least among his many responsibilities at the GHI is overseeing programs for graduate students and recent PhDs.

Several of the GHI’s programs for younger scholars and the general public would not have been possible without outside support. The very successful 2003 session of the Young Scholars Forum, outlined in this issue of the *Bulletin* by GHI Research Fellow Christine von Oertzen, was funded by Allianz AG. The tribute to Willy Brandt described in this issue by Dirk Schumann would have been inconceivable without the assistance provided by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Willy Brandt Foundation. And, as noted above, the Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius ZEIT Foundation has provided the means for the GHI to present distinguished public figures to a broad audience in Washington, DC. The GHI is very grateful to these generous organizations and to the Friends of the German Historical Institute.

While the *Bulletin* regularly reports on the activities of many scholars associated with the GHI in different ways—including Research Fellows, guest speakers, conference participants, and grant recipients—there is one important group of scholars whose efforts on behalf of the GHI are rarely if ever mentioned in these pages. The German and American scholars who served on the GHI’s Academic Advisory Board for over a decade provided invaluable guidance in matters such as research staff appointments and publications policies. With Professor Klaus Hildebrand as chair, the Academic Advisory Board was a reliable advocate of the GHI’s interests during the recent legal restructuring of the foundation of which the institute is a part. The long-serving Academic Advisory Board stepped down this summer, and its successor, chaired by Professor Friedrich Lenger of the University of Gießen, had its constituent meeting in August. The GHI is greatly indebted to the former board and looks forward to working with its successor.

Christof Mauch
Director

FEATURES

PEOPLE ON THE MOVE: THE CHALLENGES OF MIGRATION IN TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE

Rita Süßmuth

On May 5, 2003, Professor Rita Süßmuth (University of Göttingen), former Speaker of the Bundestag (Bundestagspräsidentin) and Chair of the Independent Council of Experts on Migration and Integration (appointed by the German government), delivered the third Gerd Bucerius Lecture. The event was sponsored by the ZEIT Foundation.

Today I will be speaking to you about migration in transatlantic perspective. When I use the term migrants, I will be referring to all people who cross international borders to live outside their country of citizenship, both temporarily and permanently; legally and illegally; voluntarily and as refugees. This is an important issue that is nowhere receiving the urgent political attention it requires. I am pleased to be speaking to you in the United States of America, a country with a long history of immigration, a country that knows first hand the challenges and enrichment that immigration can bring.

Through my work as the chair of Germany's Independent Commission on Migration¹ in 2000 and 2001 and through my current appointment (May 2003) as chair of the newly established Independent German Council of Experts on Migration and Integration, I have spent much time analyzing migration issues in Germany and worldwide. I have examined diverse, international methods of steering migration and fostering integration. I have studied demographic and migration trends to try to understand how these issues will develop in the twenty-first century. I can only conclude that the international community and individual nations have much more to do in this policy area. At present, no national immigration policy is adequately facing the challenges of the future, and no society has reached the degree of ethnic and cultural openness necessary to deal with those challenges.

Having said this, my first thesis today is:

1. *The twentieth century was just the beginning! The twenty-first century already is, and will continue to be, the century of worldwide migration. Many countries, especially Germany, are in a state of denial about this fact. This has to change!*



Rita Süßmuth delivering the Bucerius Lecture

The current causes of migration differ from those of the past. People no longer migrate to form colonies, to spread their religious beliefs, or to exercise power in another country. However, economic hardship, political, religious, and ethnic persecution, family reunification, and the search for better economic opportunities or relief from natural catastrophes remain constant motivations for migration. Alongside these factors, modern transportation and communication networks are making migration more popular than ever before. Additionally, 50 percent of worldwide migrants are women, a fact that is unknown to many people.

Each of the approximately 200 countries on this earth is either a destination, transit, or source country of international migration, or a combination of these. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 175 million people lived outside of their country of citizenship in the year 2000. Relying on data from the UN Population Division, the IOM has documented a marked rise in the number of migrants worldwide since 1965. There were 75 million international migrants in 1965. In 1975, the figure rose to 84 million and, in 1985, to 105 million. In 1990, there were 120 million and, in 2000, there were 175 million international migrants worldwide.²

With a world population of 6 billion people in the year 2000, only 1 out of every 35 people migrated across international borders. That is to say, about 2.9% of the world's people are living in a country where they are not citizens. The international migrant population, therefore, forms a clear minority of the world's population. However, the portion of the world's population that is on the move is growing faster than the global population as a whole, which means the percentage of people on the move will be increasing in the future. One must also consider that the world's migrant population influences both the destination countries and the countries of origin far more than the numbers alone would suggest.

Just as we can try to use recent trends to predict future population growth, we can also try to sketch a picture of the future world migrant population. According to the U.S. Census Bureau's population projection, by 2050 the current world population of 6 billion people will expand to 9 billion inhabitants. This represents a 50 percent increase in world population. If the international migrant community continues to increase at the current rate of 2.59 percent,³ then the world's international migrant population would be 539 million people in 2050. When this projected immigrant population worldwide is compared with the projected world population mentioned previously, it would compose about 6% of the world population in 2050. Although this calculation is primitive and does not adequately consider variables such as epidemic diseases like HIV/AIDS—HIV is expected to reduce the population on the African continent by one-third in the coming decades—this calculation demonstrates that

we can expect the migrant population to increase relative to worldwide population. According to this calculation, the international migrant population as a portion of world population will have more than doubled by 2050, and the number of international migrants will be three times the current level.

2. *The current German and European practices of erecting barriers and making immigration policy on the national level will not be plausible strategies for dealing with migration in the twenty-first century.*

The European Union has taken its first steps toward coordinating its migration policy. In 1999, at the Tampere Summit, the EU member states pledged to coordinate their migration policies in the area of asylum and refugees by the year 2004. Since the Tampere Summit, the European Council has drafted guidelines on several aspects of asylum policy that each EU country is obliged to enact in national law. Also, in February of 2003, the Interior Ministers of EU countries reached consensus on harmonizing family reunification policies. Since the EU Summit in Thessaloniki, the EU has been granted the authority to establish policies in the areas of labor migration, refugees, and integration for all its member states. However, at this summit the EU was not granted the power to establish immigration quotas for its member countries.

3. *The EU favors multi-national policies concerning migration. Starting with the issue of refugees, the EU aims to harmonize many of its migration policies and procedures.*

North America, Europe, and Australia have been the main destinations of recent migrants. The increased volume of migration will challenge current structures of steering migration and fostering integration in the transatlantic community and worldwide. This challenge is one that can only be met multilaterally. This leads me to my next thesis:

4. *Fear of terrorism and concern for security must not be allowed to dominate consideration of migration issues. It must remain clear at all times that it is unacceptable to equate immigrants with terrorists.*

The issue of homeland security and terrorism has raised many questions relating to migration in the United States. The Immigration and Naturalization Service has been incorporated within the new Department of Homeland Security, and the agencies responsible for enforcing migration laws and for providing migration services have thus been separated. Migration is being stigmatized at the beginning of the twenty-first century in a retrogressive manner. Immigrants, especially refugees, have often been held responsible for the terrible crimes of their co-ethnics, fellow countrymen, or religious kin. History has shown us time and time

again that making a group responsible for the crimes of those falsely assumed to be part of that group is a tremendous error.

5. *Transatlantic as well as international partnership and cooperation are essential to steering migration and fostering integration in the future. Transnational solutions will be the only solutions capable of meeting the challenges of twenty-first century migration.*

The U.S. experience with steering immigration has already proven to be an important policy resource for Germany. In the past two years, there has been a push in Germany to develop an immigration and integration law influenced by the policies and practices of our transatlantic partners. The Federal Republic of Germany has been a country of immigration since its founding. During its early years, the Federal Republic had to integrate Germans displaced from the former eastern regions of Prussia and the Third Reich. From the mid-1950s until the early 1970s, the Federal Republic recruited large numbers of so-called guest workers. Recruitment of guest workers ended in 1973, but since then Germany has remained a country of immigration, mainly as a result of family reunification and various regulations allowing individuals with particular skills to migrate to Germany. The most popular of these regulations was the recent measure that will allow up to 20,000 computer experts to live and work in Germany.

In Germany, the immigrant, non-citizen population in 2000 was around 9%, or 7.297 million people.⁴ Additionally, 5 million "Aussiedler," ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and Russia, have migrated to Germany. Germany has the highest number of immigrants living within its borders of any country in Europe. More than 40% of the immigrants living in Germany have been residing in the country for many decades.

The International Organization for Migration notes that "the case of Germany stands out because of the sheer volume of migration it has experienced in recent years. Throughout the 1990s, Germany was Europe's most important country of migration, the annual registered immigration of foreign nationals consistently exceeding inflows into the rest of western Europe combined."⁵ Most of these migrants were refugees. Like the United States, Germany has been deeply affected by immigration. Unlike the United States, Germany is undergoing the slow process of recognizing that it is a country of immigration. It is in the process of facing its longstanding inconsistencies: It is a major exporter, but does not want immigration; it has recruited workers and their families, but sees them only as "guests" staying temporarily in the country; it invests widely abroad and its citizens travel across the globe, but it sees cultural diversity at home as a threat. Having recognized the need for trade and investment, Germany must recognize the inevitability of migration and

cultural exchange. This is a delayed learning process that is taking place in Germany and in Europe.

Although immigration has taken place throughout the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, Germany denied that it was a country of immigration until 2000. In that year, Germany's political parties came to a consensus recognizing that Germany is indeed a country of immigration. This long overdue step forward in modernizing German thinking and immigration law was immediately followed by a step backward. German politicians, especially conservatives, fought to distinguish the situation in Germany from that in other countries of immigration. There was a debate about German ethnic homogeneity. Some asserted that there is a German *Leitkultur*, a guiding culture, and that Germany is not a "classical country of immigration." The German word for immigration, *Einwanderung*, was replaced by a new term, *Zuwanderung*, highlighting the fact that the movement of persons to Germany did not necessarily have to be permanent, but could also be temporary or transitional. The current discussion in Germany has not been successful at lifting the long-standing myth that homogeneity is the only glue binding German society together. This leads me to my sixth thesis:

6. *What initially seemed to be a change in the German immigration paradigm turned out to be two steps forward and one step back.*

The current discussion of the new immigration law has prompted Germany's changing society to confront a number of suppressed issues. These issues address the very core of the country's identity and self-understanding. They include language, culture, values, religion, labor and unemployment, demography, education, constitutional principles, equality, and human rights.

Germany is in the process of modernizing its immigration policies with an immigration law that will increase transparency in the immigration process, speed up the asylum process, and actively offer immigrants a better chance to integrate into German society through language instruction and courses on German society and culture. Under the new law, the aforementioned Independent Council of Experts on Migration and Integration would issue an annual report evaluating the current state of immigration in Germany and recommend an immigration agenda for the coming year. There is much controversy surrounding six aspects of the new law and it will not be easy to push it through both houses of parliament. The main points of controversy are:

- the removal of the *Anwerbestopp*, a ban on recruiting foreign labor that was implemented in 1973 (This ban has been amended with so many exceptions that it would be much easier to state directly who may come to work in Germany.)

- the introduction of a point-based system for allowing skilled workers to migrate to Germany
- the number of hours integration courses, especially language courses, should last (Proposals range from 600 to 900 hours for every immigrant. How these courses are to be financed is also controversial.)
- the number of times the words “limiting immigration” should replace the words “steering immigration”
- the maximum age at which children have a right to be reunited with their parents (The current version of the draft law sets the maximum age at 12, with exceptions allowing children up to age 18 to join their families; other proposals range from 6 to 21. Current regulation sets this age at 16 in most cases.)
- the persecution of people on gender-specific grounds and the persecution of individuals by an entity that is not a nation-state.

7. *The long-standing migration and especially integration policy based on the principle of passive self-regulation must be replaced in the future with a more active approach. This approach must not only be adopted in law, but must be practiced by immigrants and citizens alike.*

The immigration debate in Germany has been complicated by the ongoing recession and high unemployment rate in the Federal Republic. The current hardship faced by many cannot be ignored; yet it is not a reason to ignore demographic facts that the country will face in the near future. By 2010, Germany will find itself with a growing population of retirees and a shrinking labor force. Given the extent of Germany’s welfare state, it is absolutely necessary that the country have a fully functional system of steering migration and fostering integration before the demographic crunch cripples the economy and welfare system.

The debate on immigration has forced people to take sides on the issue of integration. A front has opened between advocates of assimilation and defenders of multiculturalism. This debate has taken on a slightly different tone in Germany than in the United States—as far as I’ve understood the U.S. debate—as it is something different to assimilate into a self-consciously multicultural society than into one that believes itself to be homogeneous, even though in fact German society is not homogeneous. The key to resolving this debate in Germany is to dispel the myth of homogeneity. Whether one argues for a need for assimilation or the need to establish diversity within unity, these sides must establish a common ground on what is necessary to keep the societal glue in Germany sufficiently sticky, so to speak. This leads me to my eighth thesis:

8. *In order to establish a road map for integration and to prepare a society for immigration in the twenty-first century, the myth of homogeneity must be*

destroyed and clear goals must be established for newcomers and long-time members of society.

On the one hand, this means focusing on non-discrimination laws. For Germany, this means the rapid ratification of the EU ordinance on anti-discrimination, and for the transatlantic community, it means the enforcement of anti-discrimination guidelines. On the other hand, this also implies harmonizing criteria and establishing a system for achieving integration goals for all transatlantic partners.

Globalization, the increased speed of movement and communication, the greater involvement and curiosity of the global community, the growing gap between wealth and poverty, humanitarian and military intervention, humanitarian movements, international labor market migration, and the increased movement of terrorist networks have multiplied the challenges of steering migration. Today, more than ever, we need to better integrate and coordinate migration and development policy. Diversity and security have sometimes become slogans under which racial profiling is hidden. Especially following the tragic attacks in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, fear and bias can lead to outright discrimination and hatred. This brings me to my next thesis:

9. *One of the biggest challenges we face in twenty-first century migration and integration is how to fight terrorism without developing an immigration system based on racial profiling and discrimination, without spurring social disintegration, and without allowing social, ethnic, and economic cleavages to destroy the social glue that unites us.*

Migration is multifaceted, and migration policies must adequately address all aspects of migration, including the very difficult and complex issue of human trafficking. In addition to economic and humanitarian migrants who enter the country either legally or illegally, there is a growing number of people who are being brought to our countries enslaved. These people are often referred to as trafficked persons. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the establishment of democracies in Eastern Europe, human trafficking has been eating away at the democratic principles western democracies have fought so long to preserve. Human trafficking is one of the most heinous crimes that exist in the world today, and like the United States, Germany must recognize the extreme growth of this illegal trade in people over the last decade. Over the past year, at least 700,000 and possibly as many as 4 million men, women, and children worldwide were victims of human trafficking. These statistics conceal the utter misery and abuse that this group of migrants endures within our democracies! Violated and disposed of by our societies, victims of trafficking, in most cases, are treated as perpetrators and are deported to

their countries of origin based on immigration violations. This brings me to my next thesis:

10. *Migration policy must give greater attention to the trafficking in persons. Not the victims of trafficking, but rather the organized criminals behind human trafficking must be brought to justice!*

The United States and the international community have made great strides in improving the fight against human trafficking. In 2000, the UN produced a definition clarifying what human trafficking is. It is “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, or abduction, or fraud, or deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.”⁶ In the same year, the UN also succeeded in getting 117 signatories and 25 parties to sign the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. The new protocol supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and thereby strengthens the international effort to combat human trafficking. The protocol has not yet entered into force because it has not yet been ratified by the necessary number of national parliaments. We are currently still losing the struggle against human trafficking.

11. *Humanitarian migration must be seen in a different light, especially in Germany. Refugees are not ‘weaker’ than other migrant groups. This group of—partially temporary and partially permanent—immigrants not only needs protection, but also requires the opportunity to participate fully in society.*

Often seen as the “downside” of migration issues, asylum seekers are often marginalized in destination countries to a greater extent than most immigrants. Separating people into categories of economically advantageous and disadvantageous is not an acceptable way to view immigrants. This oversimplified assumption of calculating the value of a person’s humanity has become commonplace in Germany. The infamous slogan, calling for “Zuwanderer, die uns nutzen, und nicht die, die uns ausnutzen” (“immigrants who are useful to us and not those who use us”) was unfortunately able to heavily influence popular opinion.

The danger of separating immigrants into the categories of economically advantageous and disadvantageous, good and evil, persecuted and terrorist, illegal alien and highly skilled worker, is growing. Instead of profiting from diversity, migration, and globalization, we are off to a bad start this century as globalization has taken a turn toward hatred and an

oversimplification and artificial division of the world into east and west, good and evil, right and wrong. This beginning has allowed voices that believe diversity is a problem rather than a strength to become louder.

12. *A clash of civilizations is not inevitable. Migration is a human instinct and has been a fact of human life from the outset. Indeed, migration has been a key factor in the rise of civilization. Fear and denial that our humanity lies in our diversity is, however, a force that could cause a demise of civilization. This force must be counteracted.*

How the transatlantic community deals with illegal immigrants will be decisive in forming adequate migration policies. The United States of America and Germany, as well as all the other members of the transatlantic community, do not yet possess the tools needed to meet the migration challenges of the twenty-first century. The reduction in the number of illegal immigrants and the improvement of the quality of life of all immigrants should be the measuring stick by which the transatlantic community judges the success of its policies. Currently, policies fail to steer migration and foster integration. One only needs to look at the booming business of human trafficking to notice a distinct failure not only of steering migration but also of protecting human rights. This is not only a failure of our national policies, but also a failure of international cooperation and policymaking! Migration and human rights issues are closely connected, especially when we are dealing with victims of human trafficking and refugees as well as ethnic, religious, or economic discrimination. In all these areas, international cooperation is absolutely necessary. The UN can play an important and central role in engineering plausible solutions to failing national policies. The Geneva Convention and the UN Charter of Human Rights are milestones along this path. This path must, however, be better paved.

Current countries of destination will experience a continuous rise in immigration throughout the twenty-first century on account of the security and poverty gap between industrialized and developing countries.

Future Challenges

1. Migration policy in Germany and in the EU is in the process of changing and becoming a matter primarily of EU rather than national responsibility. This period of transition has been marked by national self-interest and protectionism, by policies aimed at curbing unwanted immigration of refugees from crisis regions. It is also marked by policies that aim to maximize “desirable” migration—young families and skilled workers—destined for labor markets. It is a fact that most current and future EU member countries have low birth rates and aging populations, and that

these countries need immigration because of demographic and economic factors. These problems cannot be solved through EU-internal migration. EU-internal migration is very low, in any event, and represents only 2% of migration in the EU.

2. The EU must achieve harmonized migration policies that all of its members enforce. There needs to be a harmonized policy on how refugee status is granted, on the rights of refugees, and on residency laws. Binding agreements already exist concerning migration and refugees, such as the EU's 1999 Tampere agreement, the UN Human Rights Charter, and the Human Rights Convention of the European Council. The main issue at hand is to find political solutions for people that we need and for those who need us. The biggest challenge in forming multinational migration policies is avoiding a two-class migration community. This is a *very* important task.

3. Migration policies must also be pre-emptive and provide protection for immigrants. They should prevent crisis and conflict, violence and poverty; they should encourage self-help and sustainable development. They should also allow fair participation in international trade.

Globalization that is not rooted in an international order, globalization without protection for human rights and human dignity, globalization without financial and market regulations, will not achieve these goals. The current system, in most cases, enables the powerful to make decisions contrary to the interests of the poor and vulnerable. This could lead to a situation in which radicalism, fundamentalism, ethnic hatred, violence, and cultural confrontation increase. This is why national migration policies must be anchored in, and expanded by, transnational and international policies, for example by the EU or the United Nations.

4. It is the responsibility and obligation of the transatlantic community to preserve and advance the common values of freedom, justice, and prosperity. This continues to be a long-term goal that presents us with a major challenge. National egoism continues to be more dominant than the readiness to commit oneself to the transatlantic community politically. Instead of cooperation and partnership, confrontation and violence control many regions of the world. Prevention has been a far-reaching political slogan with a short range of effectiveness. Security policies that are based mainly on military measures will lead to further escalation of violence and not to increased levels of security. In most cases, peaceful solutions to conflicts through diplomacy can lead to the sustainable economic and social development of an unstable country or region.

The EU is aware of its political weaknesses, but it also is aware of the strengths that lie in its support and enforcement of the Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership: constitutional legality, democracy, human

rights, protection of minority rights, and a market economy (understood in the EU as free and social market economies).

Democracy is not secure, and will not be so in the future, without effective and recognizable improvement of each individual's social and economic situation.

The biggest enemies of social development and civil society are violence, propaganda, and the exclusion or oppression of people, especially when combined with displacement, persecution, and murder and when joined with the destruction of essential goods, infrastructure, and services: food, health services, shelter, education, and work. As long as the cycle of violence is not broken, we will not be able to achieve freedom or peace.

5. Destination countries know it is necessary that migration policies quantitatively steer and integrate newcomers; they also know that there are limits to how much governments can influence migration flows. Cultural diversity is a popular term used in politics, as is the term integration. Integration is a process that calls on immigrants to recognize the constitutional principles and laws of a destination country, to participate and be successful in the education system, labor force, and political culture of that destination country. This is possible only when immigrants are able to speak and understand the destination country's language and when the destination country's citizens, as well as immigrants, are familiar with cultural and ethnic diversity in that country. In many countries, citizens and immigrants alike currently do not possess adequate knowledge of the cultural and religious diversity in which they live. This results in the absence of mutual respect and recognition.

The challenge we face is not to dismiss our own culture; rather it is just the opposite. We must possess a strong sense of self-identity in order to be able to participate in cultural exchange and respect diversity. Being open to diversity and exercising tolerance without giving up personal identity will lead to enrichment and progress of each individual and of society as a whole. We have undervalued the common and diverse cultures in our global community for far too long. For people of all cultures, ethnicities, and nationalities, the greatest indignity is to see their culture, their way of life, underrated.

Peaceful coexistence is possible only when tolerance and abstinence from claiming the infallibility of one's own religion or culture are practiced. We have to get away from the idea of a "clash of civilizations" and move toward intercultural dialogue. In Germany, we are just at the beginning of a long journey on the way to this goal. There have, however, been positive developments toward this aim. Our collective responsibilities in the transatlantic community result mainly from common cultural

and political traditions. Common migration challenges bind us and obligate us to work together.

With regard to my simple projection concerning the future size of the international migrant population, we have no alternative but to globalize our migration policies in an increasingly globalized world. Migration presents us with a challenge, an opportunity to make the most out of the world's most important resource: people. Let us not pass up this opportunity!

All countries in the transatlantic partnership are facing similar challenges. We do not yet have the tools to face our upcoming challenges, but we have a wide range of experiences and ideas that we can use when confronting them. No country can meet this global challenge alone!

We must immediately increase our policy cooperation concerning the steering of migration and the fostering of integration to ensure that the twenty-first century will be one in which migration and cultural exchange are means of building civilization and not destroying it.

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- ¹ Unabhängige Kommission "Zuwanderung." *Zuwanderung gestalten, Integration fördern* (Berlin, 2001).
- ² International Organization for Migration, ed., *World Migration Report 2003*, 4.
- ³ *World Migration Report 2003*, 5.
- ⁴ Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, ed. *Migrationsbericht der Ausländerbeauftragten* (Berlin, 2002), 79.
- ⁵ International Organization for Migration, ed., *World Migration Report 2000*, 190.
- ⁶ <http://www.osce.org/odihr/democratization/trafficking>

EXCEPTIONALISM IN EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY

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“Don’t be afraid to say you don’t know,” is one of the rules which Oliver Rackham, the British forest historian, proposes in his provocative manner for historians of the environment.¹ I will try to heed this advice. Therefore, as I set out ten theses, they should be understood as cautious hypotheses about some open questions. My subject, the problem of Europe’s special path (*Sonderweg*) in environmental history, appears rather ambitious; it is difficult to grasp. Moreover, the comparison between Europe, the New World, and the Third World is burdened with prejudices. By analyzing questions of this kind, one is moving on shaky ground. It is not even certain whether Europe as a whole is an appropriate unit for environmental history because in several respects the Mediterranean is a region of its own which has had characteristic environmental problems throughout its history.

In this paper, “Europe” means first and foremost Western and Central Europe, the earliest centers of industrial development. In what sense Mediterranean Europe, too, belongs to my concept of Europe or whether the whole Mediterranean should be understood as a particular environmental region remains an open question. My paper seeks to examine the connection between environmental conditions and the industrial revolution. In general, I have the impression that Western and Central Europe since medieval times can indeed be considered an environmental unit in some important respects.

But, to be sure, in many other respects the units of environmental history are much smaller, and the progress of knowledge depends on field research in these small areas. Large-scale overviews always run the risk of constructing history out of preconceived assumptions, not solid research. On the other hand, mere field studies are frequently not able to identify the truly distinctive traits of a specific region, as the comparison with other regions is missing. Important particularities of European environmental history have not been adequately recognized because of the lack of comparison with non-European regions. Reading recent works on American, Indian, or Chinese environmental history, one gets surprising insights into characteristically European features of the relationship be-

tween man and nature. Therefore, a worldwide comparison can be justified because of the services it offers to regional research.²

1. A Plea for Caution in Regard to the Spiritual Approach

In his Christmas lecture in 1966, which became the starting point and a sort of holy text for environmental history, Lynn White Jr. assigned the Judeo-Christian religion a prominent place among the “historical roots of our environmental crisis.” “Especially in its Western form,” he declared, “Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen. . . . Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and Asia’s religions . . . not only established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that it is God’s will that man exploit nature for its proper ends.” Modern science and technology, the immediate causes of modern alienation from nature, have—in the words of Lynn White—“grown out of Christian attitudes toward man’s relations to nature.”³ This statement has deeply influenced the environmentalists’ view of Western civilization in comparison with the old civilizations of the East. The history of religion and of spiritual movements seemed to be the royal road to writing environmental history in a world-wide perspective and overcoming the immense complexity of the material world.

Eugen Drewermann, a popular German ex-priest, presented a similar view in his German bestseller, *Der tödliche Fortschritt—Von der Zerstörung der Erde und des Menschen im Erbe des Christentums* (Deadly Progress—On the Destruction of Earth and Mankind within the Christian Heritage). “The religion of Israel,” he states, “has remained, after all, a desert religion which . . . has never been able to perceive the earth as good-natured and warm like a Great Mother.”⁴ The recent cultural turn within the social sciences seems to have endowed the spiritual approach with a new attractiveness in environmental matters as well.⁵ But this might in the end turn out to be a blind alley. I fear it is an illusion to believe that the history of religion offers a clear and simple structure for a world history of the relationship between humankind and nature. Religion is not an autonomous force in history. In this regard, historians have much to learn from the writings of Clifford Geertz. In a comparison of the cultural appearance of the Islamic religion in Morocco and Indonesia, Geertz discovered fundamental differences that stood in connection with ecological contrasts. “Intensive, extremely productive wet rice cultivation has provided the main economic foundation” of the culture of Java, he writes; “and rather than the restless, aggressive, extroverted (Moroccan) sheikh husbanding his resources . . . , the national archetype is the settled, industrious, rather inward plowman of twenty centuries, nursing his terrace. . . . In Morocco civilization was built on nerve; in Indonesia, on diligence.”⁶

Elsewhere he warns of drawing direct conclusions about everyday behavior from religious ideas: "But no one, not even a saint, lives in the world religious symbols formulate all of the time, and the majority of men live in it only at moments."⁷

To be sure, religion is no trifling matter in environmental history. But it makes little sense to tear some seemingly environmentalist elements of religion, such as "Mother Earth," out of the greater context. The meaning of religion for the practical relationship between man and nature can only be discovered by analyzing everyday religious culture, not merely by contemplating its basic religious ideas. In this way, the imagined contrast of "East" and "West" becomes blurred; a much more complicated picture emerges instead.

The "dominium terrae" ("Subdue the Earth!") commandment of the Judeo-Christian god has had no clear practical meaning throughout history, contrary to the opinion of some environmental historians. In early modern times a human responsibility for nature and the duty of animal protection was deduced from this commandment, which was understood within its biblical context. Did Christianity remain a desert religion in the agrarian West? Certainly not, if one looks not only at the Bible, but also at popular religion, at the stories of the saints, the festivals of the church. Everywhere, one finds traces of the traditional agrarian world. And it is hardly a coincidence that on the whole, modern environmentalism is most widespread in Protestant countries.

On the other hand, were the great Eastern religions really non-anthropocentric? Did they really promote a brotherly relationship toward nature?⁸ Herbert Franke, one of the leading German historians of China, made statements of this kind about Chinese religious and spiritual traditions; but this view has been vigorously attacked by Gudula Linck. "Yin and Yang—forget it." According to Linck, the old Chinese veneration of unspoiled nature was not a mirror of reality, but a resigned sigh from isolated individuals who retired from public life.⁹ Above all, the publications of Mark Elvin have debunked the myth of Chinese harmony with nature through the millennia.¹⁰

The widespread belief among environmentalists that rescue will come from non-Western cultures is not well-founded. It is quite easy to find overwhelming evidence for an anthropocentric attitude toward nature not only in the history of the West, but in the history of the East as well. It is not here that we find the key to the unique European path in environmental history. To be sure, this is not to say: "Forget religion as a driving force in environmental history!" Perhaps we need a new Max Weber to discover intimate links between Protestantism and modern environmentalism. But even between Protestant Europe and Protestant America there exist remarkable differences in environmental history.

2. Outlines of an Institutional Approach to Environmental History

If we look at institutional aspects of environmental history, we arrive on more solid ground.¹¹ In this context, I conceive the term “institution” in the broad sense of the institutional school of economics; as comprising not only administrative bodies and established organizations, but also rules and customs fixed for a long time. My basic philosophy is very simple: It is not ideas and individual actions that are of decisive importance in the evolution of the human treatment of nature, but rather the lasting patterns of everyday collective behavior and the institutions that generate and perpetuate those patterns.

I would argue that on this level, a distinctive European path can be recognized most clearly and concretely, though some open questions will remain. The management of environmental problems in Europe has been deeply influenced over the centuries by old European traditions of *Verrechtlichung*—regulation by law—dating back to Roman times. In the pluralistic European political tradition, where different sources of law always existed, law has frequently been a subject of discussion and controversy. Law was not only imposed by an omnipotent ruler, but was also conceived as something an individual could use to fight against the ruler. For over five hundred years, the forest communities (*Markgenossenschaften*) of the Tyrolean peasants instituted legal proceedings against the Habsburg government in order to preserve their *jus regulandi silvas*; and in the end, in 1847, they won.¹² I have the impression that it would be difficult to discover similar stories in other regions of the world—it seems that there was not even the hint of such stories. The basic conditions of environmental history have been deeply imprinted by this long-time process of legal regulation.

One could propose a hypothesis that contradicts this finding: Are institutions of this kind really so important for the treatment of nature in the course of history? Did the really decisive things not happen on a level below these institutions, on the level of the domestic economy? There is some truth in this view. Until the nineteenth, even twentieth century, the basic units of environmental behavior in most regions of the world were very small: the family, the house, the farm, the neighborhood. Until modern times, the environmental advantage gained by European traditions of legal regulation was probably not very considerable. But at least since the eighteenth century, it has been growing along with the increasing complexity of environmental problems that could no longer be regulated sufficiently within the framework of a domestic economy. The sound management of woodlands, of water resources, of pasture, and of urban problems demanded more and more institutional regulation.

In this context, we should take notice of another important point: The growth of effective institutions which are founded upon everyday behavior needs a lot of time; it cannot happen as a quick reaction to a sudden state of emergency. In the leading European countries, industrialization was—at least in comparison with the rest of the world—a relatively slow process that lasted several generations. Therefore, Europe had a better chance than many other regions of the world to build institutions that acted as a certain counterbalance against the negative side effects of industrialization.

Perhaps the greatest achievement of research on environmental history so far has been the rediscovery of the immense number of environmental conflicts in the urban regions during the period of early industrialization in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At least in Germany, the most impressive research has mainly been done in this area.¹³ But on the whole, the results are highly ambiguous. On the one hand, the reader is impressed by the broad scope of early environmentalist concern; on the other hand, one may be irritated by the lack of immediate and effective action against the obvious pollution of the environment. An institutionalist approach would probably be fruitful here and help advance discussion. Instead of asking the question “Was environmental protest successful or not?” one might ask: “In what way were institutions of environmental management influenced or shaped by this protest?” In this way, environmental history need not remain an endless lament. Repeated environmental protest has frequently had an institutional effect in the long run. Sometimes, the most difficult problems are not the lack of any practical measures, but the new environmental issues created by certain kinds of temporarily successful environmental management, for instance by waterworks, organized reforestation, major projects for cleaning up the cities, or nuclear energy as a remedy for the depletion of limited fossil energy resources.

The most important European success story told by the institutionalist school of economic history is the development of reliable property rights, but it is not certain whether the rise of private property was a success story in environmental history. In the era of subsistence economy, well-established property and inheritance rights may have been the best way to conserve the fertility of the soil. But under the conditions of unlimited and worldwide capitalist dynamism, unrestricted private property rights tend to become an environmental risk. Thus, the European path has definite drawbacks: even institutions that have been rather successful for a long time may become detrimental under changed conditions. Today, African agrarian scientists are complaining about the hypertrophy of private property rights in the European legal tradition: “Traditional legal doctrine sanctifies the property rights of the individual

against the state, but perceives hardly any objection to the individuals appropriating more and more property rights at the expense of the public's larger interest in environmental resources as the common property of all."¹⁴

Yet it seems that the emphasis on private property rights is not the whole European tradition. The development of certain kinds of collective loyalties belongs to the European heritage as well, though it is difficult to say whether they are particularly European. Above all, the nation-state has been an invention with far-reaching environmental consequences. Environmental history as a whole is always much more than environmental history in the narrow sense of the word.

3. Balance and Imbalance Between Field and Pasture

For the biologist, there is a clear and simple natural foundation of Eurasian superiority: the domestication of big mammals, especially cattle and horses.¹⁵ This success alone does not explain European superiority over the Asian civilizations, from where most European domesticated animals originated. But Eric L. Jones is probably right that in early modern times there was already a quantitative European advantage in regard to large animals. "Europeans commanded more working capital per head than Asians, mainly in the form of livestock. . . . They brought more draught animals to bear on their fields than the Chinese and stronger, better-fed ones than the Indians."¹⁶ Long before the industrial revolution, the peoples of Western and Central Europe—of "carnivorous Europe"—probably had more sources of energy and calories available to them than most Asians, if we disregard nomadic peoples. This holds true for water power, too, if we think of the multitude of rivers that were water-bearing year-round, which were the driving force of the tens of thousands of water mills that were a distinctive trait of Central and Western European development and landscape since medieval times. Therefore, the origins of Europe's special path in environmental history as well as in the history of technology can be traced far back into premodern times.

The use of large mammals for cavalry and the deep plough certainly gave Europeans a military and economic advantage, but did it stabilize the agrarian ecosystem? A pastoral economy frequently leads to overgrazing and the destruction of woodlands. In many regions of the world there is an ancient tension between peasants and herdsmen, especially in the Asian regions that suffered from nomadic invasions. But even in European history there are many instances of hostility between agricultural and pastoral cultures. Most famous is the case of the Spanish Mesta, the powerful shepherds' organization that invaded the fields by means of royal privileges and neglected the interests of the peasantry. In the view

of Douglass C. North and Robert P. Thomas, both pioneers of the institutionalist school of economics, the Mesta is the striking negative proof of the power of institutions in the course of economic history.¹⁷ Whether the Mesta had a similarly detrimental effect on the environment is not certain. Modern Spanish environmentalists are becoming enthusiastic about the biodiversity upon the *camínadas*, the old paths of transhumance.

Be that as it may, compared with the Mediterranean and with many other regions of the world, Western and Central Europe are, on the whole, characterized by relatively successful combinations of farming and herding, and that means by a relatively well-organized material flux in agriculture combined with high ecological reserves. To be sure, the balance was frequently far from perfect, but up to the nineteenth century, this balance tended to improve. This equilibrium was of decisive importance for the improvement of agricultural sustainability because prior to the introduction of chemical fertilizers, the conservation of the fertility of the soil depended on the use of animal manure. In this regard, there were significant differences between many regions of the world. This is a subject that deserves the special attention of environmental historians. With respect to manuring practices, there was even a striking contrast between the old agricultural regions of Europe and most Yankee farms in North America, which exploited the abundance of land without much care for maintaining fertility. European peasants had known since medieval times that they inhabited an area of limited resources.

The balance between field and pasture depended on institutions: the three year crop rotation system, the wood and pasture commons (*Allmende*), and contracts between peasants and pastoralists. For this reason, an institutional approach might be fruitful in analyzing the ecology of traditional agriculture as well. Nowadays, institutions of this kind are lacking. The old principle of balance between agriculture and pastoralism has been forgotten. Today, in the era of chemical fertilizers and highly specialized agriculture, the awareness of one of the most important elements of ecological stability in human existence has nearly disappeared.

4. The Western European Marriage Pattern

There is a widespread and well-founded opinion that overpopulation and population pressure on resources—sometimes abbreviated as PPR—is the most important environmental stress coefficient in history. This view has not remained unchallenged. The main counterargument notes that “overpopulation” is an inexact term susceptible to ideology, that the most densely populated countries are in many cases the wealthiest ones, and that population growth frequently enforces several forms of intense agriculture that are more sustainable than the old slash-and-burn econo-

mies. There is some truth in this counterargument. Environmental history cannot be reduced to mere demographic history. Chinese wet rice agriculture offers the best known example of population growth creating an economy with relatively high ecological stability. But Chinese history also offers impressive evidence that an agricultural system that encourages unlimited population growth carries a great ecological risk in the long run.

What are the characteristics of European reproductive behavior in comparison with other cultures? To be sure, there is no simple answer that does justice to all regions and historical periods. In his famous work, *Les paysans de Languedoc*, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie describes how the peasants of southern France repeatedly stumbled into the Malthusian trap of overpopulation and famine during medieval and early modern times. But in Western Europe, bad experiences of this kind ultimately contributed to a learning process. From the Middle Ages on, there was a peasant maxim, "No land, no marriage."¹⁸ This maxim did not limit the number of children within marriage, but in the course of centuries, clear signs of fertility control emerged.

The question whether the story of birth control is a happy story of sexual know-how or a sad story of infanticide and sexual repression is one of the great unsolved mysteries of history. Be this as it may, this story exists. David Grigg remarks that "the seventeenth century is of greatest importance for the widening of the demographic options." "In the first place . . . , it saw the appearance of the West European pattern of late marriage and a comparatively high proportion [of] unmarried [people]."¹⁹ And this is not the end of the story. Fernand Braudel observes about eighteenth-century France: "Contraception by coitus interruptus is spreading like an infectious disease and is gaining more and more adherents."²⁰ It is curious to see how this famous historian disapproved of the environmental wisdom of his own people in this regard. At the end of the nineteenth century, doctors warned that coitus interruptus might lead to physical or mental illnesses. But a German farmer coolly replied: "I don't believe that. Otherwise everybody would be sick."²¹

It is an interesting problem whether reproductive patterns of this kind can be explained by the institutional approach. From the eighteenth century until today, the state and its institutions have frequently favored population growth and opposed contraception and other birth control practices. It was society that tacitly but stubbornly resisted the political encouragement of population growth. Sometimes, historians should look for a tacit environmental reason by reading between the lines of the sources and for informal institutions of society independent from government policy. The hidden passive reserves left over by birth control probably have been (and are) one of the most important elements of

ecological stability in the past and the present. The precarious environmental situation of a country like China at least since the eighteenth century seems to demonstrate the dilemma of a land which has lost a great deal of its soil reserves.

5. Continuity, Sustainability, and Self-Sufficiency

Donald Worster has declared that he is deeply skeptical of the term “sustainable development,” which the 1992 Rio Conference named as the supreme environmentalist goal for the world economy. Worster dislikes this term in politics as well as in environmental history because he suspects that “sustainability” is simply a catchword designed to justify the unrestrained exploitation of nature. From his point of view, the preservation of untouched nature is a better goal than “sustainable development.”²² It is easy to understand his skepticism when one bears in mind the American experience in which sustainable development has never been a historical reality over a longer period. However, for an analysis of the environmental history of Europe, the criterion “sustainability” makes more sense. If there is a continuity of villages, towns, and institutions over a long period combined with a sedentary mentality as it existed in many parts of Europe—but also, to be sure, in Asian regions—then a history of sustainability can make sense. And the chances of a genuine sustainable management of resources are greater when there is a high degree of local self-sufficiency and limited dependence on external forces. It seems that many parts of Europe were characterized since medieval times—if not since antiquity—by a relatively high degree of continuity and local and regional autonomy.²³ When reading the famous stories of the rise of European commerce, one should not forget that most European regions lived mainly on their domestic resources until the nineteenth or even twentieth centuries. This self-sufficiency applied at least to the most important resources, grain and firewood.

The traditional German term for “sustainability,” *Nachhaltigkeit*, stems from forestry; in this area, it comprises a history of several hundred years—to be sure, a history which reveals much of the ambiguity and the manipulative possibilities of that concept.²⁴ But there is no better alternative even today.

It is significant that the goal of *Nachhaltigkeit* has a peculiarly long tradition in some Central European saline forests. As early as 1661, the chancellor of Reichenhall, an old Bavarian salt-works city, stated: “God created the woodlands for the salt-water spring, in order that the woodlands might continue eternally like the spring. Accordingly shall the men behave: They shall not cut down the old trees before the young trees have grown up.”²⁵ In these words, sustainability appears as a secular form of

eternity that endows human things with an affinity to God. The condition for this kind of sustainability was the autonomous saline town, which needed huge masses of wood, which lived on its own forest resources, and which was accustomed to having salt-works running constantly over many centuries. In many mining towns there was no such spirit of sustainability because of the violent ups and downs of the mines.

The interior regions of Asia raise the interesting question of whether there is perhaps a different type of sustainability, a sustainability connected with discontinuity and mobility—a nomadic type of sustainability. Under the conditions of many steppe regions, settlement leads eventually to overgrazing and to desertification. The question of whether the nomadic economy is sustainable or not is still controversial, all the more so since it has political consequences for the treatment of nomadic tribes.²⁶ A definitive and general answer is not possible. One should probably distinguish between planned and inherent sustainability. The latter was as a rule more typical of traditional societies than the former. But there seems to be growing evidence that nomadic peoples not only adapted themselves to the conditions of the steppe, but, to a certain degree, *created* the steppe by the destruction of woodlands and sometimes even of agriculture. Surely, many nomads had a kind of soil awareness, but they had no methods for improving the soil, and they defined their status by the possession of livestock, not of land. At least under modern conditions, it seems that the future belongs to the sustainability of the sedentary peasant, not to that of the nomad.

6. Forest and Power

Especially for the last decade, we have become remarkably well informed about many chapters of East and South Asian environmental history. Just take the two well-done, recently published anthologies on China and India/Southeast Asia, both products of cooperation between Western and Asian scholars: *Sediments of Time* and *Nature and the Orient*.²⁷ These are based on extensive regional research, most of which has been little known in Europe up until now. Because of this new abundance of information, a comprehensive comparison between “East” and “West” in environmental matters has become much more complicated than at the time of Lynn White’s Christmas speech in 1966, and whoever studies this new mass of literature may doubt whether a well-founded comparison will be at all feasible in the future. But in the end, one point seems to be even clearer than before: With regard to the institutional treatment of forests, there has been—for at least five hundred years—a fundamental difference between China and India on the one hand and Western and Central Europe on the other. Since the late Middle Ages the protection of forests

has been a manifestation of political power in Europe; in Asia, however, it has not. One would hardly expect that the environmental history of the world contains major features which are so distinctive, but as far as I can see, the evidence is overwhelming.

One may also find a love of trees in ancient Chinese literature, and certain traditions of forest protection existed in China, too. Nicholas K. Menzies has investigated these traditions: the imperial hunting reserves, the Buddhist temple and monastic forests, the Cunninghamia groves of some peasant communities, among others. But on the whole it remains clear that these examples were exceptional. "The trend of government policy during the late Imperial period was to open land for settlement and to permanent agriculture, not to exclude the population." Therefore, "administrative authority was rarely exercised to reserve forested land as government property," as was the case with many European governments.²⁸ Not the conservation of forests, but the clearing of forests was a manifestation of power in Asian cultures. "Traditional Chinese thought exhibited a definite bias against forests and the cultivation of trees," observes Eduard B. Vermeer. "Forest areas were seen as hideouts for bandits and rebels, beyond the reach of government authority, where uncivilized people lived their wretched lives without observing the rules of property. In this view, the clearance of forests and agricultural reclamation brought safety and political and cultural progress."²⁹ Although this attitude was widespread in Europe too, since late medieval times it stood in competition with a better appreciation of the forests.

In India, traditions of forest protection may have been somewhat better developed than in China; but on the whole, the situation seems to have been similar. It is true that an anthology on Indian forest history starts with the forest protection edict of the Mahrat King Shivaji of about 1670 A. D.: ". . . The mango and jack trees in our own kingdom are of value to the Navy. But these must never be touched. This is because these trees cannot be grown in a year or two. Our people have nurtured them like their own children over long periods. If they are cut, their sorrow would know no bounds."³⁰ But in all the literature so far available, this edict appears rather unique. Apart from the Indian tradition of cultivating mango and other fruit trees, the edict does not refer to any institutional traditions of forest protection. Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, the authors of an "ecological history of India," praise the alleged traditional Indian harmony with nature, but they, too, do not present any sources on forest protection in pre-colonial India.³¹ (Or do these sources exist in the archives of the Mughal period, but written in old Persian which most Indian historians do not read?) The contrast to the immense mass of forest protection documents in Central and Western Europe from the sixteenth century on could hardly be sharper.

The causes are manifold. Often the royal passion for hunting is said to have been the main motivation for European forest protection. But I believe that the high value of the woodlands for pasture—which lasted from prehistoric times until the nineteenth century—might be even more important. Here again, livestock seems to be at the core of the problem. For governments, shipbuilding was, as a rule, the primary interest that made forest protection a matter of utmost priority, whether in sixteenth-century Venice, in medieval Portugal, in Colbert's France or in John Evelyn's England. (Even in early Ming China, the building of a fleet gave a uniquely strong though transitory impetus to a gigantic reforestation project.³²) Another strong force for institutional control of woodcutting came from the mining interests, as long as wood and charcoal were the energy base of mining and smelting. The peasants have frequently been charged with being the enemies of the forest; but this accusation was a one-sided evaluation from the perspective of governmental forestry. The peasants had their own woodlands for pasture, firewood, and building, woodlands which from the forester's viewpoint might have been of inferior quality, but were superior in regard to biodiversity.³³

My argument can be challenged with the question whether the sharp institutional contrast between East and West in the treatment of forests truly corresponds to a contrast in actual practice. Was it really the forest laws and forest administrations that protected the woodlands rather than unwritten customs and the interests of the people? I admit this is a difficult problem still full of open questions. Many historians of forests frequently give the impression that the true history of forest laws is the history of the violation of these laws. Forest history often has been written as the history of forest destruction, at least before the great reforestation movement of the nineteenth century.

In my earlier work, I have repeatedly discussed this pessimistic kind of premodern forest history. It is a complicated matter, and a general evaluation is hardly possible. But in any case, there are good reasons to be cautious with many forest destruction stories in Europe.³⁴ Oliver Rackham has repeatedly ridiculed these stories, remarking that the deforestation storytellers forgot the simple fact "that trees grow again."³⁵ At least in most Western and Central European regions the forest easily regenerates itself even without artificial reforestation; limiting the human use of the forest is enough. Under conditions of this kind, governmental forest protection could succeed with relative ease. The European tradition of institutionalized forest protection was surely favored by European ecology. But the decisive point was probably the fact that in spite of innumerable forest conflicts between government and peasants or other forest users, there was to a certain degree a common interest in the conservation

of the forests and—withstanding countless violations—a certain acceptance of the regulation of forest use in principle, if not in every case.

7. The Advantage of European Polycentrism

In the course of the present process of European unification, much hope is frequently placed in common European environmental policies. But even today, we often have to recognize that really effective environmental policies are usually best achieved within small nations like Denmark or the Netherlands. An effective consensus is best reached where society is relatively homogeneous and communication is not too complicated. The opinion that problems will be solved by European integration might therefore turn out to be a fundamental error. In the past, European polycentrism appears to have had considerable advantages in regard to the handling of environmental issues. The peculiar European process of legal regulation (*Verrechtlichung*) is conditioned by this polycentrism where every authority needs legitimation by law. Where, on the contrary, there is only one single authority far and wide, there is no strong pressure for legitimation, and no legal advantage can be obtained by individual engagement.

Even more important is another point. Effective environmental management can only be achieved by institutions that are not too far away from the site where action is demanded. Forest and water management—the two classic areas of governmental intervention in environmental matters—both present numerous historical examples of the advantage of tackling problems from nearby, not from a far-away capital. Even if the Chinese Emperor had been determined to protect the forests, he would not have been able to do so effectively because an appropriate forest policy can be organized only on a regional level, not on the level of a huge empire. In this regard, a comparison between China and Japan is instructive. Even though in Japanese cultural tradition a high estimation of woodlands does not seem to be more deeply rooted than in Chinese tradition, for strictly practical reasons Japanese institutions started a forest protection policy with remarkable effectiveness in the course of the eighteenth century.³⁶

In Europe, a comparison between France and Germany is informative. Under the strong administration of Colbert and his *grande ordonnance forestière* of 1669—Colbert even warned: “France will perish from lack of wood!”—France gained European leadership in forest policy, which it held throughout the eighteenth century. But in the long run, the French centralist system was not well adapted to forest problems. At the end of the eighteenth century, German states took the leadership in forestry.³⁷ This success was conditioned by German political polycentrism. In vari-

ous German states a plurality of regional approaches to forestry arose. It was the only way to obtain real practical progress. German nationalists complained about German particularism (*Zersplitterung*), but Wilhelm Pfeil (1783–1859), a leading Prussian teacher of forestry, emphasized that German scientific forestry was—in contrast to French forestry—“exclusively the product of the German partition into different countries.”³⁸ In this way, the rigid Prussian dogmatism of Hartig’s forestry rules was counterbalanced by other forestry schools that came out of the mixed forests of middle and southwest Germany.

The lessons of forest history could probably be transmitted to other areas of environmental policy. Consequently, one can doubt whether it is wise at the present time for many environmentalists to adopt the current “globalization” rhetoric, though it partly descended from the rhetoric of global ecological problems. There are indeed connections between environmentalism and “globalization.” The *causes* of many environmental problems have analogous structures all over the world, but the *solutions* frequently demand much local knowledge and appropriate regional methods.

8. A Green Revival of Wittfogel’s “Asiatic Mode of Production”

The theory of the “Asiatic mode of production,” also known as “Oriental despotism,” is thought-provoking, but does not have the best reputation. It was worked out by Karl August Wittfogel (1896–1988), who started as a German communist and finished as an American anti-communist, and the development of his theory was influenced by the great change in his life and outlook. Initially, it was an endeavor to apply Marxism to the history of non-European civilizations that produced neither feudalism nor capitalism; later on, it was used by Wittfogel as a weapon in the Cold War. The core of the theory is the following argument: Everywhere in the world where agriculture needs artificial irrigation on a large scale, there is little room for individual producers and a strong tendency toward bureaucratic centralism.³⁹ Wittfogel’s theory presented a political economy of totalitarian bureaucracy. At the same time, it offered an explanation for the fundamental difference between Western and non-European cultures. It is interesting to note that Douglass C. North adopted the Wittfogel theory as an impressive example of an institutional approach to economics, arguing that in this case economic institutions are generated by nature: “Wittfogel’s hydraulic society was in effect a natural monopoly, with economies of scale derived from the indivisibility of an integrated water system.”⁴⁰

In reality, however, the relationship between nature and institutions seems to be more complicated. For a long time, there has been a well-founded counterargument to Wittfogel. In most cases, even in India and China, irrigation can be managed on a local level. Natural conditions and the mode of production alone do not really enforce a central bureaucracy. The "Asiatic mode of production" is not based on simple natural causality.

Despite this argument, the problem is not yet settled. As Mark Elvin wrote to me: "[Wittfogel's] ghost cannot be exorcized." Undoubtedly, there is a historical connection between irrigation and power, though it does not consist of a simple causality. Arid regions did not, to be sure, create the *necessity* for establishing a central bureaucracy, but they did create the *possibility* for one. Even if local irrigation was sufficient, improved irrigation on a major scale could multiply the agricultural product. Central power was not enforced by natural conditions, but it could make itself indispensable through ambitious irrigation projects: through the building of waterworks as well as the subsequent demand for regulation; and, last but not least, through the demands of crisis management, because larger irrigation projects generated great risks. Big dams increased the risk of catastrophic floods if the dams failed at only one single point or if the masses of water became too powerful. Waterworks have to be supervised and repaired continuously in order to operate well. Drainage is as important as irrigation itself in order to avoid salinization and the spread of swamps and malaria. The central bureaucracies often legitimated themselves through the problems of big waterworks, but in the long run they were not able to solve these problems in an effective way. In Chinese imperial myth, the Emperor was the savior in the face of the big floods, but catastrophic floods recurred again and again. The inherent contradiction of the Asiatic mode of production originates from ecology, not so much from economy.

As a rule, it is difficult to isolate ecological causes in history, as they usually interact and work together with other forces. Peter Christensen summarizes the medieval downfall of Mesopotamia as follows: Plague and epidemic diseases made "visible the inherent environmental instability which I believe was the key factor in the decline of Mesopotamia. The large-scale colonization and expansion in Parthian and Sassanian times had created an ecological system extremely sensitive to the smallest disturbances."⁴¹ But one should not forget that over a long period, irrigation systems offered a kind of stability by making peasants independent from the vagaries of the weather to a certain degree. The claim advanced by Clive Ponting and others that already the Sumerians had committed ecological suicide by irrigation with subsequent salinization does not correspond with the millenia of flourishing agriculture in Mes-

opotamia.⁴² The extensive irrigation networks contained problems similar to modern industrial systems. For a long time one is mainly aware of the advantages, while the full extent of the ecological trap becomes obvious only much later.

It seems that one characteristic feature of European environmental history is the absence of large-scale systems of field irrigation (not of small-scale systems of meadow irrigation). Eric L. Jones believes that this absence proved to be an advantage in the end. "The very impracticability of hydraulic agriculture freed a fraction of European energies for other purposes. The rainfall farmers of Europe might be fewer in number than the farmers of China and India, but the former spent less time on all aspects of farmwork than the latter spent on water control work alone."⁴³ In the long run, the lack of major irrigation was an element of ecological stability and likewise of individual autonomy. It is an irony of history—as Marc Reisner has pointed out⁴⁴—that in large parts of the arid American West, "Asiatic" conditions have emerged in the course of the twentieth century: a kind of agriculture totally dependent upon large irrigation networks which means dependence on governmental subsidies and threat of desertification. Reisner predicts that the agriculture of Arizona and California will have a fate similar to that of the agriculture of Mesopotamia. Under these conditions, the term "sustainable development" makes no sense.

9. Environmental Repercussions of European Colonialism

As to the ecological aspects of colonialism, we have two great works which have gained worldwide attention: Alfred W. Crosby's *Ecological Imperialism* and Richard H. Grove's *Green Imperialism*. Today, colonialism is one of the most discussed subjects in international environmental history. Nevertheless, the significance of colonial expansion for environmental developments in Europe has remained a neglected problem. Reading Crosby, one gets the impression that imperialism has been an ecological success story, at least from the European point of view. But Crosby does not tell the whole story. Europe not only colonized the New World with grain, cattle, and sheep, but was itself colonized with the potato, maize, and not least by the phylloxera which destroyed traditional European viticulture. The potato encouraged strong population growth and undermined European traditions of birth control which were weakened, too, by the chance to emigrate to America. Maize increased soil erosion and did not fit into the traditional crop rotation systems. Therefore, it seems that European ecology was not stabilized, but in some ways disturbed by colonialism.

Richard H. Grove discovered a lot of surprising indications that point to colonial origins of modern environmentalism. Is colonial history after all, at least seen from the environmentalist standpoint, a story with a happy ending? Considerable doubts remain. The history of ideas presented by Grove is not identical with a history of actions and real effects. But even the history of ideas seems to be ambiguous. If one carefully scrutinizes several important points in Grove's argument, one repeatedly discovers that the true origin of colonial environmental awareness lay in Europe, not in the colonies. Poivre looked at Asian agriculture with the eyes of a French physiocrat. Alexander von Humboldt's deforestation concerns presumably originated in his German homeland, where fears of that kind had become a real mass psychosis at the end of the eighteenth century.⁴⁵ In the spring of 1790, young Humboldt undertook a journey on the Rhine together with Georg Forster, then a famous world traveler. Forster's report contains long reflections on the imminent danger of wood shortage, which might cause northern peoples in the end to emigrate to the south.⁴⁶ In a recent publication, Grove himself has pointed out that Hugh Cleghorn, one of the founding fathers of Indian forestry, and several other pioneers of colonial environmentalism were influenced by their Scottish background, by the experience of a country "already made barren by the evils of the English."⁴⁷ The criticism of the ruthless soil exhaustion caused by North American farmers was inspired by the pattern of traditional European agriculture and the European agrarian reforms of the late eighteenth century.⁴⁸

On the whole, the effects of colonialism on the European environment do not appear to be fortunate. The following effect can be identified most clearly: The lack of a durable tradition of forest protection in leading colonial powers like Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and even Denmark is apparently conditioned by the ease with which these countries were able to import masses of timber from their colonies or other regions of the world. In contrast, the German states developed scientific forestry at a time when Germany had no colonies and was forced to live on its own wood resources. Furthermore, the omnipotence of the Mesta in Spain during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is connected with the rise of Spanish colonialism. As for England, the mass import of Peruvian guano in the nineteenth century thwarted the efforts of agrarian reformers to improve the inherent sustainability of agriculture. The colonial world trade threatened the traditional European balance between field and pasture and nurtured the illusion of unlimited resources. The full consequences of this development, however, belong to the postcolonial period, which probably experienced the deepest ecological change in history.

10. A “European Miracle” in Environmental History?

In contrast to the pessimistic view of European culture that prevails in the spiritual approach to environmental history mentioned at the beginning, the institutional approach seems to present a European success story similar to the one told by Eric L. Jones in his *European Miracle*. But I fear this is not the end of history. In spite of all the achievements of environmental policies, there are no true grounds for optimism. Human institutions, even if they are effective, are never fully adapted to the complexity of environmental problems. One of the most impressive lessons of history has always been the insight that this very success may become the cause of decline in the long run.

To be sure, it was the relatively stable ecological conditions of Western and Central European soil and the relatively effective institutions of the countries in these regions that made the rise of industrial civilization possible. Only a region with rich wood and water resources and—at least to a certain extent—sustainable methods of forest utilization was able to enter a path of unlimited growth in energy-intensive industries with high water consumption. Coal did not start the industrial revolution. The pit-coal only carried on a development which had begun on the basis of charcoal and wood. Moreover, only countries with effective urban and national institutions capable of overcoming at least the worst damages caused by industry were able to make industrial development a self-sustaining and popular process. But sustainability remains an illusion in an economy that annually consumes the fossil resources that have grown over a period of a million years. Since the European path is marked by exceptional characteristics, it cannot become the model for the whole world. In some respects, it may not even be an appropriate model for the European future. Moreover, a part of the traditional foundations of European ecological stability, for instance the old combination of agriculture and animal husbandry, has been overtaken by modern developments. The stability of deep European soils is threatened by growing acidification, especially during the last decades.

Perhaps we should learn the lesson of Chinese environmental history, which is far better documented than any other non-European history. Mark Elvin described the history of the Chinese Empire as “three thousand years of unsustainable growth.”⁴⁹ Perhaps he goes too far in this harsh evaluation. The great anthology co-edited by Elvin, *Sediments of Time*, suggests that the environmental decline of China is fully documented only for the last three *hundred* years. Based on the present state of research, I prefer an interpretation of Chinese history which differs a little from Elvin’s. It seems to me that for many centuries, Chinese agriculture did indeed embody a high degree of ecological stability. This stability

was founded mainly on three elements: (1) the wet rice cultivation that in its traditional form needed little or no manure; (2) the highly elaborated system of terraces that stopped soil erosion; (3) the systematic use of “night soil,” of human excrement, for fertilization.

It was mainly the last point for which Justus von Liebig, the great chemist, praised the Chinese for being the wisest people on earth, because they gave back to the soil all they had taken away from it.⁵⁰ I presume that for a long time, a high degree of inherent sustainability did indeed exist in Chinese agriculture and may partly explain Chinese cultural continuity over the millennia. But it was precisely this stability that encouraged continuous population growth and concealed the elements of unsustainability: population pressure, deforestation, erosion, in marginal regions even desertification and, above all, the growing loss of ecological reserves. The environmental crisis of China might foreshadow the environmental crisis of Western civilization: a crisis aggravated precisely by its long-term success.

Notes

¹ Oliver Rackham, “The Countryside: History & Pseudo-History,” in *The Historian* 14 (1987): 16.

² This paper is based upon my *Natur und Macht—Eine Weltgeschichte der Umwelt* (Munich, 2000); enlarged paperback edition 2002.

³ Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” in *Science* 155, no. 3767 (March 1967): 1205ff. With a similar tendency, Rolf Peter Sieferle, “Europäische Traditionen im Umgang mit der Natur,” in *Europas Kulturen und ihr Umgang mit der Natur*, Mainauer Gespräche, vol. 14 (Insel Mainau, 1999), 17.

⁴ Eugen Drewermann, *Der tödliche Fortschritt*, 5th ed. (Freiburg, 1991), 73.

⁵ See, for instance, several contributions to *Europas Kulturen und ihr Umgang mit der Natur*, Mainauer Gespräche, vol. 14 (Insel Mainau, 1999).

⁶ Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (Chicago, 1971), 9ff.

⁷ Clifford Geertz, *Dichte Beschreibung: Beiträge zum Verstehen kultureller Systeme* (Frankfurt, 1995), 86.

⁸ Tenzin Choegyal, the junior brother of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, when asked by the author about environmentalist elements in Buddhism, emphasized that the aim of Buddhism is *not* human unification with nature, but on the contrary human deliverance from the material world! Peter Gerlitz, *Mensch und Natur in den Weltreligionen* (Darmstadt, 1998), arrives at a similar result for world religions in general.

⁹ Herbert Franke, “Geschichte und Natur—Betrachtungen eines Asien-Historikers,” in *Natur und Geschichte*, ed. Hubert Markl, (Munich, 1983), 51–69; Gudula Linck, “Die Welt ist ein heiliges Gefäß, wer sich daran zu schaffen macht, wird Niederlagen erleiden—Konfliktaustragung an der Natur während der Umbrüche in der chinesischen Geschichte,” in *Mensch und Umwelt in der Geschichte*, ed. Jörg Calließ et al., (Pfaffenweiler, 1989), 327–351.

¹⁰ See note 49; Mark Elvin, “The Environmental History of China: An Agenda of Ideas,” in *Asian Studies Review* 14 (1990): 39–77; Mark Elvin, “The Environmental Legacy of Imperial China,” in *The China Quarterly* 156 (Dec. 1998): 733–756.

- ¹¹ My institutional approach has some affinity to the organizational approach of Frank Uekötter with whom I had many discussions; see Frank Uekötter, "Confronting the Pitfalls of Current Environmental History: An Argument for an Organizational Approach," in *Environment and History* 4 (1998): 31–52.
- ¹² Heinrich Oberrauch, *Tirols Wald und Waidwerk: Ein Beitrag zur Forst- und Jagdgeschichte* (Innsbruck, 1952), 21. The particular Western character of this public sense of law has been stressed by the Russian liberal Bogdan Kistiakovsky, who stood in close connection with Max Weber in his criticism of Russian Intelligentsia, in *Vechi—Wegzeichen, Zur Krise der russischen Intelligenz*, ed. Karl Schlögel, (Frankfurt, 1990), 212–250.
- ¹³ See my review of the works of Arne Andersen, Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, Michael Stolberg, Ralf Henneking, Ulrike Gilhaus, Jürgen Büschenfeld, Peter Münch, et al. in *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 50 (1999): 365–384.
- ¹⁴ J. B. Ojwang with Calestous Juma, "Towards Ecological Jurisprudence," in *In Land We Trust: Environment, Private Property and Constitutional Change*, ed. Calestous Juma and J. B. Ojwang, (Nairobi, 1996), 321.
- ¹⁵ Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs and Steel* (London, 1997), 174ff; Marvin Harris, *Kannibalen und Könige* (Stuttgart, 1990), 145ff.
- ¹⁶ Eric L. Jones, *The European Miracle: Environment, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia* (Cambridge, 1981), 4.
- ¹⁷ Douglass C. North and Robert P. Thomas, *The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History* (Cambridge, 1973), 4, 86, 129, 131.
- ¹⁸ Angus McLaren, *A History of Contraception* (Oxford, 1990), 141.
- ¹⁹ David Grigg, *Population Growth and Agrarian Change: An Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, 1980), 289.
- ²⁰ Fernand Braudel, *Frankreich*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart, 1990), 183.
- ²¹ McLaren, 189.
- ²² Donald Worster, "Auf schwankendem Boden: Zum Begriffswirrwarr um nachhaltige Entwicklung," in *Der Planet als Patient*, ed. Wolfgang Sachs, (Berlin, 1994), 95ff.
- ²³ At a time when Third World examples of autocratic development had been discredited, Dieter Senghaas presented several European countries as historic patterns of appropriate and autonomous development: Dieter Senghaas, *Von Europa lernen: Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtungen* (Frankfurt, 1982). For a thorough explication of that approach, see Ulrich Menzel, *Auswege aus der Abhängigkeit: Die entwicklungspolitische Aktualität Europas* (Frankfurt, 1988).
- ²⁴ About the many different meanings of "Nachhaltigkeit" in forestry, see Wiebke Peters, "Die Nachhaltigkeit als Grundsatz der Forstwirtschaft, ihre Verankerung in der Gesetzgebung und ihre Bedeutung in der Praxis," (diss., University of Hamburg, 1984).
- ²⁵ Götz v. Bülow, *Die Sudwälder von Reichenhall* (Munich, 1962), 159 f. The question whether sustainability was really obtained in the saline forests of Reichenhall remains controversial today; see Alfred Kotter, "'Holznot' um 1600: Die Energieversorgung der Saline Reichenhall," in *Salz Macht Geschichte*, ed. Manfred Treml et al., (Augsburg, 1995), 186–192.
- ²⁶ H. F. Lamprey, "Pastoralism Yesterday and Today: The Over-Grazing Problem," in *Tropical Savannas*, ed. Francois Bourlière, (Amsterdam, 1983), 658, believes to recognize an "overwhelming evidence of continuing extensive ecological degradation" by nomadic pastoralism. Melvyn C. Goldstein and Cynthia M. Beall, *Nomads of Western Tibet: The Survival of a Way of Life* (Hong Kong, 1990), present a description of skillful adaptation to an extremely hard environment. But it is doubtful whether one can generalize this Tibetan example.
- ²⁷ Mark Elvin and Liu Ts'ai-jung, eds., *Sediments of Time: Environment and Society in Chinese History* (Cambridge, 1998); Richard H. Grove, Vinita Damodaran, and Satpal Sangwan, eds., *Nature and the Orient: The Environmental History of South and Southeast Asia* (Delhi, 1998).

- ²⁸ Nicholas K. Menzies, *Forest and Land Management in Imperial China* (New York, 1994), 44. Yi-Fu Tuan, *China* (London, 1969), 32, 141, 142 mentions some cases in Chinese history where an alliance between imperial power and forest protection can be observed, but at the same time makes clear that this policy was not effective in the long run.
- ²⁹ Eduard B. Vermeer, "Population and Ecology along the Frontier in Qing China," in Elvin and Liu, *Sediments of Time*, 247ff.
- ³⁰ Madhav Gadgil, "Deforestation: Problems and Prospects," in *History of Forestry in India*, ed. Ajay S. Rawat, (Delhi, 1991), 13.
- ³¹ Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, *This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India* (Delhi, 1992).
- ³² Jaques Gernet, *Die chinesische Welt* (Frankfurt, 1979), 331.
- ³³ Joachim Radkau and Ingrid Schäfer, *Holz: Ein Naturstoff in der Technikgeschichte* (Reinbek, 1987), 59–65, 157–159.
- ³⁴ For France, see Andrée Corvol, *L'Homme et l'arbre sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1984), 632. "Il est donc fort délicat d'employer l'expression de 'crise forestière' puisque chaque réorganisation administrative se justifie au travers de ceux qui la conduisent." Similarly, Ingrid Schäfer, "Ein Gespenst geht um": Politik mit der Holznot in Lippe 1750–1850 (Detmold, 1992).
- ³⁵ Oliver Rackham, *Ancient Woodland, Its History, Vegetation and Uses in England*, (London, 1980), 153. I am not likewise convinced when Rackham transfers his mockery upon deforestation stories into Mediterranean history, for instance in Oliver Rackham and Jennifer Moody, *The Making of the Cretan Landscape* (Manchester, 1996). See, for the Mediterranean, J. R. McNeill, *The Mountains of the Mediterranean World: An Environmental History* (Cambridge, 1992). McNeill repeatedly characterizes Rackham's position as a "maverick opinion," 72, 311.
- ³⁶ Conrad Totman, *The Green Archipelago: Forestry in Preindustrial Japan* (Berkeley, 1989).
- ³⁷ Michel Devèze, *La grand réformation des forêts sous Colbert* (Nancy, 1962); Heinrich Rubner, *Forstgeschichte im Zeitalter der industriellen Revolution* (Berlin, 1967).
- ³⁸ Karl Hasel, *Studien über Wilhelm Pfeil* (Hannover, 1982), 137.
- ³⁹ Karl August Wittfogel, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas* (Leipzig, 1931); *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven, 1957). Joachim Radkau, "Der Emigrant als Warner und Renegat: Karl August Wittfogels Dämonisierung der 'asiatischen Produktionsweise,'" in *Exilforschung: ein internationales Jahrbuch* 1 (1983): 73–94.
- ⁴⁰ Douglass C. North, *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York, 1981), 26.
- ⁴¹ Peter Christensen, *The Decline of Iranshahr: Irrigation and Environments in the History of the Middle East 500 B.C. to A.D. 1500* (Copenhagen, 1993), 104.
- ⁴² Clive Ponting, *A Green History of the World* (London, 1991), 70ff.
- ⁴³ Jones, *The European Miracle*, 8.
- ⁴⁴ Marc Reisner, *Cadillac Desert: The American Desert and Its Disappearing Water*, rev. ed. (New York, 1993).
- ⁴⁵ Joachim Radkau, "Holzverknappung und Krisenbewußtsein im 18. Jahrhundert," in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 9 (1983): 513–543.
- ⁴⁶ Georg Forster, *Ansichten vom Niederrhein* (1791: Stuttgart, 1965), 56ff.
- ⁴⁷ Richard Grove, "Scotland in South Africa: John Crumie Brown and the Roots of Settler Environmentalism" in *Ecology & Empire: Environmental History of Settler Societies*, eds. Tom Griffiths and Libby Robbin, (Seattle, 1997), 144.
- ⁴⁸ The most famous early example is Harry J. Carman, ed., *American Husbandry* (1775: Port Washington, 1939).

⁴⁹ Mark Elvin, "Three Thousand Years of Unsustainable Growth: China's Environment from Archaic Times to the Present" in *East Asian History* 6 (1993): 7–46.

⁵⁰ Justus v. Liebig, *Chemische Briefe* (Leipzig, 1865), 498ff. In *Sediments of Time*, one finds contradictory comments on the use of human excrements. On page 6, Elvin criticizes this method as an offspring of worm diseases; on page 503, Kerrie L. MacPherson in an article on cholera quotes D. B. Simmons (1879) that the returning of "nightsoil" to the soil reduced "the danger of contamination" to "a minimum." Both opinions may contain some truth; I presume that the favorable effect prevailed. I got the impression that the modern hygienic movement tended to overstate the danger of worm infections.

THESES ON RADKAU

*Comment on Joachim Radkau's lecture, delivered at the GHI,
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In 1845, the young Marx wrote his "Theses on Feuerbach," published some four decades later in 1886 by Engels. This was Marx at his most philosophical, grappling with the moral responsibilities of intellectuals. He concluded with an eleventh thesis, which consisted of the famous aphorism: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point is to change it."¹

Here I shall offer a mere ten theses on Radkau, regrettably without any pithy aphorisms. This should not be interpreted to mean that he is any less worthy of attention than was Feuerbach—he is certainly more comprehensible. Rather, it is a format that responds directly to the organization of Radkau's article, and is intended to ease the navigation between the two texts.

The domain of Radkau's ten points is the environmental history of the world, territory that Radkau explored in his book *Natur und Macht* (2000).² The intent is to identify those respects in which European environmental history (here confined mainly to Central and Western Europe) follows its own trajectory, and those respects in which its trajectory is shared elsewhere around the world. This is an ambitious and intrinsically interesting pursuit, which requires command of an immensity of data, not merely from history but ranging into the natural sciences from anthropology through zoology. The difficulties are enormous, but the rewards are too.

1. In his plea for caution in regard to the spiritual approach, Radkau is if anything too cautious. Not only has Elvin's research in Chinese environmental history undermined the naïve position that eastern religions brought gentle treatment of earthly environments, but the whole premise of the argument advanced by Lynn White was convincingly refuted not long after White published it.³ The main difficulty with religious arguments is that individuals and institutions are capable of bending or ignoring religious (and any other) precepts as occasions seem to warrant. Economic necessity or opportunity inspires endless ingenuity in the reinterpretation of principles. So has (and does) anxiety about security. Thucydides remarks on much the same thing in his passage on the Corcyran revolution, where he wrote (Book III, chapter 82) that revolution is a stern master that brings men's character down to the level of their

circumstances. Convictions are easily compromised or abandoned when confronted by necessity or even convenience. This is not true of all people of course; merely most of us.

2. In calling for an institutional approach to environmental history, Radkau is also surely on firm ground. The sustained collective behavior of the many is normally more decisive than the ideas or actions of individuals, perhaps more so in environmental history than in most other varieties, e.g. military history where a single decision may have vast and enduring consequences. Here Radkau argues that there are elements of European exceptionalism in the long-term importance of law, especially as it restrains the state, and in the widespread institution of private property. This is an interesting assertion, but not, to my mind, convincingly demonstrated. Were not Islamic potentates also constrained by law, even to the point where ordinary people could sometimes use the law against the state? Did not the Chinese gentry (before 1949) enjoy private property in land? It seems to me uncertain that these institutions and practices were confined to Europe, or were even more prominent in Europe than elsewhere. Before the nineteenth century, many parts of Europe had extensive common lands; the property regime was a complex one, in which private property was only one element. But Radkau is surely right to focus on the significance of property regimes for environmental change. Different arrangements entailed different incentives and risks for users of land and other resources, provoking different behavior and different consequences.⁴

3. In drawing attention to the unusual presence of livestock in European life, Radkau is at once following a well-trodden trail and making a new suggestion. As he recognizes, this characteristic has often been cited as a source of European military or economic advantage. In this respect, Europe was probably distinctive among agrarian societies, although obviously only in degree. Indeed, Andrew Sherratt has shown that heavy reliance on livestock was a European characteristic from the time when the Neolithic complex first took hold in Europe, about 7,000 to 4,000 B.C.⁵ Did the balance between field and pasture help stabilize agrarian ecosystems, specifically by slowing or eliminating fertility loss? It may well have done so, precisely because livestock could browse in forests, meadows, heaths, and other non-arable lands, and via their manure provide a reliable nutrient subsidy to farmers' fields.

It does seem that in comparative perspective Central and Western European agriculture before chemical fertilizers showed remarkable sustainability. This of course derived from a number of things, not merely livestock and manure, but also, for instance, an equable climate. Another was the resort from at least the fifteenth century onwards to nitrogen-fixing fodder crops such as alfalfa and clover.⁶ Beyond that, while Euro-

pean agriculture may have shown remarkable stability, it did not show unique stability. Other societies found other routes to the same end. For example, Egypt, from Pharaonic times until the construction of the Aswan Dam in the 1960s, featured an extraordinary agricultural continuity based on the annual flood of the Nile with its silt subsidy from the Ethiopian highlands. The fishpond-silkworm-rice paddy complex of southern China, which developed at least as early as the Song Dynasty, is another example of an agricultural system that endured without significant degradation or disruption over many centuries. Agriculture that received reliable nutrient subsidies in the form of nightsoil (human excrement) could also prove very stable over the centuries. This practice is mentioned in Homer's *Odyssey*, and so presumably existed in Bronze Age Greece, but probably was most institutionalized in Japan and parts of China. Lastly, long-fallow shifting agriculture could also be very stable over long periods of time if population growth did not require shortening the duration of fallow. So with respect to the balance between pasture and field, one can say that the European path was probably a special one, but that a few other societies reached the same destination (agricultural stability and near-sustainability) along different paths.

4. The Western European marriage pattern is a fascinating subject that has attracted considerable attention ever since Hajnal pointed it out in 1965. No one, to my knowledge, has systematically considered its ecological significance. It was, as Radkau suggests, probably of utmost importance in stabilizing population/resource ratios.⁷ Late marriage and socially suppressed fertility, which allowed societies to adjust population levels to resource availability, surely evened out some of the fluctuations in resource exploitation. The question remains, however, whether or not this was genuinely peculiar to Europe. Some recent scholarship considering the limited Chinese data puts this in doubt; and it is beyond doubt that from at least 1600 Japanese society systematically suppressed fertility and thus, like Western European societies, had the capacity to raise it when circumstances warranted, for example in the wake of an epidemic. The Chinese studies are not definitive because the quality and quantity of the data are weak, relying heavily, for example, on records pertaining to the imperial lineage of the Qing Dynasty, which might not be representative of the population at large. But these studies at the very least raise serious questions about the notion that Chinese population growth went unconstrained by social checks on fertility. The new evidence suggests that patriarchs exerted great power over their extended families, and, as it were, granted licenses to married couples to have babies. Through abstinence, abortion, infanticide, and perhaps other means, young couples avoided births and children that they, or at least the patriarch of their family, did not want. Of course, in chaotic times the patriarchs lost their

authority over young people, and fertility surged, as for example during the Mao years. If this revised appreciation of Chinese fertility history is correct, it poses problems for Radkau (and others) who emphasize Chinese population growth and attribute it to unchecked fertility. It may be that here, as with Radkau's third point, Europe's specific path was distinctive, but other societies reached the same destination (socially controlled fertility) via other paths. The mix of infanticide, abortion, abstinence within marriage, postponed marriage, and constraints on remarriage differed from case to case, but in Japan, possibly in China, as well as in Europe, societies could adjust population size to fit economic and ecological circumstances. That said, however, it may still be the case that Europe's mechanisms of fertility control were more precise or more effective than those elsewhere. This remains a promising and important field for research for Europe and the rest of the world alike, one that unites social, demographic, economic, and environmental history.⁸

5. Radkau's fifth point is closely connected to his third. Radkau considers sustainability explicitly here, wondering whether steppe nomads had a sustainable society and commenting on the self-conscious sustainability of German forest management. With respect to sustainable agriculture, the long-term champion, as I noted above, was Egypt, although this was due to special circumstances prudently exploited by Egyptian farmers. With respect to steppe nomads, it seems to me likely that their habits sometimes were sustainable and sometimes not. The key variable was probably livestock populations, which were subject to change on account of a number of forces, including epizootics as well as supplies of water and grass. On the semi-arid and arid steppelands, marginal differences in climate could have great effects, so the concept of sustainability is complicated by sharp oscillations in ecological conditions. A given density of livestock population might be entirely sustainable for five years but completely unsustainable for the next five. In any case, the historical work on these subjects for the steppe has not been done, so far as I know. Contemporary anthropology seems to support Radkau's doubts about the sustainability of nomadic society.⁹ Perhaps it is best to think of steppe nomads as practicing a sometimes unsustainable economy but with a resilient society, so that after calamities both human and livestock populations rebounded and reclaimed their territories. After all, pastoral nomads in Eurasia managed to survive, albeit with frequent difficulties, for several millennia. That they have in recent centuries become marginal rather than prominent in history is a matter of politics and power, rather than of ecology and sustainability.

6. The nexus between forests and power is also a fascinating subject. Radkau suggests that Europe's experience may be different from China's and India's, at least since medieval times, because states and peasants had

a shared interest in and acceptance of the principle of forest conservation. States needed forests for naval timber; peasants needed them for fuel-wood, and for nuts and berries; and peasant livestock needed them for browse—shoots and shrubs to get them through the winters. It seems that forest protection for naval purposes was rare in India and China. This may be so, although it could also be an impression derived from the nature of the sources, which for India at least are very thin prior to the nineteenth century. My belief is that Radkau is essentially correct here, for two reasons. One is that from the fifteenth century the competition for naval power in European waters remained fierce, and so the incentive to maintain the oak, pine, and fir forests on which naval power depended was consistently strong. The recurrence of war and the consequent unreliability of foreign markets made it seem preferable for each naval power to have a ready domestic supply. Only the Dutch Republic deviated from this policy, drawing ship timber from the Baltic and the Rhine basin. The second reason is that forests and timber in early modern Europe may already have become scarce in a way that they were not (yet) in India. In Mughal India, forests remained abundant, at least in the north, and Mughal policy concentrated on rewarding the clearing of forests for cultivation.¹⁰ The Mughals never developed much of a navy. In China, too, the state encouraged deforestation in frontier zones. Chinese styles of agriculture did not easily mesh with forest preservation, as Radkau notes, and the Chinese emperors rarely felt the need for a large navy, because China had no challengers at sea (although pirates often made trouble). Resources were better spent on the Inner Asian frontiers. Forest protection generally did not fit the economic or military priorities of the Chinese or Mughal state.

One major exception to this rule must be acknowledged. The Qing dynasts, whose origins lay in Manchuria, actively preserved forests in Manchuria, hoping to maintain an environment in which they enjoyed hunting (rather like European nobility), and to maintain Manchuria for ethnic Manchus. A belt of forest, called the “willow palisade,” was intended to help keep both Mongols and Chinese out of Manchuria from the 1640s until the 1850s (it did not work).¹¹

7. The advantages of European polycentrism is an argument that has often been made to explain the military, political, and economic success of Europe in recent centuries. Here Radkau extends the notion to environmental management on the grounds that large-scale states cannot know enough about local conditions to devise and enforce suitable policy, and that multiple polities could easily learn from one another which practices are best. The latter argument is one routinely used to justify federal systems of government. Radkau turns to German forest history to make his case, and does so persuasively.

But can it prudently be extended beyond forestry to other aspects of environmental management? Probably the argument holds in those arenas where management is undertaken locally and the components of the managed ecosystems stay put, like trees. But local, small-scale environmental management presumably runs into difficulty in cases where the things to be managed refuse to stay still and instead move around from one jurisdiction to another. When it comes to migratory birds and wildlife, river water, or air pollution, for example, the appropriate scale for regulation and management is probably a larger one, and the advantages of polycentrism become disadvantages. Historically, of course, few of these things were subject to much regulation or management, but that has changed lately. The Rhine, for example, has been the focus of considerable efforts at regulation since at least 1815, and European polycentrism has made this effort more, rather than less, difficult.¹²

8. The absence of large-scale irrigation is surely one of the distinguishing features of European agriculture and society. The equable climate is the basic reason irrigation was never sufficiently rewarding. Whether large-scale irrigation gives rise to bureaucratic centralism or not (and it surely cannot account for the Russian case), it clearly has had ecological consequences. As Radkau notes, those may become important only slowly, after centuries of salt accumulation. And they may vary greatly in severity from place to place: Mesopotamia and California probably are among the most severely affected, although in the former case clever adjustments allowed Mesopotamia to host some of the world's richest societies from about 3500 BC until the Mongol invasion of 1258. California is unlikely to match this record! It will be interesting to see whether in the American West abundant money and technological power will be deployed to check or reverse the environmental costs of large-scale irrigation agriculture.¹³ Again, Egypt is a special case, an exception until the Aswan Dam, but one that since the 1960s is the exception that truly proves the rule: without the annual flushing and silt deposit from the Nile's flood, Egyptian irrigation agriculture in recent decades has shown an impressive record of environmental degradation.

9. Radkau's perspective on the ecological repercussions of overseas colonialism is another very interesting position, but I think it begins with a misreading of Alfred Crosby. In his book *The Columbian Exchange*, published before *Ecological Imperialism*, Crosby considered the ecological and demographic consequences for Europe of maize, potatoes, and other imports from the Americas.¹⁴ As an Irish-American familiar with the story of the Irish potato famine, Crosby would be among the last to suppose that the ecological effects of colonialism in Europe promoted stability. In tilting his lance at Grove's *Green Imperialism*, Radkau may have hit his target more squarely. Grove did downplay the intellectual importance of

European environmentalism, especially in Central Europe.¹⁵ But critiques of Crosby and Grove aside, the real thesis here is that overseas colonialism disturbed ecological balances in Europe. This is surely true in that it provided windfall subsidies (what E.L. Jones called “ghost acreage”) of grain, timber, and fish among other things. And, as Radkau notes, the new American crops improved the food supply in Europe. This helped to ignite the long-term population growth beginning in the eighteenth century, although the reduction in lethal epidemics was probably just as important here (remember that this was a global, not merely European demographic trend). Radkau judges the environmental repercussions of colonialism as less than fortunate for Europe. That is probably true in that the colonial windfalls discouraged efforts at sustainability and allowed expansions of several sorts—expansions probably crucial for European wealth and power in the modern world. In this respect, colonialism represents an alternative version of what coal provided after about 1820: a windfall that encouraged growth and discouraged balance and sustainability. Colonialism was a subsidy from another place; coal a subsidy from another time. Oil, except for that produced within Europe, was (and remains) both.

10. In his tenth and final point, Radkau warns that in apparent ecological success may lie the seeds of later crisis. He sees this pattern in the Chinese past. But consider the lessons of his seventh point about the benefits of polycentrism. If China has suffered environmentally from its very success, it is surely in no small part due to its history of centralization, which made experimentation with unorthodox practices difficult, and thereby limited the rate of learning from experience. Polycentric Europe, on the other hand, ought to be well positioned to avoid the perils of success, precisely because its fragmentation allows experimentation and systematic learning from experience and observation of what works best. And in any case, Europe’s successes seem not to have concealed the elements of unsustainability: who is more attuned to issues of sustainability than northern Europeans?

One of the concerns many environmental historians share is that their work should prove useful in the quest for a more prudent ecological order on earth. When environmentalists look at environmental history, this is precisely what they are searching for. For them, the point is not merely to describe and interpret the world as it is and as it has unfolded, but to change it. Given the global scope of environmental issues, any such ambition will require a sense of the whole as well as of local details. In his paper, and in his book, Radkau has been bold enough to think about large-scale questions in environmental history, here posing them as possible issues of European distinctiveness. The project is as valuable as it is bold, regardless of whether or not one agrees with any specific claim to

European uniqueness. The diligent accumulation of detail is of course indispensable, but by itself provides very limited insight. Coupling it with synoptic vision and restless imagination is what yields the most intellectually exciting results, and the most appropriate basis for contemplating how to change things. Radkau has done just that.

Notes

¹ In the original: "Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert, es kömmt drauf an sie zu verändern."

² His predecessors in this terrain include Clive Ponting, *A Green History of the World* (London, 1990); Ian Simmons, *Environmental History* (Oxford, 1993); Sverker Sörlin and Anders Öckerman, *Jorden en ö: En global miljöhistoria* (Stockholm: Natur och kultur, 2001). Successors include John F. Richards, *The Unending Frontier: An Environmental History of the Early Modern World* (Berkeley, 2003); J. Donald Hughes, *An Environmental History of the World* (London, 2001); B. de Vries and J. Goudsblom, eds., *Mappae Mundi* (Amsterdam, 2002).

³ Yi-fu Tuan, "Discrepancies between Environmental Attitude and Behaviour: Examples from Europe and China," in *Canadian Geographer* 3, 175–191.

⁴ See, for example, John F. Richards, ed., *Land, Property, and the Environment* (Oakland, CA, 2002).

⁵ A. Sherratt, "Plough and Pastoralism," in I. Hodder, G. Isaac, and N. Hammond, eds., *Patterns of the Past* (Cambridge, 1983), 261–305.

⁶ On alfalfa and clover, see Mauro Ambroselli, *The Wild and the Sown: Botany and Agriculture in Western Europe, 1350–1850* (Cambridge, 1997) and Thorkild Kjaergaard, *The Danish Revolution 1500–1800: An Ecohistorical Interpretation* (New York, 1994).

⁷ I make this argument emphasizing the economic, not ecological side of things in J.R. McNeill, "The Reserve Army of the Unmarried in World Economic History: Flexible Fertility Regimes and the Wealth of Nations," in Derek Aldcroft and Ross Catterall, eds., *Rich Nations—Poor Nations: The Long-Run Perspective* (Cheltenham, UK, 1996), 23–38.

⁸ Among the new literature on Chinese fertility, see Ts'ui-jung Liu et al, eds., *Asian Population History* (Oxford, 2001); James Lee and Wang Feng, *One Quarter of Humanity: Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Realities* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999). The leading skeptic is Arthur P. Wolf, "Is There Evidence of Birth Control in Late Imperial China?" in *Population and Development Review* 27 (2001): 133–54.

⁹ Caroline Humphrey and David Sneath, *The End of Nomadism? Society, State and the Environment in Inner Asia* (Durham, NC, 1999); Caroline Humphrey and David Sneath, eds., *Culture and Environment in Inner Asia* (Cambridge, UK, 1996), 2 vols.

¹⁰ Richard Eaton, *The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204–1760* (Berkeley, CA, 1993); Richards, *The Unending Frontier*, 32–38.

¹¹ Patrick Caffrey, "The Forests of Northeast China, 1600–1953," Ph.D. thesis, Georgetown University, 2002.

¹² See Mark Cioc, *The Rhine: An Eco-biography* (Seattle, 2002).

¹³ Australia's Murray-Darling basin is another interesting case where money and expertise are available to address the problems of salinization—which are both recent and severe.

¹⁴ A. Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange: The Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492* (Westport, CT, 2003 [1972]).

¹⁵ I still insist that Grove has excellent points in his emphasis on Indian ecological thought and practice upon Portuguese, Dutch, and British officials and thinkers, as well as in his argument that colonial islands brought out environmental issues more clearly than did most other settings.

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AFTER 1989: IS GERMANY SO DIFFERENT?

Keynote Address for the conference "Historical Justice in International Perspective" at the German Historical Institute, March 27, 2003

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Not so long ago, I found myself in Washington, D.C., discussing the issue of transitional justice with around 40 pretenders to the leadership of a country, let us say, "embedded" into one of the founding regions of our civilization, the Tigris and Euphrates River valley. They listened with polite attention while I offered some generalizations about Germany's most recent experience with this subject. But to my surprise, when the other Americans in the room and I concluded our remarks, we were met with a storm of notably self-confident indignation. One by one, our listeners let us know that they had little to learn from other states. Their experience with dictatorship was different. Hence, their options would be shaped by their specific departure from dictatorial rule. Only those who lived through this experience—"the people," we were informed—could determine their country's appropriate path.

Perhaps I should not have been surprised by these protests. In one respect, my American colleagues in the social sciences begin with a similar argument, although they do this dispassionately and with purely analytical purposes in mind. For the experts in democratic transition, the study of justice after dictatorship (or after any sustained period of injustice) is first of all an inquiry into "difference." One begins the examination by assuming difference and then works outward to generalizations about the divergent paths that are available to a state in reckoning with its troubled past.

For example, we are told that regimes of overthrow will follow different paths than those that come to power by negotiation. Leaders of the first regime type will find it easier to address past crimes because their predecessors are no longer around to challenge their authority, let alone to return to power. Conversely, the representatives of negotiated transitions will be in a much weaker position due to their continuing vulnerability to attack and overthrow. In their ascent to power, they may have even struck sordid deals with their adversaries that could come back to haunt them.

Likewise, commentators assume that the imperative to act upon injustice will be proportionate to the severity of the offenses in question. In

the case of egregious rights violations or indisputable crimes against humanity, there will be intense public and international pressure to satisfy the demands of the victims and to mend their fractured society. In contrast, lesser offenses—the loss of a home, the destruction of a career, the betrayal of a friendship—will be harder to address. Presumably, there will be far fewer advocates of retributive action. Their cries for justice will be drowned out by other citizens' calls to get on with life and to focus on practical tasks like institution building and economic reconstruction.

Would anyone deny the importance of these distinctions? It is hardly contestable that South Africa's modest approach to criminal trials in the mid-1990s was unlike Greece's aggressive trials of the "colonels" two decades earlier, or that Chile's "truth and reconciliation" commission of 1990 had a different agenda than its Argentine predecessor in 1983. Different histories, different leaders, and different decisions make distinct responses inevitable.

Then, too, if one takes the issue of difference to an extreme that few scholars would wish to defend, it is possible to argue—as did my aforementioned discussion partners—that there are few meaningful commonalities among these cases. Every country, just like every tyrant, police informant, ideologue, and university professor, is different from every other. Of course, this discovery is about as enlightening as the recognition that every event and every experience is unique. But let's face it, uniqueness has its attractions for politicians.

There is, however, another way of thinking about our topic. Instead of beginning with unlike cases, let us pose the opposite question. What factors do all instances of transitional justice have in common? Many onlookers will find the question counterintuitive. In geographical terms, few expressions of modern dictatorship could be more different than, say, Cambodia under Pol Pot and Hungary under Janos Kadar, or Milosevic's Serbia and Jaruzelski's Poland. Hence, at first glance, the task of acting upon these circumstances would seem radically different from one case to the next. Likewise, if we focus on cases with an historical sweep, say, Europe in the wake of the Second World War and again during the postcommunist 1990s, the challenge appears equally daunting.

Nevertheless, if we could identify similarities among these cases—a necessarily more demanding task than pointing to differences—wouldn't this discovery tell us something interesting about our subject? One possibility is that we will get a provocative glimpse into the future challenges awaiting any country after its departure from dictatorship or, in a broader sense, any people who has suffered grievous harm. Another benefit is that we will better understand why scholars throughout the world show no sign of ceasing to publish books, organize symposia, and lecture on the theme of transitional justice.

I propose to ask precisely this question about the seemingly incomparable case of postunification Germany. How often have we heard that Germany is different? But for this reason, few states are better suited for my comparative exercise. If commonalities can be found between this supposedly exceptional instance of transitional justice and other cases, they are likely to be found elsewhere as well.

To engage this thought experiment, I suggest that we begin with what happened in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) after the events of 1989/1990. To account for something, we must agree about what we are seeking to explain. Contrary to the common wisdom, this is not so easy; I have addressed this point in my *Judging the Past in Unified Germany*.¹ Then, I will suggest three ways—one of which is still in gestation—in which Berlin's actions were not that different from other states in transitional situations. These are: 1) the constraints of precedent; 2) the illusion of resolution; and 3) the "eternal return" of the past. In terms of justice per se, if my reading of these common challenges is correct, this is not a completely uplifting story. But at the end of this essay, I hope to provide insight into why the attempt to come to terms with injustice, however difficult, should matter to us at all.

Germany: A Special Case?

Germany has always seemed to be the "special case." In the late nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century, German officials and intellectuals repeatedly appealed to concepts like the *Sonderweg* in seeking to bolster their conceptions of a unique national identity. Likewise, after the debacles of two world wars, their European neighbors searched for special solutions—*Sonderlösungen*, if you will—to the recurrent problem of German power. Our temptation is to think that the 1990s were no different. Germany would again be special.

In late 1989 and 1990, when the two German states were on the verge of coming together, experts informed us that East Germany's fate would be dramatically different from that of any of its Soviet-bloc neighbors. After all, the German Democratic Republic alone had a national counterpart in the West. Its weaknesses were matched by the other state's strengths. Only the GDR faced the prospect of total transformation according to the economic and political principles of a liberal capitalist order. Only its leaders faced the likelihood of being divested of meaningful political roles in the unified German state. Indeed, as this unequal relationship was played out, it was logical to assume that East Germany would be the one place—among all of the formerly communist states—where transitional justice was most fully realized.

In one respect, this has been an accurate prediction. More so than in other parts of Eastern Europe, the ex-GDR experienced virtually the

gamut of efforts to act upon past crimes and injustices. Throughout the 1990s, criminal courts were the scene of numerous prosecutions for the shooting deaths at the Berlin Wall and along the inter-German border. Hundreds of thousands of civil servants from the old regime were vetted for their "suitability" for continued employment in the new democratic order. Administrative courts reviewed competing claims for thousands of houses, dachas, parcels of land, and other forms of property lost under the old dictatorship. And, by decade's end, two parliamentary commissions had completed investigations of a host of wrongs that could not be resolved by statute.

If quantity had the same meaning as quality, the story would end here. Nonetheless, despite the fact that Germany's leaders sought to address a greater number of offenses than any of their peers, these efforts were met with widespread dissatisfaction among those who followed them about the *quality* of justice that was ultimately achieved. When we think about the many different cases that are typically considered in scholarly studies of transitional justice, this point should not be news to any of us. Disappointment, disillusionment, and disgruntlement are to be expected.

Why should this matter? The first reason I shall suggest is that transitional justice is not a policy smorgasbord, where one pauses to review a menu of options and then chooses the most attractive course. ("I'll take two truth commissions, one short trial, and no property issues.") If only the challenges of governance were this straightforward! Rather, the ability of democratic leaders to control the political agenda is always less than they hope for and, for that matter, less than outsiders think. A century and a half ago, Karl Marx made this point in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*: "Men do not make [history] by themselves but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past."²

For example, not long after the demise of the apartheid system, South African rights activists invited a slew of policymakers, practitioners, and intellectuals from fledgling democracies in Latin America and Europe to learn about the various strategies for dealing with our topic. The idea was not merely that the enthusiasts of the post-apartheid order would compare and contrast their circumstances with their counterparts' experiences. Rather, many hoped that after reviewing diverse cases, they could make well-informed decisions about the approach that best suited their needs and, if all went well, that had the greatest likelihood of being palatable to all concerned.

I recall a senior Chilean participant in this exercise telling me proudly at the time that the South Africans had selected his country as their model because it represented the least confrontational path. Looking back, I am

not persuaded that his assessment held true. Still, it is more important to recognize that well before the “retrospective justice shuttles” had touched down in Johannesburg and Cape Town, the leaders of the African National Congress and the National Party had already formalized their decisions in the interim constitution of 1993. Here and there, interested parties could debate the meaning of ambiguous terms in the document—for example, the loaded concept of “amnesty”—but the framework for all subsequent discussions had been set.

At this point, some of my social science colleagues would undoubtedly tell me that this particular outcome was the predictable result of a negotiated transition. Accordingly, they would argue, one could expect a different outcome from a regime of overthrow. In fact, this is what critics confidently predicted about unified Germany’s intentions. For many, the country’s predominately western leadership was bent upon imposing “victor’s justice” upon its vanquished counterparts, regardless of the damage it did to the credibility of German legal traditions and the rule of law. Precisely because West Germany’s policies had been validated in the court of history, it could and, they were certain, would impose its will as it wished. In the favored expression of the GDR’s long-time party secretary, Erich Honecker, one would have had to be “blind as kittens” not to recognize this fact. However, if we look closely at two of the Federal Republic’s most prominent efforts to achieve retrospective justice in the 1990s—the opening of the once secret files of East Germany’s security police (the *Stasi*) and the return of expropriated property to its original owners—we can see that these assumptions were not quite correct.

Consider the controversy that broke out in 1990 over the millions of *Stasi* files that suddenly became available after the Wall’s fall.³ Despite observers’ first impressions, the fact that authorities had access to these documents was hardly an opportunity for self-satisfaction and gloating. Contrary to expectations and against the demands of many East German dissidents, West German officials initially balked at the prospect of giving the *Stasi*’s victims access to the tainted remnants of dictatorship. At a time of turbulence and uncertainty in the East, they feared that the opening of these records would have explosive consequences. Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble underscored his belief that there were more important things to be done than stirring up ugly memories. Chancellor Helmut Kohl noted that it would be best to destroy the files outright.

Yet despite their apprehensions, Germany’s leaders soon discovered that they could do little to prevent these records from entering the public sphere. In many respects, their predicament was a natural outgrowth of decisions reached months before unification. Thousands upon thousands of personal dossiers and surveillance reports had been captured in January 1990 when outraged citizens stormed the *Stasi*’s Berlin-Normannen-

strasse headquarters, and shortly thereafter, journalists, well-meaning activists, and a variety of opportunists had already begun to circulate large portions of the records. As a result, by summer 1990, the GDR parliament, the *Volkskammer*, was rushing to pass legislation on what its representatives considered to be the appropriate uses of the files. Hence, even before West German officials arrived on the scene and regardless of their wishes, the opening of the *Stasi's* records was well underway.

In much the same way, Kohl and his colleagues found their hands similarly tied on the issue of property restitution.⁴ The suddenness of the GDR's collapse precipitated a landslide of disputes over the disposition of tens of thousands of properties lost, stolen, or expropriated since WWII. In an ideal world, federal officials would have preferred to pick and choose when they would get involved in the adjudication of these matters. But here, too, their options were shaped by circumstances "encountered, given, and transmitted from the past"; indeed, a somewhat more remote past.

Months before the signing of the Unification Treaty, the point at which West Germany's legal system was officially transferred to the territory of the GDR, the *Volkskammer* had taken another step toward redressing the old regime's offenses by returning scores of nationalized firms to their original owners. For the FRG, this *fait accompli*, too, raised uncomfortable matters of precedent: if these companies could be returned, then why not other forms of property as well? Further complicating matters, this was not the only precedent for addressing open property disputes. West Germany itself had set the stage decades earlier under Konrad Adenauer. In the 1950s, the new democracy committed itself to compensating the Jewish victims of Nazism for their property losses during Hitler's "aryanization" campaigns. Of course, as long as Germany was divided, this policy could not be applied to the GDR. Unification raised the issue anew.

By itself, each measure made good sense. Nonetheless, the unwieldy conditions of the times made it impossible—in both this and other cases—to compartmentalize policymaking. Once West German authorities moved ahead on one controversy, it seemed, they were immediately confronted with other disputes. Among these were the fantastically complex issue of the Soviet Union's postwar expropriation of nearly one-third of the landed property of the area that would eventually become the GDR; the destruction of scores of houses and apartment buildings in order to clear the way for the Berlin Wall's construction; and, in the GDR's waning days, the purchase by hopeful citizens of state-controlled houses and other properties that many had occupied for their entire lives.

In all of these cases, there is much to admire about the Solomonic care with which German administrative courts sought to reach fair and con-

sistent rulings about the disposition of such properties. Unfortunately, it is also true that few of the parties to these disputes found much satisfaction in their decisions. To the contrary, the losers in the restitution battles could not help but conclude that justice had been denied to them. Ironically, having enjoyed a taste of justice, the beneficiaries felt they should have received even more.

This dilemma brings me to a second feature of transitional justice, the illusion of resolution. We often hear from activists and intellectuals that the most sensible goal in the face of such disappointment is to search for that fine line between doing too much and doing too little. On the one hand, they tell us, one must provide the victims with the assurance that wrongdoing will be addressed. But on the other, one must also look to the future by reconciling aggrieved parties to a life together. Can it be any wonder, then, that those who take responsibility for this synthesis are frequently depicted as healers, attacking the “ills,” “wounds,” “festering sores,” “traumas,” “tumors,” and “cancers” of historical injustice while simultaneously preparing a divided society for the return to good health. But if this is healing, tell that to the family of the murdered activist Steve Biko who sought in vain to have South Africa’s amnesty law overturned.⁵ Or tell that to the families of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt whose car was blown up by the Chilean intelligence service while they were in our nation’s capital.

The problem with justice, qualitatively speaking, is that it is so hard to recognize, and one never knows when one has received enough of it. Hannah Arendt tells us that some crimes—genocide, mass murder, and torture—are so horrific that it is impossible to know how to deal with them in a fully satisfactory manner, let alone to understand them.⁶ Yet even smaller offenses, like those that I mentioned earlier, are not so banal that they can be easily forgiven or passed over. In fact, injustice reaches everyone around it. Not only do the victims despair for lack of a resolution, but even the perpetrators can find themselves confined to a legal and moral limbo that can be lifted only through withdrawal and death.

If we consider the outcome of the much-publicized trials of the GDR’s former communist elite, it is clear that Germany has been no exception to the rule. This was not the first time in the latter half of the twentieth century that democratic leaders sought to achieve justice through criminal prosecutions; Greece, Bolivia, and Argentina did the same. However, Germany’s trials were arguably the most thorough. Beginning in 1990—once again, as a result of decisions reached before unification—an array of politburo figures, military officers, and lowly border guards were indicted on charges of ordering or facilitating the shooting deaths of hundreds of East Germans who had sought to flee their country. In painstaking fashion, local and appellate courts reviewed mountains of

evidence and agonized over the appropriate legal principles for assessing culpability. Although fewer than thirty defendants were convicted and only a handful spent time in jail, I personally believe that most of these decisions were rendered fairly and conscientiously.

Still, the disturbing result of the entire endeavor is what did not happen. Instead of provoking introspection and debate, the trials were largely received with disinterest and boredom by the majority of German citizens. At the same time, there was precious little evidence of reconciliation—or even dialogue—between the activists who had defended these measures as a vital part of Germany's healing process and the wrongdoers who stood to lose the most from convictions. Before the last judgment was rendered, both sides had been thoroughly marginalized. The heroes of 1989 were reduced to pleading their cause to each other while their counterparts were revealed to be little more than lonely old men wasting away in desolate living rooms. To paraphrase another passage from the *Eighteenth Brumaire*, what began as tragedy during four decades of communist rule seemed predestined to return as farce in a new political order.⁷

If this were where the similarities among states' diverse experiences with transitional justice came to an end, my story would be interesting but of limited long-term significance. Why then does this topic continue to intrigue us today? A major reason, and the last of my three points, is that the unaddressed or under-addressed issues of the past need not go away. They have the potential to return again and again. In fact, one of the most striking features about many scholarly treatments of transitional justice is how many of them deal with events that took place before their authors were born. If this is transitional justice, this has been quite a long transition!

One frequently cited reason for the staying power of these issues has to do with the interests of the victims themselves. As long as these persons are still alive or particularly vocal descendants can be located, demands for justice and rectification will prosper. In fact, when one aggrieved group steps forward to levy its demands, it is not uncommon for another to follow in its stead. In 1988, the advocates of Japanese-Americans who were deported to internment camps during World War II forced the Reagan administration into making compensation payments by arguing that few of their clients would be around much longer to benefit from an admission of guilt. In quick succession, the Jewish survivors of Nazi slave labor camps drew upon their own longevity concerns to intensify demands for compensation from German corporations that had profited from their misery; a final settlement was reached only a year ago. Continuing this cascade, African-American descendants of American slaves began demanding reparations for the injustices inflicted upon

their forefathers. Not very long ago, Ina McGee, the 69-year-old great granddaughter of a former slave provided the following rationale for her family's decision (which included support from her 99-year-old mother) to initiate a class-action suit against three Texas corporations: "The Germans got theirs. The Indians got theirs and may get more. Everyone has received reparations except for African-Americans. It's our turn now."⁸

Such interest-based explanations undoubtedly account for the resurgence of many demands for compensatory justice. Nonetheless, I doubt they are reliable predictors of the salience and vitality of these issues over time. Furthermore, I do not believe they are true to the spirit with which these claims are raised. More than a century after the wrongs took place, Ina McGee can define a *part* of her identity in terms of her descent from persons she never knew because there is much about her demands that transcends biology. Of course, slavery is no longer a tangible reality in this country. What is tangible, however, is the continuing existence of social and economic conditions—inequality, structural unemployment, endemic poverty—that one can trace back to the institution of slavery.

In this light, it is no accident that African-American demands for reparations have intensified recently as public support for the most visible means of redressing historical injustice in the U.S.—affirmative action—has waned. As preferential hiring and university admissions policies are challenged in the courts, those who have the most to lose from a change in policy will understandably seek new vehicles for expressing their discontent. In this not exactly literal but symbolically significant way, the grievances of a new era can be planted in the fissures and faults of another age.

It is too early to tell how or whether comparable parallels will be drawn in Germany, say, ten or twenty years from now. However, if coming generations so desire, I believe they will have no problem finding reasons for relating their government's actions in the first decade of unification to contested issues in their own age.

The groundwork has already been laid. While the debates over the merits of transitional justice in the 1990s were clearly heartfelt, they were also part of a more comprehensive dispute over how Germany was to be unified. Thus, one side's nervousness about the applicability of western legal norms and mores to the ex-GDR as well as the shadow of "victor's justice" reflected deeper concerns about how quickly the FRG should dismantle the old socialist system. Conversely, the other side's eagerness to push for justice and accountability spoke to a conviction that one could not act quickly enough.

We now know that the Kohl administration's aggressive implementation of the latter course led to severe economic dislocations in the East, the collapse of the region's social security net, and a feeling among east-

ern Germans that they had been relegated to a second-class status in their new country. But let us imagine that this mood were somehow to be sustained over the coming decade. It is true that economic conditions have improved dramatically in recent years and that most of the GDR's former citizens now enjoy the benefits of the German *Sozialstaat*. Nonetheless, some twelve years after the fact, many also feel that they remain less than equal partners in the unification project. There are still few prominent easterners in high governmental positions, and many westerners continue to regard their compatriots with a hint of condescension. If these latent tensions were to be exacerbated, isn't it possible that a disgruntled Dresdener or an alienated Berliner might be tempted to reach for his or her former identity and proclaim in Kennedyesque fashion: "Ich bin ein Ostdeutscher!"

Should this happen, or to the extent that it is already happening, I have identified some rich opportunities for rekindling old debates about Berlin's reckoning with the GDR's crimes. For example, one hotly contested aspect of the debate over the *Stasi* files was their use in vetting East German officials for ties to the secret police. Although we will never have the exact figures, approximately 40,000 administrators were fired outright or forced into early retirement as a result of these findings. How might one capitalize upon this issue to serve future controversies? Conceivably, someone who wanted the German government to pay greater attention to selecting easterners for high governmental posts could argue that these dismissals confirmed that Berlin had never been fully committed to treating all Germans equally. Or conversely, those who disputed the idea of affirmative action could just as easily contend that federal authorities had disqualified far fewer officials than they could have. It would not be hard to come up with similar arguments about other nagging issues in the post-Wall period.

Of course, my scenarios exist only in the realm of fancy. There is no guarantee that any will take the form I have described. Yet my point is not whether one or another criticism of past policy will be used to call attention to enduring social and political disputes. Rather, I mean to suggest that demands for justice and for the admission of wrongdoing exhibit a stubborn resiliency that makes them difficult to step over lightly.

The Meaning of Transitional Justice

Now that I have identified three similarities among states' efforts to come to terms with their past, where does this recognition leave us? I can imagine that those individuals who are optimistically moving down the path of restorative justice would be disappointed after listening to me, even distressed. After all, these similarities are not about what can be

done but instead about what cannot be done: factors you can't control, issues you can't resolve, and controversies you can't escape.

Because I am an historically-minded political scientist, these seemingly less than uplifting conclusions do not bother me much. The objective is to get things right. In particular, in a scholarly climate of postmodernist fascination with dominance and power, I like being able to shine light on what states cannot do and cannot determine. At times, their leaders are given too much credit. With respect to one subgroup of my own discipline's sometimes fetishistic obsession with rational choice, I also enjoy having the opportunity to point out that justice is about something more consequential than acting out preferences and fitting them into neatly configured boxes.

But if I am right, what should we say to those hopeful individuals who still want to do something about the recurring problem of historical injustice? From my perspective, the answer to this question is actually good news. If the attempt to repair long-standing wrongs is not about using a utilitarian calculus to decide what we should or should not aspire to accomplish, then it must be about something more fundamental in life that transcends individual cases. As Hannah Arendt emphasized in her examination of Adolf Eichmann's "unthinkable" crimes, you don't need to anguish over the difficulty of achieving justice before you act upon it.⁹ You take action because it is the right thing to do. I would push Arendt's point even further. Doing the right thing should not depend upon the gravity of the crimes. It should be one's first consideration in dealing with every instance of injustice.

In this light, allow me to emphasize what I am not arguing in this essay. I am not saying that one should refrain from addressing the wrongs of a tyrannical regime just because one's room for maneuver is constrained by preceding events and decisions. Nor am I saying that one should abandon the quest for justice, truth telling, and reconciliation because these goals are difficult to attain. Indeed, I welcome the fact that democratic leaders can never be sure that they will satisfy all participants in a dispute, even including parties a generation or more down the road. I am simply arguing that we should be aware of what we are getting into and be prepared for the challenges I have described above.

At this point, I want to return to the implicit problem of beginning with the differences among cases before proceeding to what unites them. When one starts with differences, one may please the social scientist or the occasional politician. But in the same breath, one runs the risk of characterizing principled decision-makers—that is, the kind of leaders both Arendt and I would prefer—as something we hope they are not: calculators and opportunists who first test the wind's direction before deciding what to do.

This is no small matter. We are accustomed to speaking about transitional justice in terms of its retrospective purposes. But it can have prospective functions as well. The spirit and energy that democratic leaders bring to a common problem provides their citizens with important signals about what they can expect in the years to come. Should the new regime's behavior be unresponsive and erratic, it is unlikely to gain the trust of a population that has long been subjected to cynical manipulation. Yet, it has a chance of winning credibility if its representatives show their dedication to the principles of fairness and decency that were denied in the past. The recognition of universal norms happens to be an essential condition for all democracies. It transcends the idea that states are so unique that they cannot learn from each other. In fact, if I were given the opportunity to speak to Iraq's new leaders, I would begin with exactly this point.

Notes

¹ A. James McAdams, *Judging the Past in Unified Germany* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

² Karl Marx, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1968), 97.

³ *Judging the Past*, chapter 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, chapter 5.

⁵ For example, see John Dugard, "Retrospective Justice: International Law and the South African Model," in A. James McAdams, ed., *Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 269–290.

⁶ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 241.

⁷ *Selected Works*, 97.

⁸ *Houston Chronicle*, January 20, 2003.

⁹ Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1976), 277–278.

GHI RESEARCH

AUTHORITY IN THE “BLACKBOARD JUNGLE”: PARENTS AND TEACHERS, EXPERTS AND THE STATE, AND THE MODERNIZATION OF WEST GERMANY IN THE 1950S¹

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Contested Modernization

In recent years, research on West German history has shifted its focus in two respects. Mentalities, consumer culture, gender and generational relations, forms of social control—“cultural” issues in a broad sense—have replaced political institutions, decision-making, and economic development as dominant topics. The period from the late 1950s to the early 1970s is now attracting more interest than the first postwar decade.² Not surprisingly, this shift has also changed interpretations of postwar West German history. Both the concept of a “restoration” of the capitalist order with its missed opportunities and the concept of a “zero hour” from which a completely new democratic West Germany emerged have been discarded, the former as overstating historical possibilities, the latter as being too schematic. Recent interpretive models are based on notions of westernization and Americanization, and they describe the driving forces behind as well as the obstacles to this process that made West Germany eventually a stable part of the Western world. From this perspective, the 1950s no longer appear as a decade of apolitical materialism and authoritarianism, but rather as a time of transition during which Nazi and pre-Nazi authoritarian attitudes were being undermined by mass culture and Western ideas. The 1960s then saw a new generation assuming leadership positions and calls for reform in many areas. This happened long before the student protest movement of 1968 took the stage.

Ulrich Herbert has most recently summed up this new paradigm of West German history by describing developments from the 1950s on as a “process of liberalization,” which “began in the late 1950s, came to a peak over the course of the 1960s, and continued in diversified forms until the 1980s.”³ Herbert defines liberalization as the modernization of “ways of life and political attitudes” in terms of “participation, democratization, and pluralization.”⁴ Liberalization tackled and overcame “existing deficits of liberalism and modernity.”⁵ This definition, while being much more subtle and flexible than previous ones, raises a number of questions.

First, it seems to suggest that every deviation from the attitudes and mentalities that were predominant in the 1950s had positive effects. This may undoubtedly be true in many, but hardly all respects. For instance, the widespread notion that comprehensive planning would solve all problems, most notably in the fields of urban and educational planning, is no longer seen by many observers as evidence of a successful modernization of attitudes in the 1950s and 1960s. If all change is basically regarded as positive, then an unwarranted teleology creeps into the concept, as in previous models of modernization. Second, it can well be argued that the ideology of thorough planning as a precondition of successful reform was not "liberal" at all, at least not in the European sense of the term, although it was certainly "modern." Third, Herbert's concept of modernization and liberalization seems to imply that their main developments occurred at the same time and were linked to each other. For example, this was arguably not the case with the grassroots politicization that brought the Greens to national prominence. It took place rather from the late 1970s on, well after the Bundestag had passed the great reform bills of the Brandt era. In sum, while Herbert's concept sheds new light on the roots of processes of liberalization in West Germany, as a linear concept it entails a number of problems, particularly in light of the experiences of the 1990s, during which modernization (i.e. democratization) and outbreaks of devastating violence happened simultaneously in Eastern Europe. Modernization and liberalization should therefore be conceptually separated. Modernization may be better understood as the growing complexity of society in all fields and as a reaction to this complexity, with liberalization being one of its possible outcomes, but not a necessary one.

The Concept of the Project

This essay is part of a research project that examines West German education in the 1950s and 1960s as a crucial element of West German modernization. By "education" (*Erziehung*) I mean the activities of all institutions devoted to the task of instilling norms and knowledge in children and youth, centering on family and school as core institutions. I want to explore two issues in particular: how West German education dealt with the legacy of the Nazi past, and how it reacted to the emerging consumer society, in which children and young people seemed more than ever to be in need of attention and guidance. The project will focus specifically on concepts and practices of punishment and the conflicts they generated, as these conflicts always throw the positions in question into sharp relief. I am also planning to make the project comparative by examining American education in the 1950s and 1960s. Here, too, education had to meet

the challenges of an emerging consumer society, and it faced its own problematic legacy of the past through the process of desegregation. Processes of transfer will be given particular attention, since references to American concepts were made frequently in the West German pedagogic debate, and many schoolteachers had gained firsthand experience of American education through postwar exchange programs.

Historical research in the field of West German education thus far has mainly focused on Allied attempts to reform school education in the immediate postwar years.⁶ Studies of the family in postwar Germany have largely been concerned with demography, gender roles, and social policy, but not with education.⁷ West German youth culture has come under close scrutiny in recent years, but the focus of these sophisticated studies has been primarily on cultural Americanization, not on the relations between youth culture and education in family and school.⁸

This essay looks into the problem of authority at West German schools in the 1950s. Contrary to what one might expect during a supposedly authoritarian period, the authority of teachers did not go unchallenged during the Adenauer years. There were serious problems of discipline, and the methods to enforce discipline were contested. Parents wanted to be heard and were ready to criticize teachers and to use legal means against them. The following part of this essay will examine one such conflict in detail: the debate over corporal punishment. Corporal punishment became the subject of heated debates in the 1950s, fueled by lawsuits that resulted in rulings by the highest West German criminal court in 1954 and 1957. The final part of this essay will take a closer look at these debates. In both cases, state governments were called upon to make decisions and settle conflicts. At stake in these conflicts and debates was the acceptability of methods of enforcing discipline at school and, by implication, notions of order in society as a whole. These methods were not determined by political fiat, but negotiated among the various actors. Participation was taking place and, all in all, furthered democratization, although this participation was guided by various motives.

The Uerdingen Scandal

In the fall of 1951, the parents of two students who had just been dismissed from one of the high schools in Uerdingen, an industrial city north of Cologne, filed a lengthy complaint against the school, in which they stated:

“In the present case, the great majority of teachers in this Uerdingen school display a remarkable lack of a democratic mindset. They rely on traditional teaching authority that shares its roots

with Prussian militarism and the arrogance of officials, which, thank God, is abhorred today. They deny the right of co-determination to those who are interested and active in school affairs. They neglect the primordial right, the right of parents.”⁹

Terrible things seem to have happened in Uerdingen. Following the publication of an anonymous letter in a local paper which criticized the school principal for not canceling classes on *Kirmes*-Monday in late July, when many of the city’s factories had closed down for the day, the author, Hermann Simons, a tenth-grader from one of the city’s *Gymnasien*, had been dismissed from school. Klaus Eilemann, one of his classmates, had met the same fate for helping to organize the collection of signatures against Simon’s dismissal.¹⁰ The city was in turmoil. Protest meetings were held, and the regional conference of high school principals proclaimed their solidarity with their colleague. Meanwhile, local and regional papers covered the developing *Uerdinger Schulsandal*, and Uerdingen’s mayor, who also was a member of the North Rhine-Westphalian parliament for the conservative CDU, weighed in on behalf of the two students. Eventually, the state minister of education had to take action after the parents of the two students had filed a formal complaint against the principal. While Minister Teusch upheld the principal’s decision, she criticized him and the teachers’ council of the *Gymnasium* for not having applied appropriate pedagogical discretion in the process. The case was settled with a decision that attempted to accommodate both sides, although the principal’s authority was given priority over the position of the parents. Was democracy in jeopardy here? Was Adenauer’s Germany showing its authoritarian face? Certainly not, as a closer look reveals. The case is telling not so much for its outcome but for the arguments made in the process about the acceptable means to maintain authority and discipline at the Uerdingen *Realgymnasium*.¹¹

The complaint, as the above quote shows, made two historical references and one legal as well as moral point to bolster its case. It denounced Prussian militarism as an outmoded attitude incompatible with new West German democracy and therefore inappropriate in schools. Hence, it was not only Nazism that now had to be overcome, but a certain feature of the much older Prussian tradition as well, which had never been wholeheartedly accepted in the Rhineland. Rediscovering one’s regional identity meant rediscovering democratic roots. The second historical argument—the rejection of the “arrogance of officials” (*bonzenmäßiges Beamtentum*)—was somewhat ambiguous. It can again be read as alluding to Prussian officials in the nineteenth century, who had descended upon the Rhineland after 1815 and found themselves embroiled in a number of conflicts soon after, most prominently religious conflicts between Catholicism and

Protestantism. It can also be read as a retrospective attack on corrupt Nazi officials, in particular those who, in the final stages of the war, had taken care of themselves and left it to others to meet the advancing Allied forces and arrange surrender. However, the term "Bonzen" in conjunction with "Beamte" also had been a staple of Nazi and other antirepublican propaganda before the takeover in 1933. The term had been directed against officials backing the Weimar Republic who were accused of having been appointed only due to their party allegiances and of being interested only in their personal well-being. In sum, the term was problematic.

The third key argument made in the complaint faulted the authorities for not involving the parents properly in the decision-making process. The parents were addressed as "interested and active" because in the preceding years, councils giving parents a say in school affairs (*Elternausschüsse*) had been set up all over the country. The local council had not been contacted in this case, however. In addition, this parental right to voice an opinion was construed as something more fundamental, as the "primordial right," assuming priority over states' rights. This was an implicit reference to Section 6 of the Basic Law of 1949, which had stipulated that education was the parents' "natural right." It also referred to Nazi school policy, which had abolished elected parental councils in favor of small bodies of appointed representatives that were under tight control of the principal and lacked the right even to discuss disciplinary matters.¹² Reinstating parents' rights and redefining the private sphere in this vein was of major importance in the early Federal Republic, particularly for conservatives.

One crucial element of the conflict was not mentioned in the complaint, for it definitely would have hurt the case brought against principal Dr. Borucki. The last sentence of Heiner Simons' letter to the *Rheinische Post* had originally read: "This should even be obvious to a principal who does not hail from Uerdingen, but rather from east of the Oder-Neisse-line."¹³ This reference to the former German East had obviously been too harsh for the editor, and had been left out of the published version.¹⁴ Simons depicted his principal as an unwanted outsider out of touch with local customs and Rhenish mentality. Others used even stronger terms. One week after Klaus Eilemann had been dismissed as well, Adolf Dembach, the CDU mayor of Uerdingen, stated in a letter to one of the parents who had tried to act as mediators in the conflict that Borucki had completely lost the trust of Uerdingen's citizenry. He would no longer be able to continue his work in the city, "for a large part of Uerdingen's elite disapproves of him."¹⁵ Borucki had never been accepted in the first place, Dembach claimed, because he had never made any effort to understand his fellow citizens and "to adapt somewhat to our local mentality. He represents the fairly unpleasant East-Elbian (the monocle-wearing Prus-

sian *Junker*), whom we always loathed here in the West."¹⁶ While the complaint had focused on methods, Dembach's letter attacked the person himself, blending Rhenish regionalism with rejection of the refugees from the East, who had to face resentment fairly often in the late 1940s and 50s.¹⁷

However, most of the teachers, as well as the regional and state school officials, most of whom were unlikely to be refugees themselves, sided with Borucki. He seems to have been a very active principal: he initiated the first alumni meeting the school ever held, started a school newspaper, got parents involved in major school events, raised funds among the Uerdingen business community to support students from poor families, and helped raise a huge sum for the construction of a new building for the *Gymnasium*.¹⁸ From this perspective, Borucki was successful, and he apparently enjoyed the support of important segments of the Uerdingen citizenry. What is more, his decision on *Kirmes*-day had not been as out of touch with tradition as the complaint claimed. As the Düsseldorf school board (*Schulkollegium*), which supervised all schools in the region, explained to the ministry, it was tradition that on *Kirmes*-Monday, classes were held for only half of the regular school day. This tradition stemmed from "before the war," which included the Nazi period.¹⁹ Borucki's decision had been in keeping with this tradition, except that due to the irregularities of schooling in the postwar years, *Gymnasium* classes had not been scheduled for Monday morning but for Monday afternoon. Hence, students were free to enjoy the *Kirmes* attractions in the morning, but had to return to school for three hours in the afternoon. Both sides could claim to be right.

There could hardly be any question, however, that Borucki was not very liberal when it came to questions of school discipline. Defending himself in a letter to the ministry of education, he cited attacks on his "honor" and attempts by certain parents to undermine his position. He had stood his ground because he knew "that in my position, I have to defend the freedom, the honor, and the pedagogical efficacy of our country's high schools." Very often, he added, "a measured stern handling of a situation is not inhumane, but rather truly compassionate."²⁰ Having learned about Simons's anonymous article in the *Rheinische Post*, Borucki quickly made clear what he saw as "truly compassionate." Right after the article had appeared on the morning of July 28 (a Saturday), Borucki interrogated several "suspects" and quickly found out who the culprit was. Since Simons himself was on leave this day (the reasons are unclear), he was summoned to the principal's private home at 9 p.m. Upon his arrival, Simons met not only the principal himself but also another teacher, who then took the minutes of the interrogation (the term *Verhör* was used by all parties involved). It lasted one hour. More students were

interrogated the following Sunday and on Monday, both at school and again at the principal's home. On Monday afternoon, the teachers' conference decided to dismiss Simons and to issue a warning to Eilemann; the decision was submitted to the Düsseldorf school board for approval. When summer break began on the following morning, both students were not given their grade reports. Their parents had not been allowed to express their opinion, nor had they been informed about the pending decision.²¹

When classes resumed at the beginning of September, the parents were eventually told that a decision was imminent and that both students were suspended from classes until its announcement. Public outcry followed. Eilemann's energetic older brother, a university student, published an open letter to Borucki in a local paper, and the local school board (*Schulkuratorium*), part of the city government and responsible for part of the school budget, scheduled a meeting to voice its opinion on the matter. While its members were gathering, the Düsseldorf school board, now in obvious haste, announced that it had upheld the principal's decision. This was adding fuel to the fire. The local school board condemned the stance of the Düsseldorf officials. On the evening of the same day, parents and former students organized a protest meeting in the hall of a local brewery. Eilemann collected signatures on a petition criticizing the decision, while his brother drove a car with a loudspeaker on top through the town announcing the meeting. The meeting was well attended, Mayor Dembach was present (and promised to take the case to Minister of Education Teusch), and the local press covered it in depth. A committee of three, among them the head of the parents' council of the *Gymnasium*, was elected to contact all parties involved and seek to reconcile their positions. To no avail, however; the principal was unwilling to change his school's decision, and he received the public backing of the regional conference of high school principals.

Despite the outcome of the affair, it is remarkable how quick and adept the families in question and other Uerdingen citizens were in using the new democratic means of voicing protest against administrative decisions. They knew how to appeal to the public, get politicians involved, and get the press interested. The prejudices against Borucki's Eastern background probably helped to rally people for the cause, but the press coverage of the protest meeting neither backed such a position nor reported this as a factor in the affair. Public criticism of the dismissal centered on the disproportionate character of the punishment. Simons's letter was seen as an act of misconduct that warranted a more lenient punishment.

A second argument that took on equal importance was put forth in the press coverage: that the principal and the teachers' conference had not

followed due process of law. Not only had the parents not been contacted before the decision had been reached, but the parents' council of the *Gymnasium* had not been contacted either. As it turned out, it had not even met for two years. More blunders of this nature became apparent when the complaint, filed by the parents after public pressure had not resulted in overturning the dismissals, was examined by the state ministry of education. The official in charge at the Düsseldorf school board initially had refused even to meet with the parents of the two students. Furthermore, he had given them misleading information about the consequences of the punishment, failing to explain the difference between dismissal (*Entlassung*) as a pedagogical measure and expulsion (*Verweis*) as a legal (and more severe) punishment.²² For his part, by failing to submit his letter to the principal prior to publication, Simons himself had not followed the rules laid out in the school's bylaws.²³ When Minister Teusch finally answered the parents' complaint, she made clear that she regretted both the inept pedagogical and the deficient legal handling of the case, even though she saw the dismissals, which had been followed by the two students being accepted at another local *Gymnasium*, as appropriate.²⁴

Authority at school rested upon upholding pedagogical principles and legal rules. Protecting the "honor" of the principal, however, was not a motive of the minister's decision. Nor did she take offense at the public activities that Simons's and Eilemann's families had launched. Here, Christine Teusch, a staunch Catholic, evidently did not agree with the principals' conference, which had condemned those activities as "a claim to rule, if not on the part of the 'street,' at least on the part of those lacking the expertise to rule."²⁵ When it came to parents' rights, blunt assertions of authority on the part of the state would not be sufficient. Decisions concerning school discipline had to be well founded—if not, parents would not hesitate to criticize them and challenge those responsible. A host of issues could trigger such conflicts: female students wearing pants, the timing of summer and fall breaks, student protests against construction delays, and, most notably, the use of corporal punishment.²⁶ The 1950s were a decade in which conservatism prevailed, but this should not be mistaken for unquestioned acceptance of authority.

The Debate about Corporal Punishment

"It is my opinion that the war and the collapse are the powerful judgement of God, who has punished our people's mind, soul, and body. . . . The teacher, as an educator, acts on behalf of the parents, while the parents act on behalf of God. Should the punishment that the Lord God inescapably metes out to us not be available to those who represent him?"²⁷

The protestant pastor who made this point in a letter to the North Rhine-Westphalian minister of education in September 1947 may have expressed a somewhat extreme position by deriving the legitimacy of corporal punishment in school from God's punishment of the German people in the immediate past. But he was not alone in placing the issue of corporal punishment in a much wider historical and ideological context. The minister of education responded by adding another element to this context, pointing to the positive experience "of other, non-German countries in which corporal punishment by teachers has long since ceased to be used" as a reason for setting precise limits on the use of corporal punishment by teachers in a decree he had issued in June 1947.²⁸ The West German debate about corporal punishment in school, starting in the late 1940s and continuing with unmitigated intensity throughout the 1950s, was also a debate about national identity. The acceptability of corporal punishment was not assessed on pedagogical grounds alone, but also with reference to the fundamental issues of German guilt and democratic reconstruction. Parents and teachers voiced their opinions in the debate, state governments attempted to set and enforce rules, pedagogical and legal experts weighed in, and the courts had to settle conflicts. Justifying or rejecting corporal punishment was a complex task. Transforming it into a legal issue was a way to defuse the problem, but this transformation remained incomplete since it created new difficulties.

In the first years after the war, most of the newly appointed state ministers of education had issued decrees to regulate the use of corporal punishment by teachers. Hesse, Bavaria (its first education minister, who held office only for a few months, was a Social Democrat), West Berlin, and Saarland banned it completely, while the other states, including North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony, wanted its use limited to punishing acts of brutality, cruelty, and other very severe violations of school discipline. These decrees made explicit reference to the unrestrained violence with which the Nazi regime had oppressed its opponents, and defined the new regulations as a clear break with this immediate past. They also explicitly referred to a decree of the Prussian coalition government of 1920, which characterized corporal punishment as "the very last resort," thus pointing to the positive legacy of the first German democracy.²⁹

When the second Bavarian minister of education, ultra-conservative Catholic Alois Hundhammer, rescinded his predecessor's decree in June 1947 and permitted corporal punishment in cases of severe disruptions of school discipline by students, it became clear that learning from the Nazi experience could lead in a different direction. In preparing his decision, Hundhammer had asked Bavarian parents if they were in favor of teachers wielding the cane. Sixty-one percent of the parents supported their

minister's proposal, and he could therefore cite popular backing for his measure. It had helped, though, that the ballots had had to be signed by the parents and had been collected in class. Given that teachers generally favored corporal punishment, opposition could have exposed one's children to unpleasant treatment.³⁰ However, Hundhammer's decree and its democratic legitimation, however questionable, represented one possible way of distancing new West German democracy from the Nazi past. The totalitarian Nazi regime had defined itself as the supreme authority over education as a whole, and relegated all other actors, including parents, to a subordinate position. The Basic Law of 1949 had reinstated parents' rights and, by characterizing those rights as "natural," vested them with an authority that superseded any statutory law.³¹ Hundhammer and other conservative Catholics could therefore very well argue that by permitting corporal punishment in school, they were only fulfilling parents' wishes. From this perspective, teachers acted simply *in loco parentis*.

Proponents of this position could also point to empirical findings about family upbringing and corporal punishment in the home. In the Hessian city of Darmstadt, more than a tenth of the parents polled in 1951 regarded corporal punishment as generally acceptable, while over a third considered it a means of "last resort"; four-fifths of the high school students polled reported personal experience with this form of punishment.³² The nature of change over the following decade is far from clear. In 1965, according to an Allensbach survey, a third of those polled all over Germany deemed corporal punishment generally acceptable, while almost half saw it as a legitimate "last resort."³³ What was acceptable at home would not be easily abolished at school.

Banning corporal punishment completely would therefore require more, not less, state intervention. State governments and parliaments would have to enact the necessary laws, the courts would have to uphold them, and then teachers and parents would hopefully follow suit. In a widely discussed ruling in July 1954, the fifth Chamber of the *Bundesgerichtshof*, the highest West German criminal court, seemed to move the debate in this direction. A teacher from Lower Saxony had slapped and spanked students on eight occasions and had been sentenced to a fine; the fifth Chamber now rejected his appeal. In its ruling, the court cited both historical and pedagogical arguments. It listed and discussed in detail the dismantling of legal regulations that had allowed corporal punishment in the military, in prisons, in marriage, and at school over the previous 150 years. It also expressed deep skepticism whether school education should require corporal punishment at all, and referred to the decrees and their pedagogical rationales in those states that had completely abolished corporal punishment. While the Senate did not want to finally settle this matter, it came to the conclusion that "in rare exceptional cases, a mea-

sured corporal punishment by the teacher may be warranted.”³⁴ From this point of view, wielding the cane or spanking was supposed to be the very rare exception, not a normal feature of school education.

Proponents of the practice were outraged, and reacted with defiance. Max Kohlhaas, a prolific legal commentator, claimed that the ruling had created in many teachers a “feeling of total helplessness even towards the manifestly evil elements.”³⁵ Kohlhaas and other advocates of the practice argued that not only were teachers acting on behalf of parents, they were also forced to resort to the cane by the constraints under which they were operating, *i.e.*, large classes and students coming from broken families. Legal scholars in particular made the point that teachers also had a customary right to mete out corporal punishment. In addition, societal developments in the second half of the 1950s seemed to lend further credibility to its proponents. From 1956 to 1958, a wave of youth riots disturbed the West German public. While harmless-seeming by more recent standards, the riots of the *Halbstarken* were seen by many observers as indicative of the failure of West German democracy. Often occurring in conjunction with the screening of American movies featuring rebellious characters and rock-’n’-roll music, the riots seemed to demonstrate the dangerous effects of cultural Americanization, leading immature youths to act violently and, potentially, to turn against the democratic order in forms akin to those of the late Weimar years.³⁶ Reinforcing order was imperative, and corporal punishment seemed an appropriate means to this end.

Advocates of this position were therefore greatly pleased when the second Chamber of the *Bundesgerichtshof* handed down a ruling in a case of corporal punishment in October 1957 that was markedly different from the 1954 ruling of the fifth Chamber. Charges had been brought against a teacher from Hesse, where corporal punishment had been banned completely in 1946, for hitting students with a cane and slapping them in the face in seven cases. After the lower court had thrown out the case, the state attorney had filed an appeal. The second Chamber confirmed the ruling of the lower court. Drawing upon a number of rulings of the former *Reichsgericht*, the justices saw corporal punishment in school as an accepted, common practice throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and thus—in legal terms—a customary law that was considered to be among teachers’ educational responsibilities. This could only be changed either through laws made by state parliaments or through new customary law. Neither condition had been fulfilled thus far; ministerial decrees were no substitute for laws. Unless the teacher overstepped the boundaries of a “measured punishment”—which in the case in question he had not, according to the second Chamber—he had every right to wield the cane whenever he saw fit.³⁷

Compared to the 1954 ruling, the new ruling constituted a clear step back. Implicitly agreeing with conservative fears about unruly youth, it called for relying on traditional practice rather than discarding it in favor of liberal responses to the challenges of the Nazi past and the emerging consumer society, in which young people were to assert their independence in novel ways. However, judging from the Allensbach survey of 1965, the ruling seemed to be consistent with what many teachers and parents deemed acceptable forms of punishing children and youths. It took another twenty years to settle the issue of corporal punishment in school. The 1960s saw an intense debate about a root and branch reform of education in West Germany, but this debate addressed the question of corporal punishment only implicitly in the context of revising school bylaws and the various forms of disciplinary methods that had already been an issue in the Uerdingen case. Decisions that schools took in this respect came to be subject to a growing body of legal regulations, and could be challenged in court.³⁸ The tendency to turn conflicts about discipline into legal proceedings (*Verrechtlichung*) accompanied the general liberalization of school practices over the course of the 1960s and early 1970s. In the process, corporal punishment lost prominence but remained an issue. The state parliaments of Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Bremen, Lower Saxony, and Rhineland-Palatinate passed bills in the first half of the 1970s that unequivocally banned corporal punishment in school. In 1976, the *Bundesgerichtshof* in another landmark ruling finally declared that the practice had no legal basis whatsoever, bringing its legal erosion to a close.³⁹

This was not the end of the story, however. Some states refrained from passing laws explicitly abolishing corporal punishment for fear of being forced to intervene if teachers violated them. The grey zone of customary law and decrees had, after all, allowed for some flexibility on the part of school authorities. On the basis of the laws prior to the early 1970s, parents whose children were hit by teachers could file assault charges. Now, school authorities had to add charges for committing assault and battery while acting in official capacity (*Körperverletzung im Amt*), which would carry even heavier sentences.⁴⁰ Transforming questions of acceptable methods of discipline into legal questions was a mixed blessing. It helped to diffuse conflicts, but it also brought about new reasons for state intervention. A modernization it was, but it was not necessarily a liberalization.

Notes

¹ This essay is a revised version of a paper presented in Roger Chickering's Standing Seminar at Georgetown University on April 3, 2003. I would like to thank all participants for their valuable comments.

² Hanna Schissler, ed., *The Miracle Years. A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried, and Karl Christian Lammers, eds., *Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften* (Hamburg: Christians, 2000); Ulrich Herbert, ed., *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland. Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 1945–1980* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002).

³ Herbert, "Liberalisierung als Lernprozeß. Die Bundesrepublik in der deutschen Geschichte—eine Skizze," in Herbert, *Wandlungsprozesse*, 7–49, quote on p. 14.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁶ Winfried Müller, *Schulpolitik in Bayern im Spannungsfeld von Kultusbürokratie und Besatzungsmacht, 1945–1949* (München: Oldenbourg, 1995) is the most recent monograph; Torsten Gass-Bolm, "Das Ende der Schulzucht," in Herbert, *Wandlungsprozesse*, 436–466, represents a novel approach.

⁷ Robert G. Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood. Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Merith Niehuss, *Familie, Frau und Gesellschaft. Studien zur Strukturgeschichte der Familie in Westdeutschland 1945–1960* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001); Christine von Oertzen, *Teilzeitarbeit und die Lust am Zuverdienen. Geschlechterpolitik und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Westdeutschland 1948–1969* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999). For a partial exception, see Lukas Rölli-Allkemper, *Familie im Wiederaufbau. Katholizismus und bürgerliches Familienideal in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1965* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000).

⁸ See, for example, Uta Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels. Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Kaspar Maase, *BRAVO Amerika: Erkundungen zur Jugendkultur der Bundesrepublik in den fünfziger Jahren* (Hamburg: Junius, 1992); Thomas Grotum, *Die Halbstarke: zur Geschichte einer Jugendkultur der 50er Jahre* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1994); Peter Spengler, *Jugendfreizeit zwischen Kommerz und Pädagogik: empirische Studien in einer Kleinstadt (1945–1990)* (Weinheim: Beltz, 1994) is a good local case study (of the Bavarian town of Aichach).

⁹ HSTA Düsseldorf, NW 19—251, fol. 24 (formal complaint [*Dienstaufsichtsbeschwerde*] to Minister Teusch, received 9/26/1951).

¹⁰ Both names have been changed.

¹¹ The case is well documented in HSTA Düsseldorf, NW 19—251, fol. 9–201.

¹² Ottwilm Ottweiler, *Die Volksschule im Nationalsozialismus* (Weinheim: Beltz, 1979), 73–79.

¹³ HSTA Düsseldorf, NW 19—251, fol. 75. "Das müßte selbst einem Herrn Direktor einleuchten, der nicht aus Uerdingen stammt," was the wording in the published version.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 11.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, fol. 30.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ See, for example, Paul Erker, *Vom Heimatvertriebenen zum Neubürger. Sozialgeschichte der Flüchtlinge in einer agrarischen Region Mittelfrankens 1945–1955* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1988).

¹⁸ HSTA Düsseldorf, NW 19—251, fol. 125.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 74.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, fol. 126.

²¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 11–14.

²² *Ibid.*, fol. 132f.

²³ *Ibid.*, fol. 74.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 147f.

- ²⁵ Ibid., fol. 62.
- ²⁶ Examples in HSTA Düsseldorf NW 20—106, 108, 109; BR 1039/ 612, 1038/940, Reg. Aachen 24317 et al.
- ²⁷ HSTA Düsseldorf NW 20—106, fol. 154 (Pastor W. B. to Minister of Education, 9/10/1947).
- ²⁸ Ibid., fol. 158.
- ²⁹ Jürgen Rohrbach, *Die körperliche Züchtigung in der Volksschule: eine pädagogische und rechtliche Betrachtung* (Essen: Neue Deutsche Schule Verlags-Gesellschaft, 1962), 18, 40–43.
- ³⁰ Müller, 226-230.
- ³¹ Rohrbach, 43–47.
- ³² Gerhard Baumert, *Jugend der Nachkriegszeit. Lebensverhältnisse und Reaktionsweisen* (Darmstadt: E. Roether, 1952), 87f.
- ³³ Horst Petri / Matthias Lauterbach, *Gewalt in der Erziehung. Plädoyer zur Abschaffung der Prügelstrafe. Analysen und Argumente* (Frankfurt: Athenäum Fischer, 1975), 124. Cf. the sometimes bizarre findings and arguments of cane advocate Walter Hävernich, *'Schläge' als Strafe. Ein Bestandteil der heutigen Familiensitte in volkskundlicher Sicht* (Hamburg: Museum für Hamburgische Geschichte, 1964).
- ³⁴ Heinrich Stettner, *Die strafrechtliche Problematik der körperlichen Züchtigung* (Berlin-Spandau: Luchterhand, 1958), 74-78. For a detailed discussion of the pedagogical arguments against corporal punishment, see, for example, Wolfgang Scheibe, *Die Strafe als Problem der Erziehung. Eine historische und systematische pädagogische Untersuchung* (Weinheim: Beltz, 1967), 341ff.; Heinrich Meng, *Zwang und Freiheit in der Erziehung* (Bern: H. Huber, 2d ed., 1961 (1945)); Rohrbach, 20-27; Otto Menne, "Von der Prügelstrafe zur Erziehungskunst," in *Die Pädagogische Provinz* 4 (1950): 708–713.
- ³⁵ Max Kohlhaas, "Das Recht zur körperlichen Züchtigung. Übersicht über den derzeitigen Stand der Rechtsprechung und Rechtslehre," in *Unsere Jugend* 10 (1958): 401–411, quote on p. 401.
- ³⁶ Cf. Poiger, Grotum. Examples of the profound apprehension on the part of some contemporary observers: Adolf Busemann, "Verwilderung und Verrohung," in *Unsere Jugend* 8 (1956): 159–168; Paul Diwo, "Die Diktatur der 'Halbstarken,'" in *Die Pädagogische Provinz* 10 (1956): 314–318.
- ³⁷ Stettner, 82–92.
- ³⁸ Cf. Gass-Bolm, 450ff.
- ³⁹ Josef Fellsches, *Disziplin, Konflikt und Gewalt in der Schule. Systematische Analyse und schulpraktische Folgerungen* (Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer, 1978), 45.
- ⁴⁰ Heike Jung, *Das Züchtigungsrecht des Lehrers* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1977), 93.

REPORTS ON CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, SEMINARS

THE GERMAN DISCOVERY OF AMERICA: A REVIEW OF THE CONTROVERSY OVER DIDRIK PINING'S VOYAGE OF EXPLORATION IN 1473 IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC

Symposium at the GHI, February 25, 2003. Speaker: Thomas Hughes (GHI). Commentator: A.J.R. Russell-Wood (Johns Hopkins University).

"The German Discovery of America," by Dr. Thomas L. Hughes, a Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the German Historical Institute, reassessed the controversy over Didrik Pining's 1473 voyage of exploration in the North Atlantic—a German-led, Danish-sponsored, and Portuguese-financed expedition seeking a northwestern route to Asia.

Although fragmentary references to this voyage of discovery exist in a few sixteenth-century documents, some dated decades after the event, it was not until 1925 that Dr. Sofus Larsen of the University of Copenhagen published his then sensational book about the Pining voyage, *The Discovery of North America Twenty Years Before Columbus*. Since then, Larsen's account has enjoyed strong scholarly and public support in Scandinavia and Portugal. By contrast, in Germany a certain public acceptance has been offset by strenuous pro and con arguments among German scholars over the last several decades.

Four explorers were mentioned by Larsen. The leaders, Didrik Pining and Hans Pothorst, had clearly seen prior service for the King of Denmark. So, presumably, had Johannes Scolvus. The fourth participant, Joao Vaz Corte-Real, was believed to have been the agent on board for King Alfonso V of Portugal, who financed the undertaking through the good offices of his dynastic colleague and collaborator, King Christian I of Denmark. According to Larsen, the mission most likely began in Bergen, refitted in Iceland, journeyed to Greenland, and went on to discover the "land of codfish" (Labrador or Newfoundland). Pining was rewarded by the Danish king with his appointment as governor (Viceroy) of Iceland, 1478-90, and Corte-Real by the Portuguese king with his appointment as governor in the Azores, 1474-96. We unfortunately know very little about Pothorst, and even less about Scolvus.

Pining and Pothorst had had previous careers as freebooters and privateers, and were known for their expertise in northern waters. From 1925–33 they were assumed to be Danish heroes until German genealogists suddenly and conclusively proved that Pining was a native of Hildesheim, where Pothorst was probably his childhood friend.

No sooner had German heroes unexpectedly arisen, however, than distinguished German scholars entered the fray as disputants. Richard Hennig generally supported the Larsen thesis, while Egmont Zechlin and Heinrich Winter stressed its evidentiary deficiencies. Further research by Paul Pini and Klaus-Peter Kiedel extended the arguments in the years 1970–80.

Meanwhile, the slim evidentiary base has been regularly augmented by continuing public fascination with the story. Streets, buildings, and memorials have been dedicated to Pining in Bremen and Hildesheim. Stamps commemorating Pothorst and Corte-Real have been issued in Greenland and Portugal. All four explorers have achieved a certain notoriety on the internet. Novels and docudramas have further explored the border between fact and fiction.

In 1965, the Norwegian sea captain and arctic explorer Johannes Tor-noe even posited a Pining—Pothorst—Corte-Real voyage of several ships, lasting from 1471–1473, viewing the entire east coast of North America, reaching the Gulf of Mexico, and visiting the Caribbean, “far enough south to determine that there was no opening to the west,” and thereby conditioning later voyages by Scolvus and Columbus.

American and English historians have, on the whole, oscillated between ridiculing and accepting the plausibility of at least part of the Larsen saga. The German critics have trouble with the sighting of Labrador for cartographical and time constraint reasons, but even they accept the probability that a joint Portuguese-Danish voyage did take place, commanded by Pining and Pothorst, with Corte-Real and Scolvus on board. However, they doubt that the voyage went further than the west coast of Greenland.

After reviewing the scholarly disputes in detail, Hughes left the Pining saga in a “kind of suspended animation, with perhaps more suspense than animation.” Considerable circumstantial evidence does exist to support the central proposition, but the positive evidence needed for final proof is lacking. Historians still look for the additional piece of evidence that could tilt the balance one way or the other. Until then we are left with the verdict “not proven,” which, of course, can be read as “not disproven” as well.

Comments on the Hughes paper were given by Dr. A.J.R. Russell-Wood, a specialist on fifteenth-century Portugal and Professor of History at the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. He noted that Hughes

showed once again that there is a tendency for scholars to believe what they are predisposed to believe, but he also found the lecture a “timely reminder that much exploration was achieved by persons denied their place in histories of discovery.”

Dr. Russell-Wood focused on five broad issues that emerged from the presentation. 1) The central role of monarchy in the early modern period, evidenced by this significant example of the royal Portuguese use of a royal Danish flag of convenience. 2) Motivations may well have been mixed—commerce (fisheries), military gain, intelligence gathering, national prestige, and the use of Iceland and the Azores as staging points for further westward exploration. 3) Paradigms of exploration: there were contrasts between this apparently isolated Danish voyage in the north, and the repeated subsequent voyages of the Portuguese in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries to Labrador, Newfoundland, and Cape Breton. 4) Cultural heroes: nations are tempted, however late, to consecrate emblematic figures and create celebrity myths useful to their own national purposes. This has happened in connection with these four explorers even in recent decades, especially with the Salazar regime in Portugal. 5) Sources and historiography: this story is a timely reminder of how it was the exception rather than the norm for there to be firsthand accounts of voyages of exploration. Neither Pining nor Corte-Real apparently ever took on the role of chronicler. The consequent lacunae not only present problems to historians but also permit flights of fancy.

Thomas Hughes

FROM MANHATTAN TO MAINHATTAN: ARCHITECTURE AND STYLE AS TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE, 1920–1970

Conference at Columbia University, New York, March 6–8, 2003. Organized and jointly sponsored by the Institute for the Study of Europe, Columbia University, and the GHI. Conveners: Volker Berghahn (Columbia University), Cordula Grewe (Columbia University), Christof Mauch (GHI). Participants: Adrian von Buttlar (Technische Universität Berlin), Fabienne Chevallier (Paris I University), Jeffry Diefendorf (University of New Hampshire), Kathleen James-Chakraborty (University of California, Berkeley), Peter Krieger (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México), David Lazar (GHI), Christian Maryska (Austrian National Library, Vienna), Peter Müller (Office of the Federal Commission for Culture and the Media of the Federal Republic of Germany), Dietrich Neumann (Brown University), Mary Nolan (New York University), Daniel Purdy (Pennsylvania State University), Alexander Sedlmaier (Technische Universität Berlin), Beate Störckuhl (Bundesinstitut für Kultur und Geschichte der Deutschen im östlichen Europa, Oldenburg), Wolfgang Thöner (Stiftung Bauhaus Dessau).

The appearance of high-rise buildings in cities around the world in the decades after World War II was widely seen as evidence of creeping American influence. Like so much deemed “typically American,” however, the glass and steel tower was more hybrid than autochthon. In tracing the roots of architectural modernism, Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson pointed to a series of developments in both the United States and Europe, and the name they coined for this movement underscored its multifarious origins: the International Style.¹ The transatlantic interaction Hitchcock and Philip sketched in their pioneering 1932 study would continue, not least with the emigration of two of the four architects Hitchcock and Johnson had designated the leaders of the International Style—Walter Gropius and Mies van der Rohe²—from Europe to the United States. The conference “From Manhattan to Mainhattan: Architecture and Style as Transatlantic Dialogue, 1920–1970” was conceived as an opportunity for interdisciplinary examination of cultural exchange between Europe and the United States that had profound social, economic, and even political resonance.

The three papers presented during the first session of the conference explored some of the associations and expectations modern architecture and urban planning inspired. Fabienne Chevallier traced the growth and decline of French interest in the buildings rising across the Atlantic in her paper “The Skyscraper and the Reception of American Society in France,

1920–1961.” Following the First World War, it was above all French engineers and public officials, rather than architects, who sought to adopt the building technologies and construction techniques pioneered in the United States. Hopes that new ways of building could help solve social problems were strong in the years immediately following the Second World War, but gave way in the late 1950s to a growing concern among the French public and architectural profession alike about the baleful impact of American influence on local lifestyles and cultural traditions. Jeffrey Diefendorf’s paper “Planning the ‘Healthy City’: From Germany to America in the Work of Gropius, Wagner, and Neutra” examined how Walter Gropius, Richard Neutra, and Martin Wagner—like their French contemporaries—were deeply interested in the buildings rising across the Atlantic. They gave much attention during the 1920s to the possibilities that new construction technologies offered for improving housing. Their careers took very different paths after each emigrated to the United States, Diefendorf explained, and their views on architecture’s social potential changed as well. After emigrating to the U.S. during the 1930s, all three came to see the small neighborhood as the core element of a healthy city and a democratic society. Only Wagner, though, remained committed to pursuing social reform through architectural design. Neutra and Gropius, on the other hand, adapted to the realities of the American scene and were to enjoy considerable success in the postwar United States. The commercial rather than social potential of modern architecture was the subject of the session’s third paper, Christian Maryska’s “Paper Skyscraper: The Representation of ‘Tall Buildings’ in Austrian and German Commercial Art in the Twenties and Thirties.” Maryska presented numerous examples of the different ways commercial artists tried to draw upon the skyscraper’s iconic value as a symbol of urbanity, modernity, and prosperity.

The second session took up architectural debate and the extra-architectural forces that influenced the development and transmission of architectural ideas. In her paper “A Cathedral of Work and New Social Life,” Beate Störkuhl outlined the career of architect-planner Max Berg and his part in the German debate on the appropriateness of the skyscraper. Berg, in his capacity as the head municipal architect in the city of Breslau from 1910 through 1925, championed high-rise buildings for civic, commercial, and residential projects. Although he was an admirer of the Chicago School of architects and clearly borrowed both design and construction ideas from the United States, Berg was highly critical of American architectural and planning practices, and he joined in the call for a “German” skyscraper. His criticism of the “American” skyscraper stemmed in large measure from aesthetic and social concerns, but

Störkuhl suggested that the assumption of German cultural superiority—particularly prevalent in the wake of Germany’s defeat in the First World War—also played an important part in Berg’s critique. Kathleen James-Chakraborty, in her paper “Proportions and Politics: Marketing Mies and Mendelsohn,” used the careers of Eric Mendelsohn and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe to challenge the picture of the diffusion of the International Style as a “seamless transition” between the old and the new. Mendelsohn and Mies competed for commissions in Germany during the brief period of economic recovery between 1924 and 1929. Mendelsohn was considerably more successful, not least, James-Chakraborty suggested, due to his understanding of the appeal of “technological spectacle” among his commercial clients and the public they hoped to serve. In postwar America, on the other hand, concern over construction costs and the changing self-perception of the taste-making elite prepared the way for Mies’s success and influence. Mies was cast as the heir to the Chicago School architects of the late nineteenth century, and the International Style he helped create was adopted by Cold War America as a symbol of its cultural sophistication. The International Style eventually took hold in postwar Germany, too, but not before conservatively inclined architects in the Federal Republic tried to adapt “Germanic tectonics” to a new political context, Adrian von Buttlar argued in his paper entitled “‘Germanic’ Structure versus ‘American’ Texture in German Postwar High-Rise Buildings.” From the classicists of the early nineteenth century to the beneficiaries of Nazi patronage during the Third Reich, German architects and theorists repeatedly turned to tectonics and the emphasis of structure in their search for a distinctly “Germanic” architectural style. “Germanic tectonics” survived the collapse of the Third Reich, von Buttlar noted, because, as a result of the emigration of Germany’s leading modernist architects during the 1930s, responsibility for postwar reconstruction in both eastern and western Germany was largely in the hands of architects who had been active or even leading figures in the profession during the Nazi era.

Attention shifted in the third session to perceptions and experiences of the skyscraper. The rise of glass and steel towers around the globe during the 1950s and 1960s paradoxically did little to reduce the identification of such towers with the United States, Peter Krieger argued in his paper “New York Skyscrapers Made in Hamburg: Jerry Cotton as Visual Educator.” Jerry Cotton is the hero of a popular series of German crime thrillers set in New York City. Several Cotton adventures were adapted for the screen during the 1960s, and all, Krieger explained, could be filmed in West Berlin and the Federal Republic—much more cheaply than they could be in New York itself—thanks to the presence of “typi-

cally American" skyscrapers that could pass for those in New York in the eyes of German film-goers. New York, particularly Rockefeller Center, was very much on the minds of everyone involved with the development of West Berlin's "Europa-Center" in the mid-1960s, Alexander Sedlmaier noted in his paper on the prominently located shopping and office complex. Sedlmaier underscored the importance of the Cold War context in which the Europa-Center took shape: the complex was to symbolize West Germany's *Wirtschaftswunder* and political integration within the West. In Sedlmaier's view, it also reflects the postwar stress on consumer consumption; as the United States was the pioneer in "consumer modernity," he argued, the Europa-Center can also be seen as a symbol of the process of Americanization. A less direct, more complicated form of cultural interchange may have been at work in the recent redevelopment of Potsdamer Platz, Daniel Purdy suggested in his paper "Urban Experience Below the Towers of Potsdamer Platz." Purdy, considering Potsdamer Platz from the pedestrian's perspective, suggested an affinity between Potsdamer Platz and lower Manhattan. He called particular attention to the impressions created by the density of the buildings at Potsdamer Platz and the narrowness of the streets.

The final session of the conference considered the reception and practice of modern architecture in the German Democratic Republic. In his paper "From 'Unpatriotic Symptom' to 'Poetry of the Future,'" Wolfgang Thöner sketched the changes in the reputation of Bauhaus in Eastern Germany from the end of World War II to roughly 1970. Early postwar plans to rebuild and reopen the Dessau Bauhaus as a school of design initially had Soviet backing, but were abandoned as communist officials came to see Bauhaus ideas and aesthetic values as expressions of capitalism and "cosmopolitanism." In the first half of the 1950s, official policy favored "national traditions" and classicism as the proper architectural expressions of the new society being created in the GDR. After about 1956, according to Thöner, experimentation in design and construction methods became possible, and debate on architecture and planning became possible, within limits, during the 1960s. By the end of the decade, the Bauhaus tradition had come to be seen as a positive model. The last of the papers presented, Peter Müller's "Power to the Center!" took the *Fernsehturm*, the dominant element in the East Berlin skyline, as the point of departure for a discussion of the ideological concerns behind urban planning in the GDR. Official resistance to modernism began to give way in the mid-1950s as East Germany tried to compete for prestige on the international scene. Economic difficulties in the early 1960s put an end to the discussion of high-rise development in East Berlin but did not derail the construction of the *Fernsehturm*. The tower, Müller argued, served

multiple symbolic and propaganda functions. Its Sputnik-like form, for instance, was to herald a future of socialist progress and plenty.

The organizers envision a publication based upon the conference.

David Lazar

Notes

¹ Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson, *The International Style*, with a new foreword and appendix by Henry-Russell Hitchcock (New York, 1966; originally published in 1932 under the title *The International Style in Architecture Since 1922*). In his preface to the 1966 edition, Russell notes that he and Johnson had not capitalized the label “the international style” in their text, but Alfred H. Barr had in his preface to the book.

² The other two architects whom Hitchcock and Russell designated as leaders of the International Style were J.J.P. Oud and Le Corbusier.

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES FROM 1945 TO THE PRESENT

Conference at the GHI, March 10, 2003. Conveners: Dirk Schumann (GHI) and Georg Schild (GHI/University of Bonn). Participants: Dr. Cathleen Fisher (AICGS), Michael R. Hayse (Richard Stockton College), Gary LaFree (University of Maryland), Ursula Lehmkuhl (Free University Berlin), Alf Lüdtke (Max Planck Institute, Göttingen), Christof Mauch (GHI), Bernd Schäfer (GHI).

Against the background of the looming war with Iraq and growing German-American tensions, this conference brought together scholars from both sides of the Atlantic to discuss the problem of "security." The goal was to explore the term's different meanings—social security, security from crime, and military security—and to analyze the perception of security in the United States and Germany. The conference addressed a number of questions, such as why Americans and Germans have different demands on the social security systems of their countries, under what circumstances they consider themselves safe from crime, and what lies at the heart of the different perceptions of national security concerns. The conference was divided into three panels. In each panel, a German and an American scholar talked about one particular aspect of security in one country.

The conference started with a panel on perceptions of social security. Georg Schild described the historical development of the American "semi-welfare" state since the 1930s and pointed to differences between the German and American welfare states. Whereas the German welfare state is middle-class oriented and accepts large financial redistributions, the U.S. welfare state emphasizes contribution-based programs and anti-poverty measures. Both systems are deeply rooted in national traditions, and both systems face problems in the long term. Inequality has reached such high proportions in the United States that the very social fabric of the country is strained. But the German social welfare state has problems, too, as Michael Hayse pointed out. He agreed that the American and German welfare states were products of distinct historical developments. The West German government gained legitimacy after 1948 in part because it provided social security to its citizens. Today, however, the welfare state has reached enormous proportions, and current taxpayers fear that the state will not be able to support them in the future. The German government has thus far reacted inadequately to this problem.

In the second panel, Alf Lüdtke and Gary LaFree compared the perceptions of security with respect to crime in both countries. Lüdtke em-

phasized the rebuilding of the West German police force against the background of the “criminality of misery” in the early postwar years. The “hunger experience” framed the perception of crime after 1945. This experience subsided in later years and gave way to other perceptions of crime in a pluralistic society. At the same time, the police tried to find their appropriate role between the restoration of masculinity after the lost war and the image of “friend and helper.” Lüdtke and LaFree agreed that the formation of perceptions of crime within a society is a rather complex process. LaFree pointed out that after an immediate postwar period with low crime rates, the United States saw a “crime boom” in the period 1961–1974. In those years, however, there were few public debates about crime. It was only after the crime rate reached a plateau at a relatively high rate that public perception shifted. Politicians such as Senator Barry Goldwater called for stiffer penalties. As a result, the government shifted its crime-fighting resources increasingly from prevention to the “back end approach” of punishment. The 1990s saw a drop in the number of violent crimes largely because of the strong economy and because of high incarceration rates. Lüdtke and LaFree worried that the current trend of wealthy individuals surrounding themselves with private protection, such as gated communities and bodyguards, or “bubble security,” is an unhealthy development because it undermines the security from crime for the average citizen.

The third panel dealt with different interpretations of military security in Germany and the United States after 1945. Ursula Lehmkuhl described how American perceptions of national security evolved after 1945 as a result of the emerging Cold War. She pointed to the importance of the end of the East-West confrontation for American military planning. Currently, America follows contradictory trends. The administration believes that the promotion of American values is important to American security. At the same time, the administration is primarily concerned with a narrowly defined homeland security. Lehmkuhl analyzed U.S. policy on a number of different levels—as ideological confrontation, as a debate between nationalists and internationalists, and as a confrontation between “security” and “liberty.” She deplored the current state of transatlantic relations and considered it hard to repair in the future. Cathleen Fisher, too, emphasized the precarious state of transatlantic relations without, however, trying to predict the future of that relationship. She reminded the audience of the troubled relationship between Germany and the United States since the end of the Second World War. NATO had had serious debates about the introduction of new strategic plans. However, she pointed out that the glue cementing Germany and the United States in the past has disappeared. Europe has turned inward toward completing the process of integration. The European dream of security (against

wars within Europe) has been fulfilled. The American perception of security is global and differs from the European one.

Different perceptions of security vie for attention in Germany and the United States. The final discussion made clear that the German security debate centers around social security, whereas the U.S. debate focuses almost exclusively on the military aspect. Allocations of money every year in each country make the different perceptions obvious. For those concerned with the state of transatlantic relations, there was only hope that after the current crisis subsides, German-American relations can find common ground in the debate about security.

Georg Schild

HONORING WILLY BRANDT

Symposium at the GHI, March 18, 2003, sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung. Convener: Christof Mauch (GHI). Participants: Egon Bahr (Former German Federal Minister), Professor Johannes Heisig (Former President of the Art Academy of Dresden) and Henry A. Kissinger (Former U.S. Secretary of State).

More than 100 invited guests gathered at the GHI on March 18 to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the death of former German Chancellor Willy Brandt, one of the “founding fathers” of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. GHI Director Prof. Christof Mauch welcomed the two distinguished speakers, longtime Brandt associate Egon Bahr and former U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Together they had set up a “backdoor channel” to facilitate communication between the American and West German administrations, and in the process they established a lasting friendship. The audience, which included Wolfgang Ischinger, the German Ambassador to the United States, Guido Goldman and Marc E. Leland, the two chairmen of the board of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, as well as Professor Dieter Dowe of the Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung, not only witnessed the moving encounter of the two elder statesmen but was also happy to see the unveiling of a portrait of Brandt by Professor Johannes Heisig that the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Chancellor Willy Brandt Foundation had commissioned and donated to the GHI.

Both speakers recalled Willy Brandt and, on the eve of the war in Iraq, commented on the current state of transatlantic relations. Egon Bahr, praising the close cooperation between West Germany and the United States in the era of détente and *Ostpolitik*, emphasized the common values as well as the many personal, political, cultural, and economic ties that had bound both countries together in the past 50 years and would continue to do so despite current events. He also described how the very success of Germany’s political and social reorientation after the Second World War has made Germans deeply skeptical about using military means in international conflicts. It should therefore not come as a surprise, Bahr pointed out, that Germany would favor a non-military solution of the Iraq crisis. Citing Willy Brandt’s unequivocal position, Bahr stressed in conclusion that when it comes to defending democracy and freedom, Germany and all the other free European nations will stand by the United States. Henry A. Kissinger reminded the audience of the contribution German leaders had made to West Germany’s democratization

after World War II. Concurring with Egon Bahr's description of German-American cooperation in the era of "Ostpolitik," he praised Willy Brandt for his vision and courage. Expressing his dismay about the present rift in transatlantic relations, he pointed out that the new form of terrorism apparent in the attacks of September 11 demands strategies that look beyond traditional notions of state sovereignty. While faulting the Europeans for not adequately recognizing this new challenge, he called upon Europeans and Americans to join forces in devising appropriate strategies of preemption. Kissinger was confident that relations would be mended in the spirit that had prevailed in the past decades and had been conveyed by Egon Bahr in his remarks. (The complete texts of both speeches have been featured on the website of the GHI.)

After Johannes Heisig had taken the floor briefly to thank the audience for the warm welcome and to speak about his experience of portraying Willy Brandt, Christof Mauch joined the artist to unveil the painting to warm applause. A reception concluded the event, which was memorable for its cordial atmosphere as well as for its lasting intellectual and artistic contribution to the work of the GHI.

Dirk Schumann



Dedication of the Willy Brandt portrait

HISTORICAL JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: HOW SOCIETIES ARE TRYING TO RIGHT THE WRONGS OF THE PAST

Conference at the GHI, March 27-29, 2003. Conveners: Manfred Berg (Freie Universität Berlin), Christian Ostermann (Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington D.C.), Bernd Schäfer (GHI). Participants: Bain Attwood (Australian National University, Canberra), Brigitte Boenisch-Brednich (Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand), Aurelie Campana (Université Robert Schuman, Strasbourg), Svend Aage Christensen (Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen), Julie Fette (University of Maryland, Baltimore), Frank Furedi (University of Kent), Norman Goda (Ohio University, Athens), Constantin Goschler (Humboldt University Berlin), Claudia Haake (University of Western Ontario, London), Hope Harrison (George Washington University), Andreas Hilger (University of Hamburg), Richard Hill (Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand), Sander Lee (Keene State College), Bronwyn Leebaw (University of California, Riverside), Lisa Magarrell (Institute for Transitional Justice, New York), Rachel May (University of Washington, Tacoma), A. James McAdams (University of Notre Dame), Nancy Meyers (Woodrow Wilson Center), Trudy Peterson (Woodrow Wilson Center), Karen Riechert (Washington, D.C.), David Thelen (University of Indiana, Bloomington), John Torpey (University of British Columbia, Vancouver), John David Smith (North Carolina State University, Raleigh), Philippa Strum (Woodrow Wilson Center), Jakob Tanner (University of Zurich), Andrew Valls (Morehouse College), Angelika von Wahl (San Francisco State University), Robert Waite (U.S. Department of Justice, Washington D.C.), Bernd Weisbrod (University of Göttingen).

History never was, and never will be, short of injustices and atrocities. Quests for their rectification, whether material or symbolic, have become a worldwide phenomenon, particularly over the last two decades. Deriving from those claims and calls are concepts of historical justice encompassing a broad and diverse spectrum of possible actions such as restitutions, reparations, compensations, rehabilitations, truth commissions, and official apologies. Seizing on these timely currents, the GHI and the Woodrow Wilson International Center invited scholars to a major interdisciplinary and international conference to address and explore these issues from various theoretical and practical perspectives. Response to the call for papers was overwhelming.

The participants represented a broad spectrum of scholarly areas of concentration, nationality, and firsthand experiences. Unfortunately, only

this limited number of scholars will be able to attest to the atmosphere of lively debate, mutual inspiration, and engagement that this conference generated. Conference reports in this publication usually do not strike exuberant self-congratulatory tones. Taking the risk of being accused of a biased convener's perspective, however, the sheer quantity of enthusiastic responses from participants during and even long after the conference must not be left unnoticed. These three days in March 2003 in Washington were deeply rewarding for everybody involved.

The first panel, broadly called "Theory and Approaches," was opened by Sander Lee with philosophical reflections on issues of justice in war crimes trials. He argued that commonly accepted natural law justifications for tribunals are misleading and might be more honestly described as positive law accounts. Despite their use of retroactive law, these trials can be morally justified. Furthermore, the nations of the world should publicly accept the legitimacy of legal mechanisms such as the newly formed International Criminal Court. Such mechanisms, according to Lee, will empower the international community to intervene appropriately in the event of a repetition of such crimes. Angelika von Wahl examined the question of what general factors lead governments to agree to pay reparations. Taking four post-1945 cases, she demonstrated how political factors influence government involvement and how politically weak lobbies yield meager results in terms of reparations despite the morality of their claims. Ethnically or racially motivated crimes would stand a better chance to be redressed than human rights abuses pertaining to sexual orientation or gender issues.

For Frank Furedi, the demand for the rectification of historical injustices is inextricably linked with the politics of recognition. Cultural forces that encourage the politicization of memory at the level of the individual foster the growing tendency to construct contemporary identity through the demand to right past wrongs. Today, history would play a uniquely important role in the therapeutic sense of endowing individuals' circumstances with meaning. However, Furedi asserted, the idea that the rectification of old injustices will create a more inclusive identity is contradicted by recent experience. Suffering as a unique experience differentiates the victim from others. Therapeutic history is more likely to divide than reconcile. In another vein, John Torpey defined the extensive contemporary concern with past injustices as an extraordinary shift in progressive ways of thinking about politics. Putative "lessons" of twentieth-century history have encouraged a shift from the labor movement's former rallying cry of "don't mourn, organize" to a sensibility that insists that we must "organize to mourn." Therefore, efforts to rectify past wrongs have arisen on the one hand as a substitute for expansive visions

of an alternative human future and on the other hand as a response to the rise of identity politics.

Slavery and the African-American quest for reparations was the topic of the conference's second panel. Manfred Berg attempted to analyze historical discourse and the theoretical assumptions employed by the antagonists in the current polemical controversy surrounding the issue of reparations for slavery. When addressing the impact of slavery, he probed into questions of historical continuity and counterfactual analysis, as well as the inadequate compensation for African-Americans today. Although he acknowledged these notions as legitimate tools of scholarly analysis, he labeled them as highly questionable sources of moral authority in order to substantiate material claims. Demanding reparations today would create an illusion of infinite corrective justice and actually impair the prospects of redistributive social reform on behalf of poor African-Americans. In his attempt to historicize the slave reparations debate, John David Smith argued that long before modern reparationists made their case for economic redress, African-Americans had clamored for payment for their 250 years of involuntary servitude. Focusing on the history of the slave reparations movement from 1865 to 1917, Smith concluded that the history of this early debate raises questions about the rhetorical use of the term "reparations" by its modern proponents. He also underscored the historical continuity of whites' unwillingness to apologize for or to admit guilt over African-American slavery. Andrew Valls asserted that merely ceasing to engage in abuses and vowing to act upon different values is not enough. Certain kinds of rituals and symbolic expressions would be warranted to explicitly reject the values of the past. Defining the post-civil rights era of the United States as an incomplete regime transition, Valls focused on the role of apologies in moral repair during those periods and argued that an apology to African-Americans would be required to establish a just transition.

Concluding the first day of the conference, and following an introduction by Bernd Schäfer, A. James McAdams from the University of Notre Dame gave the keynote lecture at the GHI on "Transitional Justice after 1989: Is Germany so Different?" His well-received remarks are published in the "Feature" section of this issue of the GHI *Bulletin*.

An entire panel was devoted at the beginning of the second day to the South African model and "the search for truth." Rachel May critically examined the contested notion of "truth" in the truth gathering projects that have become standard features of post-authoritarian regimes. She argued that several distinct categories of truth telling must be clearly delineated in order to carry out and evaluate the tasks of truth commissions. Ultimately, a more epistemologically rigorous notion of this term is both preferable and necessary. Using testimony before South Africa's

Truth Commission by victims and perpetrators of gross human rights violations to explore how history has framed its uses of the past, David Thelen emphasized the tensions that witnesses felt between being human beings and historical actors. He advocated the reenactment of the past as a means to delve more deeply into how participants experienced their worlds. Bronwyn Leebaw examined how the concept of restorative justice was adopted by the Commission. She argued that this occurred not only as a way to conceptualize the possibility of healing, but also to advance a form of critical historical judgment. Understanding tensions between those goals is important in assessing future efforts to apply restorative principles to historical justice projects.

Opening the fourth panel on "Indigenous Peoples," Claudia Haake outlined how through the peculiar application of a policy of removal, the Native American tribe of the Delawares went from being a sovereign entity to being a nation within the United States, and eventually to living among Cherokees as a nation within a nation within a nation. She demonstrated how the Delawares refused to surrender their legal identity and continued fighting by using the American judicial system. Svend Aage Christensen highlighted the 1953 relocation of the inhabitants of the hunting settlement of Uummannaq in Greenland due to the expansion of the American Thule Air Base. The subject of official investigations, lawsuits, and negotiations between the United States, Denmark, and Greenland, the still pending case for adequate reparations demonstrated the merits of individual versus collective compensation arrangements.

In his case study on Australia, Bain Attwood considered the multi-valent ways histories have influenced projects of reconciliation in settler societies. He portrayed the problem of historical justice in such societies as being actually much greater than classic cases like Nazi Germany. Colonial pasts would be more entrenched, as they had involved several generations and problems would thus be more intractable. In seeking to redress historical injustices, history's epistemological basis would tend to give rise to singular historical narratives and thus be complicit in the modern state's goal of a unitary nation. By contrast, memory could produce more diverse historical narratives. Therefore, rectification of historical injustices would require nation states to recognize not only people's different pasts and narratives but also the different visions of citizenship and democracy that these narratives entail. By contrast, as Richard Hill and Brigitte Boenisch-Brednich jointly demonstrated in the case of New Zealand, the negotiation of compensation to Maori for the Crown's past breaches of New Zealand's founding document (the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi) has reached an advanced level. However, they asserted that the majority European (*pakeha*) population has yet to realize that this provi-

sion of reparations for past wrongs will not suffice. Historical production in New Zealand was heavily involved in the Maori quest for autonomy (*rangatoratanga*) and constituted a major national discourse. There was cause for optimism, as New Zealand has become officially bicultural, in contrast to the assimilationist policies of the past. Biculturalism as an increasing feature of everyday life would provide hope that "Aotearoa" (the Maori name for the country) could take up a significant partnership position within "New Zealand."

Jakob Tanner opened the first panel on "Post-1945 Developments." Tanner explored the efforts toward a rectification of injustices of the Nazi regime by focusing on tensions between history, law, and money during the restitution process. He looked into the impact of historical research and interpretation, the role of "nations," and why the claim for historical justice is so often expressed in financial terms. Might money, beyond its capacity to mobilize material resources, function as a symbolic language of awareness, recognition, and reconciliation? Constantin Goschler dealt with the perception of divided "wrongs" within German society. Looking at the various decades since the end of World War II to the present, he explored the tension between victims of Nazi persecution and German self-victimization. Only with German reunification in the 1990s did claims for compensation of Nazi victims rise to a prominent position in Germany itself, even serving in part as models for worldwide efforts to redress historical injustices. Bernd Weisbrod drew further conclusions from post-1945 German history when he compared postdictatorial competitions of victimhood. "Politics of the past" would have served not only as cover for past complicity, thereby obscuring aspects of mass involvement, but would also have provided conditions for politics of recognition leading to the emergence of trust in democracy. Looking into the powerful social force of public apology, Julie Fette drew on the example of France, where President Chirac's 1995 official remorse for the state-sponsored antisemitism of the Vichy Regime had created a wave of groups stepping forward to atone for their particular guilt during those years. Fette analyzed how this process helped French society to transcend its past, and how the model of apology may be applied to other historical events, such as the French role during the war in Algeria.

In the next panel, Bob Waite looked into the American legal profession's response to Nazi atrocities and the issue of war crimes trials in Germany between 1942 and 1947. He examined lawyers' and legal organizations' perceptions of war crimes, the discussion of matters of international law, the view of the International Military Tribunal assembled at Nuremberg, and the legacy of its proceedings. Norman Goda discussed aspects of Spandau military prison, which had housed the seven major German war criminals convicted but not executed at Nuremberg. Span-

dau, the only international war crimes prison in history, was administered jointly by the four victorious allied powers of World War II. According to Goda, the case of Spandau demonstrated clearly how international politics and variant historical memories affect issues of international justice, even decades after the crimes in question. Steve Heder looked at evidence of crimes against humanity committed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979 and ensuing efforts to bring perpetrators to justice after the fall of this regime. He then attempted to analytically situate the evidence and efforts at accountability within the ongoing discussion about the Nazi Holocaust. Whereas he viewed Cambodian events as best enlightened by seeing them in terms of functionalist accounts, Heder regretted that current "politically-driven" efforts by the United Nations for a trial of Cambodian crimes would perpetuate a more intentionalist, top-down theory of the case, which would shield from political scrutiny "small fish" with present political influence. Concluding this panel, Hope Harrison looked into German attempts to come to terms with the East German past after 1989. She discussed how both East and West Germans influenced this process, and she described the handling of the Stasi files and the initial steps taken by East Germans to bring former top officials to justice. Harrison also addressed how the unification process and postunification developments affected those overall efforts.

In the final panel, titled "Justice Pending and Unreconciled Past," Aurelie Campana assessed the development of Crimean Tatars' claims to redressing historical injustices from rehabilitation to the definition of new relationships with their historical homeland. She asserted that the quest for justice has greatly influenced the construction of the Crimean Tatar nation. Integrating this sentiment with an ongoing perception of resentment would explain the Tatars' intact determination to obtain complete rectification and achieve full reconciliation with the past. Andreas Hilger focused on the legal instruments of Russia's efforts to come to terms with Soviet repression against German, Polish, Hungarian, Austrian, or Japanese citizens after the end of the Second World War. He showed how those efforts are embedded in Russian politics and the inconsistent attitude toward the history of the USSR. In particular, Hilger emphasized the disregard of the historical ideologization of Soviet juridical measures. He defined this as a desire for clinical separation of inseparable parts of history to rebuild a strong Russian state in the present and therefore to create a continuity with former Soviet political priorities. Concluding the last panel, Karen Riechert drew on case studies of three Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala) to discuss their notions of transitional justice. She suggested that a concept of a "transitional society" would more accurately describe the various processes, thereby over-

coming an all too strong dichotomy between “truth” and “justice.” She noted the need for more effective prosecution of former perpetrators together with trust-inspiring reforms of the judiciary and the police, as the truth commissions at work in all three countries had insisted upon in their final recommendations.

As we are watching current developments in postconflict Iraq and the stumbling from one pitfall of transitional justice to the next, many experiences and discussions at this conference could not have been more timely. Wrapping them up comprehensively in a volume of the GHI’s series with Cambridge University Press will be a service to this outstanding gathering of international scholars and hopefully to all prospective readers.

Bernd Schäfer

GERMAN HISTORY IN THE EARLY MODERN ERA, 1490–1790 NINTH TRANSATLANTIC DOCTORAL SEMINAR

Seminar at the GHI, April 9–12, 2003. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the BMW Center for European Studies, Georgetown University. Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI). Moderators: Astrid Eckert (GHI), Amy Leonard (Georgetown University), Christof Mauch (GHI), Claudia Ulbrich (Free University, Berlin), Lee Palmer Wandel (University of Wisconsin, Madison).

For the ninth time, the Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History brought together sixteen doctoral students from North America and Germany to present and discuss their dissertation projects with one another and with faculty mentors from both sides of the Atlantic. This year's seminar was dedicated to early modern German history from 1490 to 1790.

The first panel was devoted to two papers on aspects of urban history in the early modern period. Björn Christlieb examined city correspondence from the southwestern region of the Holy Roman Empire in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, in order to uncover the symbolic meanings of the stylized language used by city councils and their scribes. Michaela Fenske presented her dissertation project on early modern market culture, which seeks to analyze the forms of power, economic exchange, and entertainment at a fair and cattle market through a micro-study of Hildesheim, which is primarily based on the surviving *Marktprotokolle* from 1650 to 1717. The discussion focused on the crucial role of language in both the city missives and the *Marktprotokolle*; the relationship between written and oral culture; the uses cities made of written forms of communication; the advantages and disadvantages of microhistory as a historical method; and the fluidity of the power relationships at work in the conflicts examined in both papers.

The seminar's second panel dealt with relations between confessions and the question of religious tolerance. Jesse Spohnholz's paper examined practical strategies for coexistence in the town of Wesel, a major refugee center for Calvinists fleeing the Low Countries, in the period 1568 to 1578. By examining how the immigrants maintained church discipline and governed charity institutions and schools, Spohnholz sought to reveal the daily tactics that the different religious groups used to informally demarcate the boundaries that divided them, even as they preserved the appearance of religious unity wherever possible. Richard Ninness's paper

studied the Prince-Bishopric of Bamberg in the period 1517–1648, focusing on high-level officials drawn from the imperial knights, who were Protestant during the Reformation. Challenging the notion of a polarization between Catholics and Protestants, Ninness stressed the economic, familial, friendship, and patronage ties between Protestant and Catholic members of the Bishopric's elite. Much of the discussion dealt with the confessionalization thesis and the criticism it has been coming under for some time. Participants in the discussion also argued that religious identities were diverse and changing rather than stable and uniform; that one ought to distinguish between different types of Catholicism; and that pragmatic and partial forms of religious tolerance could exist in the absence of "religious tolerance" as a general principle.

The third panel examined early modern rulers and their consorts. As part of a dissertation investigating the position held by the wives of Protestant territorial rulers in the second half of the sixteenth century, Pernille Arenfeldt presented a case study of the conflicts that characterized the marriage of Elizabeth, Duchess of Saxony, to Johann Casimir, Count Palatine. Princely women, like Elizabeth, Arenfeldt argued, had considerably more room for political maneuver and influence than historians have recognized. Mary Venables examined the rule of Ernst the Pious of Saxe-Gotha-Altenburg (1601–1675), arguing that although Ernst did not intend to be a political or religious innovator, he responded to the social and spiritual dislocation of the Thirty Years' War by extending the orthodox Lutheran understanding of a regent's authority to develop a vigorous program for renewed churches, schools, and public life. Among the issues raised in the discussion was the difficulty of determining whether a particular historical case is exceptional or representative. Even if politically influential women were an exception, however, it was argued that there were enough of them that mainstream political *Strukturgeschichte* ought to account for them by overcoming its separation of politics and family. Also discussed was the impact that the shattering experience of the Thirty Years' War had on notions of identity and on religious views on sin and suffering.

The fourth panel was devoted to international relations in the seventeenth century. Daniel Riches's paper examined the increase in Lutheran-Calvinist confessional tension that adversely affected Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic relations in the late 1680s and early 1690s. He argued that although Brandenburg and Sweden shared a real desire to get along, religious issues—including those dividing Protestant sects—still had significant potential to create international tension as the seventeenth century came to a close. Bernd Klesmann's paper analyzed seventeenth-century declarations of war. These declarations, he argued, were directed not just at the adversaries but also at the general public, and continued to

be shaped by highly formalized practices with partly medieval traits until far into the modern era. In the discussion, it was noted that Riches's paper revealed the important role of contingency in history, but the question was also raised to what extent the views of the particular diplomats were actually representative of collective mentalities. It was also pointed out that Klesmann's argument that seventeenth-century declarations of war were directed at the general public called into question the sharp break between old-regime and post-French Revolution warfare that is posited by modern military history.

The fifth panel brought together two very different papers on the general theme of "civilizing missions." Inspired by world-systems analysis, Luke Clossey's paper examined early-modern Jesuit missions as a macrohistorical phenomenon. After outlining the extent of German involvement in the Jesuit missions in Mexico and China, Clossey explored the missionaries' motivations by analyzing the letters of aspiring missionaries to the Jesuit general in Rome, concluding that most missionaries were motivated by a concern for self rather than the desire to convert others. Astrid Ackermann examined late eighteenth-century fashion journals. Despite their fundamentally international orientation, these journals propagated a national taste, the boycott of foreign goods, and, in the German case, a national costume believed to be traditional. Ackermann therefore concluded that these journals expressed a national consciousness, the molding of a national identity for women, and opportunities for women to become nationally involved. Much of the discussion of Clossey's paper focused on the question regarding to what extent it is possible to determine the motives of historical actors and on the broader issue of what kinds of questions historians should be asking. The discussion of Ackermann's paper dealt with the relationships between fashion and gender, between fashion discourse and the Enlightenment, and between local clothing production and national fashions.

The sixth panel explored aspects of environmental history. Marie Luisa Allemeyer's paper examined how the sixteenth and seventeenth-century inhabitants of the Frisian coastal zone perceived the danger they were exposed to by nature—the sea—and what strategies they developed to cope with these dangers. Focusing on struggles over the maintenance and the management of the dikes, Allemeyer argued that these struggles provide significant insight into the society, politics, and mentality of the coastal communities. Warren Dym studied prospecting traditions in Freiberg in the Erzgebirge from 1650 to 1765, seeking to explain the paradoxical fact that members of the Freiberg Mining Academy, which institutionalized research in the earth sciences, continued to patronize the practice of divining. Dym argued that when Enlightenment philosophers challenged mining beliefs, miners and officials defended tradition by

elevating divining in social and epistemological status. Participants in the discussion posed the question whether the conflicts between local inhabitants and central authorities described by Allemeyer and those between local customs and Enlightenment thought described by Dym could be understood as conflicts between popular and elite culture. The authors were also asked about the role of economics in the coastal communities and in mining. Finally, the discussion called attention to the larger historiographical context of the decline of magic and raised the question of how the divining rod was successfully distanced from magic.

The seventh panel brought together two papers on the history of early modern science, alchemy in particular. Andrew Sparling's paper explored how the German chemist and alchemist Johann Rudolph Glauber (1604–1670) understood and configured experience and authority in the texts he wrote and published. Interpreting Glauber's work as a distinctive form of seventeenth-century cultural life, Sparling sought to demonstrate that there were multiple ways of approaching the study of nature in early modern Europe. Renko Geffarth studied the eighteenth-century secret order of the Golden Rosicrucians (*Gold- und Rosenkreuzer*) in order to explore the conjunction of early modern protoscientific thought, alchemy in particular, with a nonconformist religious movement. The Golden Rosicrucians, he argued, provided its members with the opportunity to practice nonorthodox beliefs in a framework that was at once organized and private. The discussion placed Sparling's paper in the context of the "new" history of science, which has come to regard the boundaries between popular beliefs and science as fluid, and placed Geffarth's paper in the context of the "new" history of religion, which encourages the study of religious practices outside the major confessions. Especially with regard to the Rosicrucians, the discussion also reflected on the difficulties of drawing clear distinctions between public and private, between what is open and what is hidden.

The eighth and final panel examined eighteenth-century politics and courtly life. Christopher Bauermeister studied the electorate of Hanover, which has been characterized as "backward" when compared to other eighteenth-century German states, chiefly because of the dominance of the landed elite. After examining Hanover's reform discussions and administrative practice, however, Bauermeister concluded that Hanover showed evidence of the same sort of progressive reform that took place in the more "typical" enlightened absolutisms. Martin Knoll's paper on the princely hunt in eighteenth-century Bavaria examined a privilege that gave the prince a legal monopoly on important ecological (game) and socio-economic (the subjects' property and services) resources. Seeking to analyze the role of the princely hunt in courtly life, in the larger society, and in the ecological environment, Knoll integrated methods and ques-

tions from the cultural history of courtly life, rural social history, and environmental history. The discussion raised definitional questions about major historiographical concepts such as Enlightenment, absolutism, and cameralism, and about the complicated relationship of absolutism and cameralism to the Enlightenment. In particular, discussants wondered whether the “enlightened” Hanoverian administrative reforms did not in fact bring increasing disenfranchisement for the subjects. Finally, the discussion called attention to the ever-present danger of being too influenced by one’s sources and possible ways to remedy this.

In the concluding discussion, participants reflected on the intellectual terrain covered by the seminar as a whole. They noted the prominence of cultural history and the linguistic turn, often in the form of cultural-history approaches to other topics, such as urban history, environmental history, or the history of science. Participants also commented on the regularity with which the discussions had turned to fundamental hermeneutical issues. By contrast, topics that had been prominent in the early modern session of the seminar in previous years, such as straightforward political, social or economic history, were not as much in evidence this year. The seminar was characterized by an ideal combination of serious critical engagement and a collegial and supportive atmosphere. Most participants indicated that they plan to remain in contact with colleagues they met at the seminar. The announcement for next year’s Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar, which will be devoted to the period 1790 to 1890 and will take place in Tübingen, can be found in the “Announcements” section of this *Bulletin*.

Richard F. Wetzell

Participants and Their Topics

ASTRID ACKERMANN (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena), *Der nationale Blick der frühen europäischen Modejournale*

MARIE LUISA ALLEMEYER (Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte, Göttingen), *Gott schuf das Meer, der Friesen die Küste—und die Küste den Friesen? Lebenswelten der Küstenbevölkerung in der Frühen Neuzeit zwischen Macht und Meer*

PERNILLE ARENFELDT (European University Institute, Florence), *Negotiations Between Husband and Parent: A Case of Conflict in the Lives of Princely Women*

CHRISTOPHER BAUERMEISTER (Purdue University), *Enlightened Paternalism: The “Idiom” of Hanoverian Reform Ideology*

BJÖRN CHRISTLIEB (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg), *Die ‘Ehrbarkeit’ der Städte: Politische Handlungsspielräume im Spiegel städtischer Kommunika-*

tion (Städtische Korrespondenznetze im Südwesten des Reiches im späten 15. und frühen 16. Jahrhundert)

LUKE CLOSSEY (University of California, Berkeley), *The German Indies: Central-European Involvement in the Early Modern Jesuit Missions*

WARREN DYM (University of California, Davis), *Shaking Hans and the Deeply Learned: Prospecting Traditions at Freiberg, 1650–1765*

MICHAELA FENSKE (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen), *Marktkultur in der Frühen Neuzeit: Wirtschaft, Macht und Unterhaltung auf einem städtischen Jahr- und Viehmarkt*

RENKO GEFFARTH (Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg), *Religion und Hierarchie: Der Orden der Gold- und Rosenkreuzer als geheime Kirche im 18. Jahrhundert*

BERND KLESMANN (Universität Zürich), *‘Man hört die Rechte nicht/bey Trommeln und Trompeten’. Zur Europäischen Kriegserklärung des 17. Jahrhunderts*

MARTIN KNOLL (Universität Regensburg), *Umwelt—Herrschaft—Gesellschaft: Die landesherrliche Jagd Kurbayerns im 18. Jahrhundert*

RICHARD NINNESS (University of Pennsylvania), *Gegenreformatatorische Fürstbischöfe und ihr Dilemma: Protestantismus und die Entfremdung des Stiftsadels im Hochstift Bamberg*

DANIEL RICHES (University of Chicago), *The Rise of Confessional Tension in Brandenburg’s Relations with Sweden in the Late Seventeenth Century*

ANDREW SPARLING (Duke University), *Johann Rudolph Glauber: Experience and Authority in Early Modern Alchemy*

JESSE SPOHNHOLZ (University of Iowa), *Calvinist Discipline and the Boundaries of Religious Tolerance: The Exile Church in Wesel, 1568–1578*

MARY NOLL VENABLES (Yale University), *Ernst the Pious and the Lessons of the Thirty Years’ War*

**“VOM ALTEN VATERLAND ZUM NEUEN”:
GERMAN-AMERICANS, LETTERS FROM THE “OLD
HOMELAND,” AND THE GREAT WAR
MID-ATLANTIC GERMAN HISTORY SEMINAR**

Seminar at the GHI, May 10, 2003. Speaker: Joseph Neville (National Endowment for the Humanities). Conveners: Marion F. Deshmukh (George Mason University) and Christof Mauch (GHI).

The German Historical Institute sponsored the spring meeting of the biannual gathering of the Mid-Atlantic German History Seminar. Dr. Joseph Neville, Program Officer at the National Endowment for the Humanities, presented the paper for spring 2003, in which he described two weekly newspapers that primarily served German-Americans living in Wilmington, Delaware: the English-language *Sunday Morning Star* and the German-language *Wilmington Lokal-Anzeiger und Freie Presse*. These two newspapers regularly printed wartime letters or excerpts of letters from Germany written to relatives in Wilmington. Neville's paper attempted to provide "a German and German-American perspective on both the personal and larger dimensions of the Great War." In addition, Neville addressed the issue of *Deutschtum*—the manner in which German-Americans in Wilmington addressed their loyalties to their former homeland before and after the United States entered the war in 1917.

The topics raised by the paper reflected the complexity of Wilmington's German-American community. The German proportion of Wilmington's "white foreign-born" population stood at just under 2,000 out of 13,678. Wilmington's total population at the time of the war's outbreak was 87,411. Some German-Americans were born in Germany or the Austro-Hungarian Empire while others were second or third-generation Americans of German heritage. Some remained fluent in the language and others read or spoke only English. Religious differences also complicated the picture because the German and German-American community belonged to an array of religious denominations from Catholic, Lutheran, and Baptist, to Mennonite, Jewish or unaffiliated. In his paper, Neville raised the issue of a "counter-narrative" that emerges after examining the letters published during the 1914–1918 period. He noted that the published letters and articles served to "construct" an alternative picture to that of the English-language and generally pro-British newspapers that dominated in many cities, including Wilmington. Neville noted that by the end of the war, German-American newspapers had experienced a precipitous drop in circulation, and the German language

component almost disappeared. Indeed, at the end of the war, approximately 75% of all German-American newspapers had folded.

A lively discussion centered around questions raised by Neville's paper. Among the many questions raised were: 1) What effects did certain news events such as the sinking of the *Lusitania* or the disclosure of the Zimmermann Telegram have on German-American sentiments in Wilmington? 2) How did German relatives living in Germany perceive the United States and their relations living there? 3) Could one find German-Americans living in Wilmington who clearly identified with the German point of view regarding the war, its causes, and its execution? Or did German-American Wilmingtonians see themselves first as Americans? In other words, by 1914, how assimilated was the German community? Did this have an effect on the rather lackluster attendance at meetings calling for U.S. neutrality? 4) With Germany's declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, the newspapers ceased publishing letters from German relations to their kin in Delaware. How did this affect the readership of the two newspapers? And did U.S. military intelligence play a role in circumventing pro-German sentiments?

The wartime letters from Germany that were quoted and described in the speech display a rich source of materials. The German seminar encouraged Dr. Neville to extract some of the larger meanings from the letters, such as the manner in which they were "constructed narratives" (through selection and editing by the newspaper staff); how and if they mirrored general sentiments both in Germany and the United States; and ultimately, how the war affected the German-American community, using Wilmington as a case study. The seminar provided a fruitful forum for a wide-ranging discussion of German-American relations during wartime.

The Mid-Atlantic Seminar meets twice a year. For more information, please contact: Marion Deshmukh, Department of History and Art History, George Mason University, 3G1, Fairfax, VA 22030. Email: mdeshmuk@gmu.edu.

Marion Deshmukh

**CULTURE IN AMERICAN HISTORY:
TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES
YOUNG SCHOLARS FORUM 2003**

Seminar at the GHI, May 29–June 1, 2003. Convener: Christine von Oertzen (GHI). Moderators: Kathleen Conzen (University of Chicago), Jane Dailey (Johns Hopkins University), Christof Mauch (GHI), Mary McGuire (Southern Illinois University), Michael Salman (University of California, Los Angeles), and Christoph Strupp (GHI).

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The 2003 Young Scholars Forum offered German graduate students working on topics in American history the opportunity to develop their research in collaboration with peers and distinguished professors from this side of the Atlantic. Our work began with an invitation to German applicants to define the role of culture in their approaches to American history, encouraging submissions in the following, admittedly rather general topic areas: migrations and regions; politics and foreign relations; race, ethnicity, and identity; sexuality and gender relations; as well as religion, education, memory, experience, and historical imagery.

After selecting our German candidates, we issued a second call for papers to American graduate students. After considering many strong applications, we settled on ten excellent representatives from Germany and five from the United States. Among these fifteen young scholars, we identified seven general areas of research: the British Empire and America; Film; Intellectual History and Transfer of Ideas; Transatlantic Cultures and Discourses; Slavery; Immigration; and the U.S. Army in Germany and Vietnam. Four distinguished American mentors, each an expert in at least one of the fields mentioned, accepted our invitation to participate in the Forum and to share their broad knowledge of the topics.

In order to promote a lively exchange of views among our participants, papers were distributed in advance. Rather than asking each individual to present his or her work, we followed the model of our existing graduate seminars and decided that each participant should briefly introduce a colleague's paper.

The Forum began with a discussion of Stefanie Schneider's and Almut Steinbach's papers on British-American relations and imperialism during the nineteenth century. Drawing upon contemporary caricatures, Schneider demonstrated that the symbolic representation of friendship existed long before—and not long after, as has often been argued—its manifestation at the formal political level. Steinbach, for her part, called

into question the argument that the advance of English as the world's lingua franca may be attributed primarily to the rise of the British Empire. Americans, not Britons, led the charge, as American missionaries to British colonies such as Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Malaya (Malaysia) went so far as to put reading and writing before religious instruction.

Julian Hanich presented an analysis of the Murnau Film, *Sunrise*. Much praised by critics, the 1927 release enjoyed only limited popular success, a fact Hanich attributes less to the sense that it was "too German" and more to the complex metaphorical fantasy employed by the German-born director who had just immigrated to the United States.

The work of Anja Becker, Michael Frey, and Martin Woessner demonstrated the vitality of transatlantic perspectives on intellectual history. Becker offered us an exact portrayal of the ways Leipzig University served as a conduit for the transfer of knowledge from German professors to American students and therefore back to the United States; Frey and Woessner focused their attention on the period after 1945. Using the example of Marcuse's "One Dimensional Man," Frey showed us how the American and German student movements engaged in a lively exchange of theories back and forth across the Atlantic. Furthermore, Woessner's compelling analysis of Martin Heidegger's reception in the United States proved that the transfer of ideas and knowledge—in this instance, through the initiative of the American philosopher, Glenn Grey—hinges on the individuals and their personal connections.

Hannah Spahn brought us into the realm of linguistic theory with her analysis of Thomas Jefferson's writings. Spahn illustrated that Jefferson's views on slavery were not, as many assume, a paradox, but rather lack the sort of moral ambiguity that modern writers have posited. Jim Down's paper sparked a memorable discussion of whether one can, based on the extant archival evidence, speak of homosexual slaves; this discussion of what is and what is not actually "researchable" informed subsequent sessions as well. Transatlantic exchange is one thing, but how can one define a transatlantic culture? Manfred Roppelt, focusing on ball games in the eighteenth century, and Joseph Murray, tracing the fin de siècle question of whether the deaf should be allowed to marry one another, both addressed this complex question in novel ways. Here the differences within the transatlantic culture mattered, too, for Murray showed that the deaf community in both England and the United States insisted on marrying their deaf loved ones against the wishes of social hygienists.

Three presenters offered their perspectives on questions of immigration. Jens-Rainer Berg's contribution approached immigration as a study of body history and, in this respect, extended the analytical lines set out in Murray's consideration of social hygiene. Entire villages of Catholics

pulling up the stakes in the Eifel and heading to the Holy Land of East-Central Wisconsin was the story Beth Schlemper shared with us, offering a compelling presentation of the nuance geographers bring to the study of history and culture. Susanne Wiedemann traced the complex bundle of ethnic identity, cultural memory, and nationhood through the lives of German-Jewish immigrants—individuals who had eventually made their way to San Francisco via Shanghai.

Alexander Vasansky and Ann-Kathrin Colomb are working on the historical experiences of U.S. military dependents—in Germany and Vietnam, respectively—and their research proves how vital the study of the military is to understanding American society and culture during the twentieth century. Vasansky's interest, based on his study of the archival records, is the problem of deviance and drug use among male GIs, while Colomb's oral history sources shed light on the experiences of Army nurses in Vietnam and then on their lives upon returning to civilian life.

All of the participants presented their work and their comments in compelling and interesting ways. As a group, the participants were engaged and engaging, each able to situate her or his work within the broader strains of historiography that characterize the study of the transatlantic region. The "thickening" of our conversations during our few days together was most satisfying. The concept of culture was not essential in every aspect; instead, intellectual and social history were also important, demonstrating once again that innovative forms of writing history are bound to combine different theoretical and methodological approaches. The discussion resulted in stating the need to define and historicize concepts of transnationalism, regionalism, and transfer.

Bringing young specialists in American history from Germany together with their natural counterparts in this country turned out to be a great success. Both groups expressed the desire to come together as a scholarly community during the coming months and years, an undertaking the German Historical Institute welcomes and looks forward to supporting.

Christine von Oertzen

Participants and Their Topics

ANJA BECKER (University of Leipzig), *'Leipzig University was, until very recently, of no such great importance.'* *Academic Networks of American Students at Leipzig University, 1870–1900*

JENS-RAINER BERG (University of Hamburg), *Different Bodies: 'New Immigrants' in the American Perception*

- ANN-KATHRIN COLOMB (University of Tübingen), *For Jesus Christ and John Wayne: American Nurses in the Vietnam War*
- JIM DOWNS (Columbia University), *Were There Gay Slaves? Homosexuality and the Historian's Craft*
- MICHAEL FREY (University of Bochum), *A Disneyland Version of the Weimar Republic: The American Student Movement and Herbert Marcuse*
- JULIAN HANICH (Free University of Berlin), *Journey to the End of the Night. Murnau's Sunrise and the Conflicting Systems of the American 1920s*
- JOSEPH J. MURRAY (University of Iowa), *True Love and Sympathy. The American Deaf-Deaf Marriages Debate in Transatlantic Perspective, 1833–1920*
- MANFRED ROPPELT (Catholic University of Eichstätt), *Ball Games in Colonial North America as Part of an Atlantic Culture*
- BETH SCHLEMPER (Illinois State University), *From the Eifel to the Holyland: The Construction of Identity and Community Life*
- STEFANIE SCHNEIDER (University of Erfurt), *Gendered Nations. Love Relationships as a Symbol of Anglo-American Paranationalism*
- HANNAH SPAHN (Free University of Berlin), *Jefferson's Attitude toward Slavery and Race as a Problem in Cultural History*
- ALMUT STEINBACH (University of Konstanz), *American Missions in the British Empire. Their Contribution to the Spread of the English Language—A Study of Ceylon and British Malaya*
- ALEXANDER VAZANSKY (University of Heidelberg), *The Army in Decay: Drug Abuse and Racial Tensions in the United States Army, Europe, 1968–1975*
- SUSANNE WIEDEMANN (Brown University), *Berlin—Shanghai—San Francisco: Ethnic Identity, Cultural Memory, and Nation in the (Re) Making of the Shanghailanders Community*
- MARTIN WOESSNER (CUNY Graduate Center), *J. Glenn Gray, Martin Heidegger, and German-American Intellectual Exchange after the Second World War*

The June 17, 1953 Uprising – 50 Years Later

Symposium at the GHI, June 10, 2003. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Ursula Carpenter (Konrad Adenauer Foundation). Moderator: Lily Gardner Feldman (AICGS). Panelists: Christian F. Ostermann (Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars), Robert Bowie (Head of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State, in 1953), Martha Mautner (American Foreign Service Officer in Berlin in 1953).

Although the euphoric reunification of the two Germanys firmly cemented October 3 as the new “Day of German Unity” (*Tag der deutschen Einheit*), the previous national holiday in West Germany, June 17, remains an important date in postwar political consciousness. June 17, 2003 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the first major uprising within the communist bloc—an anniversary that has spawned a plethora of new books, exhibitions, and symposia throughout Germany despite fading memories and the loss of popular appeal. In order to commemorate this significant occasion in the United States, the Washington offices of the German Historical Institute and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation assembled a panel of experts and eyewitnesses to discuss the events and perspectives surrounding June 17, 1953.

Somewhat overshadowed internationally by the Hungarian revolution of 1956, the “Prague Spring” of 1968, and the emergence of the Solidarity movement in Poland in 1980, Cold War historians are still attempting to grasp the short and long-term ramifications of the East German insurrection of 1953. But with recently opened archives, not only from the German Democratic Republic’s ruling party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), but also from the Soviet Union, other Eastern European states, and the United States and West Germany, scholars are gaining further insight into the causes and effects of this day. Christian Ostermann, featured panelist and editor of *Uprising in East Germany, 1953*, provided a detailed chronology of the events in the GDR leading up to and following June 17, 1953 as well as a description of the American role and reactions.

Based on official documents and other archival material, Ostermann’s presentation shed light on many of the unanswered questions regarding one of the defining moments in the early years of the Cold War. The upheaval of June 17, which, as Ostermann stated, the East German leadership declared to have been “hatched by imperialistic American and West German agents,” actually had its origins months earlier. In late 1952 and early 1953, the governing regime enacted hard-line measures to increase work norms in a short-term effort to stimulate the GDR’s mori-

bund economy, ailing as a result of forced industrial and agricultural socialization and collectivization. These measures and the resultant reduced wages, in addition to declining living standards and other oppressive political and social conditions, led to unrest within the populace, compelling 130,000 citizens to flee in the first four months of 1953 alone.

In response to the mass exodus of East Germans and the concomitant economic and political instability, the Soviet Politburo expressed its "grave concern" with the policies of the SED and the situation in the GDR, and began to exert pressure on the East German leadership. This resulted, as Ostermann reported, in the proclamation on June 11 of a communiqué the SED called the "New Course," which, despite the frank acknowledgement of past mistakes and the relaxation of the forced socialization of industry and agriculture, failed to address the workers' augmented daily output quotas. The New Course led not only to widespread incredulity and confusion but also to further disappointment both within the SED and amongst the citizenry. For many, the New Course signaled the beginning of the ruling party's demise. And for the already disillusioned workers, the SED's disregard for their concerns vis-à-vis the work norms inspired many to take action.

It is commonly believed that the workers of the construction sites of the Soviet-style buildings along the *Stalinallee* initiated the strike that led to the uprising on June 17. By contrast, Ostermann claimed that it was the workers of the *Hospital Friedrichshain* who called for a general strike and various demonstrations. With news of the plans spreading by word of mouth and via the western media in West Berlin, thousands of East Germans streamed into the public squares of their cities to protest against the regime and to call for free elections. On the morning of June 17, Soviet tanks rolled into East Berlin, and the Soviet city commandant declared martial law. This led to thousands of arrests and up to 40 executions, including those of insubordinate Soviet soldiers. Although the exact number is unknown, it is believed that between 50 and 125 people were killed during the rebellion. All told, Ostermann asserted, the latest numbers confirm that over a million East Germans took part in the strikes and demonstrations in almost 700 cities from June 17-21, 1953.

Although the events of June 17 constituted a massive intelligence failure for the SED, the spontaneous and unorganized revolt also caught the Western Allies by surprise. Much has been made of the American role in the events of that day, but, as Ostermann illustrated, documents show just how unprepared the Americans were. As an American stationed in Germany at the time of the uprising, Martha Mautner provided a first-hand account of her astonishment and her experience in West Berlin during June 1953. At first, Mautner stated, the confusing and conflicting reports about what was happening in East Berlin subdued her reaction.

She said the American Foreign Service and military staff had grown accustomed to tense moments in the “crisis-prone tripwire” of Berlin. In the days following the brutal Soviet repression of the rebellion however, Mautner recalled the personal “sense of outrage” she had felt, both at the Soviets’ brutal repression of the rebellion and at the Western Allies for not doing anything about it. It was then that she finally registered the true scope and intensity of what had occurred. Despite the calls by West Berlin unions for demonstrations on the border in solidarity with the East Berlin workers, life went on as usual. In fact, on June 18 the Berlin Film Festival occurred with all the glitz and glamour that could have been expected—albeit with a minute of silence for the victims of June 17.

From the American policymaking perspective, normal life went on as well. Panelist Robert Bowie stated that in the five months the Eisenhower administration had been in office prior to the June uprising, and especially since the death of Joseph Stalin on March 5, 1953, the main foreign policy focus had been on defining a new U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union. Eisenhower sought some level of détente in order to decrease military spending. Bowie’s insight from within the foreign policy apparatus also confirmed the non-existent American role in the June 17 insurrection. He noted the CIA’s inability at the time to grasp the severity and the magnitude of the situation in the GDR, and said that many in Washington considered the uprising to be a failed Soviet-directed attempt to force the German question back on to the international agenda. Without a pervasive revolution spreading into other areas of the Communist world such as China, Eisenhower was unwilling to intervene in order not to exacerbate the situation and to prevent the spread of false hopes of U.S. assistance. Indeed, the Americans did not view June 17, 1953 as a “great, historical event,” Bowie claimed. In fact, they saw it as a propagandistic opportunity to exploit the German-German relationship. Nonetheless, the Eisenhower administration did respond to some degree by providing large amounts of assistance in the form of an overt food program providing sustenance to millions of East Germans.

The discussion concluded with a lively session of questions and answers providing more perspectives and tales of experiences from the mixed German and American audience of about 100. For all of those present, the significance of June 17, 1953 and its continued relevance 50 years later was clear. Although replaced by October 3 as the *Tag der deutschen Einheit*, June 17, with the help of public commemorations like this one, will remain an important date in the postwar German political consciousness.

Jeffrey Luppés

AMERICAN STUDIES IN TWENTIETH CENTURY GERMANY: ON THE HISTORY AND PRE-HISTORY OF THE GERMAN ASSOCIATION FOR AMERICAN STUDIES

GHI-sponsored panel at the 50th Annual Meeting of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Amerikastudien (German Association for American Studies), Amerikahaus, Munich, June 10-13, 2003. Moderator: Thomas Zeller (GHI/University of Maryland). Commentator: Hans-Jürgen Grabbe (Universität Halle-Wittenberg). Panelists: Walter Grünzweig (Universität Dortmund), Stefan L. Brandt (John F. Kennedy Institute Berlin), Philipp Gassert (Heidelberg Center for American Studies), Rainer Schnoor (Universität Potsdam), Anke Hildebrandt-Mirtschink (Universität Halle-Wittenberg), Michael Dreyer (Northwestern University).

Fifty years ago, the founding of the German Association for American Studies (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Amerikastudien, or DGfA) in Marburg opened a new chapter in the history of American Studies in Germany. To celebrate this occasion, the DGfA devoted its 50th annual meeting to German-American relations. Focusing on the four topical issues of democracy, ethnicity, popular culture, and political culture, the annual congress also provided some space for scholarly reflection as well as eyewitness accounts concerning the history of American Studies in Germany. Organized by Philipp Gassert and chaired by Thomas Zeller, the GHI-sponsored workshop presented six papers on the history of American studies in three German states: the Third Reich, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The participants themselves represented a cross-section of the disciplines that are currently most active within the DGfA: cultural studies, history, literary studies, and political science.

A stimulating and original presentation by Walter Grünzweig entitled "‘Knight Harvard’: Friedrich Schönemann, American Studies Specialist in Nazi Germany" opened the panel. Beginning with a self-critical appraisal of his earlier research on Schönemann, Grünzweig refuted the conventional view of Schönemann as a tragic figure, as "yes, a Nazi . . . but also a prolific and outstanding *Amerikanist*." Although earlier researchers had not overlooked the fact that Schönemann had placed his scholarship in the service of Nazi Foreign Studies (*Auslandswissenschaften*), Schönemann's achievements for the institutionalization of American Studies in Germany were nevertheless highlighted. After discovering Schönemann's correspondence with the famous American cultural critic H. L. Mencken, however, Grünzweig revised his views on

Schönemann. Schönemann's letters to Mencken clearly demonstrate Schönemann's consistent antisemitism as well as his one-sided, highly nationalistic reinterpretation of American political culture. Grünzweig concluded his paper with the unsettling question whether Schönemann's "German" view forced whole generations of postwar West German American literature specialists to focus on purely American issues. This allowed them to join the international American Studies mainstream while preventing a serious coming to terms with the pre-1945 history of their field.

The second culturally and methodologically reflective paper was presented by Stefan L. Brandt. "From the Myth of German-Americans to the Enemy Image USA: American Studies in the Third Reich" placed Schönemann's life and career in the larger context of the development of American Studies in Nazi Germany. Asking himself why American Studies went through a surprising phase of rapid expansion during the Nazi era, Brandt demonstrated that the growing interest in American Studies was due to a strategic interest in the United States. Therefore, an expansion in scholarship did not entail an abandonment of highly ambiguous and ideologically charged views of the United States. Overall, the expansion of the field after 1933 and the beginning institutionalization of American Studies with its first chair at the University of Berlin was completely in harmony with the political goals of the Nazi state. American Studies became an "applied science" engaging in "enemy reconnaissance" (*Gegnerforschung*) as well as a means of propagandistic support to further the regime's ideological and political ends.

The third paper, by Philipp Gassert, continued the story beyond the year 1945. His paper was entitled "'Within the German University a New Area of Investigation': On the Problem of Continuity Within the Process of the Founding of the DGfA." Although Schönemann's role in the founding of the DGfA was rather limited, Gassert argued that the fact should not be overlooked that many of the association's original 33 members participated in Nazi foreign studies before 1945. Starting with an analysis of Arnold Bergstraesser's programmatic speech of 1953, Gassert argued that the difficulties that American Studies encountered in postwar West Germany were not just the result of a lingering anti-Americanism within a defeated country. They also stemmed from the fact that *Amerikastudien* had been tainted by the Nazi Foreign Studies paradigm. The compromise formula of American Studies as a "cooperative experiment," which Bergstraesser suggested at the founding congress in 1953, allowed the various disciplines to cooperate under the umbrella of the DGfA, yet did not fuse them into a new integrated field as Schönemann had advocated during the 1920s and 1930s.

Combining the authentic views of the eyewitness with the experience of the seasoned scholar, Rainer Schnoor presented a paper entitled "Left Deviations: Scenes from More than 40 Years of East German and GDR American Studies." Reminding the audience of the pioneering work of Robert Weimann, Eberhard Brüning, and Karl-Heinz Schönfelder, Schnoor argued that during the 1950s GDR American Studies took place under pictures of Stalin yet in a space that was relatively free of ideological intrusions. Especially during the 1960s, GDR American Studies had an almost subversive character. Young East German America specialists such as Heinz Wüstenhagen discovered the voices of the "other America" of racially and socially discriminated groups, while the official party line railed against a "formalistic and decadent" Western culture. Supported by colorful reminiscences, Schnoor suggested that East German *Amerikanisten* were living in an almost schizophrenic world—dividing themselves between their enthusiasm for American pop culture and their serious political and social involvement in the building of a socialist dictatorship.

Anke Hildebrandt-Mirtschink then presented the audience with a well-researched and informative paper entitled "Continuity and Change in the 'Cooperative Experiment': On the History of the DGfA since the late 1950s." Building on her exhaustive research in the DGfA archives in Mainz, Hildebrandt-Mirtschink looked at how interdisciplinary cooperation has withstood the test of time. Since Arnold Bergstraesser's programmatic 1953 speech, interdisciplinary cooperation has been defined as the most promising venue for the organization to prosper. Except for the DGfA's first decade, however, the DGfA has mostly had to live with a preponderance of literary studies scholars. At times this was perceived as a problem leading to bitter conflicts such as the notorious battle of Tutzing (1976), when historians were denied any representation on the DGfA's advisory board. In recent years, however, these conflicts have receded and the DGfA has coped rather well. It expanded the circulation of its journal *Amerikastudien/American Studies*, it successfully incorporated East German representatives of American Studies in 1990, and it continues to recruit increasing numbers of younger scholars and students. As Hildebrandt-Mirtschink concluded, not all problems may have been dealt with in detail; nevertheless, in reaching maturity and stability, the DGfA is no longer the "cooperative experiment" it once was, but has rather become a successful "cooperative venture" (*kooperatives Unternehmen*).

Michael Dreyer's precise overview "Promised Land or Temple of Methodologies? The Role of the US for German Political Science" began with the premise that there would be no political science in Germany without the United States. This holds true for the methodological basis of the discipline (which is less prevalent among political scientists special-

izing in the history of ideas and strongest in the subfield of international relations), for most of its thematic interests, and for the professional training of political scientists themselves. The organizational impact was most visible during the founding phase, when occupation authorities promoted political science as "democracy science." Since then, however, successive generations of political scientists have had firsthand experience studying or researching in the United States. Despite the importance of the United States for the development of the discipline's methodological and organizational background, only a handful of German political scientists themselves carry out research on the United States. Only within the subdiscipline of international relations is there a larger number of political scientists specializing in U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, because of the astounding number of political scientists working in the United States, the American dominance of political science is not going to disappear any time in the near future.

In his informed commentary, Hans-Jürgen Grabbe asked about the parallels between the early twentieth-century emergence of the foreign studies paradigm in Germany and the arrival of American Studies in the United States at about the same time. Arguing that the importance of Bergstraesser's 1953 speech should not be overstated, he saw the emergence of a new generation of scholars in the 1960s as the real turning point toward what Walter Grünzweig has termed "an approach based on empathy" (as opposed to the "enemy reconnaissance" scholarship of the pre-1945 period). Concerning personal continuities beyond 1945, Grabbe reminded the audience that many who had joined the Nazi party in 1933 later became members of the anti-Nazi resistance. With regard to the GDR, Grabbe argued that historians specializing in the history of the United States seemed to have enjoyed less room to maneuver than representatives of American literary studies. A very lively discussion ensued that was augmented by the recollections of eyewitnesses such as Berndt Ostendorff (Munich University), who came in contact with East German *Amerikanisten* as a student during the 1960s, and Ulrich Littmann (a former head of the *Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst*), who highlighted the importance of the United States for the development of American Studies in Germany. Although history does not provide a guide for the future, the varied and sometimes controversial experience of German *Amerikanisten*, and also the successes of German *Amerikastudien* as well as the growth of the DGfA, suggest that American Studies will have a future in Germany that will hopefully be as interesting and stimulating as its past.

Philipp Gassert

SUMMER SEMINAR IN GERMANY 2003

Between June 1 and June 14, 2003, participants from nine American universities and three different disciplines attended this year's Summer Seminar. The group visited research institutions and met with scholars in three different German cities: Koblenz, Cologne, and Gotha. The aim of the seminar was threefold: first, the participants learned to decipher handwritten documents (old German script); second, the participants toured archives and libraries; and third, the group engaged in dialogue with German and American scholars about research methods and the practical experience of working in German facilities.

Koblenz once again served as the starting point for this year's seminar. We began at the Landeshauptarchiv near the Deutsches Eck, where Walter Rummel, our instructor, organized five sessions on paleography. Dr. Rummel used examples from the sixteenth through the twentieth centuries to illustrate different handwriting typologies. After a brief introduction to the problem of decoding old German script, the participants read texts aloud in order to practice their newfound skills. Also in Koblenz the group profited from a session with Hans-Dieter Kreikamp of the Bundesarchiv. Dr. Kreikamp led a "backstage" tour of the facility, explained the peculiarities of modern German *Verwaltung* and its file production, and discussed the process of requesting files from the stacks.

In addition to the paleography classes and the archive tours, the group met with Philipp Gassert from Heidelberg University. Dr. Gassert talked about his current research project on former West German chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger and explained how he identified archival material that was central to this project. He also discussed his note taking and information collecting process.

Our stay in Koblenz came to a close with a convivial get-together along the banks of the Mosel River at the Weinhaus Schwaab. The next day we departed for Cologne, the capital of the Rheinland and home to the puppetmasters of the *Rheinischer Karneval*.

In Cologne, we spent our first full day at the city's Historical Archive, where Drs. Eberhard Illner and Manfred Huiskes led the group on a tour of Germany's largest communal repository. They illustrated the evolving practice of preserving and conserving public records through fascinating examples from Cologne's venerable history. They also exemplified more recent efforts to collect other manuscripts, posters, private archives, and personal papers—particularly when these materials relate to Cologne's social, cultural, and economic life.

That evening we were guests of the Museum Ludwig at an exhibition opening honoring Prof. L. Fritz Gruber, an important collector of twentieth-century photographs and one of the museum's benefactors, on the

occasion of his ninety-fifth birthday. Many key figures from Cologne's cultural *Prominenz* were present at this special event and for the reception held on the museum's roof, from where we enjoyed a panoramic view of the city and its cathedral.

Saturday morning was spent as guests of the University of Cologne where William G. Gray, professor of history from Texas Tech University, related his experience of researching and writing his first book, which documents West Germany's efforts to undermine the German Democratic Republic during the Cold War. He imparted numerous valuable tips from the perspective of a former American graduate student. His presentation complemented that given by Philipp Gassert. Professor Gray focused on how to structure a research year and how to use the limited time abroad most efficiently. He also addressed the issue of finding the right moment to actually leave the archives behind and move into the process of writing. We would like to thank Prof. Norbert Finzsch for his hospitality at this event.

Following the break for the Pentecost holiday the group reconvened on Tuesday morning for a trip to the Historical Archive of the Cologne Archbishopric. Here the participants learned about the intimate relationship between Cologne's political and social history and its confessional history—particularly before the nineteenth century. Participants were given a chance to demonstrate their skill at using finding aids to locate relevant records.

We headed east to Thuringia the following afternoon. Arriving in Gotha on Wednesday in the early evening, the group decided to have dinner *al fresco* at a local brewpub in the center of this historic town. The next two days were spent at Gotha's famed Research Library, housed in the Schloß Friedenstein, which overlooks the former *Residenzstadt*. Our host, Rupert Schaab, welcomed the group and led us on a tour of the stacks, which are scattered throughout the rooms of this large Baroque palace. Dr. Schaab pointed out the highlights of the collection and discussed aspects of its history, including its temporary removal to Moscow in the mid 1940s.

In addition to the tour, the group attended four small workshops on the following topics: 1) handwriting and the development of manuscripts; 2) German libraries and Germany's library system; 3) codicology; and 4) the first published books (*Inkunabeln*). The introduction to German libraries was given by Antje Pautzke; the presentation on codices was delivered by Kathrin Paasch. We would like to thank them and Dr. Schaab for another interesting and rewarding visit to the Forschungsbibliothek Gotha.

The group celebrated its final evening, a genuine *geselliges Beisammensein*, at the Ratskeller across from the town hall. The participants

shared their views of the seminar and discussed their future plans for conducting their dissertation research in Germany.

We would like to extend our heartfelt thanks and gratitude to all those individuals and organizations that contributed to the 2003 Summer Seminar in Germany. On behalf of the GHI we also would like to thank two organizations whose combined financial and organizational support was vital for the success of this year's seminar: the German Department of the University of Wisconsin, Madison and the Nanovic Institute for European Studies at the University of Notre Dame. Special thanks go to Joan Leffler at the University of Wisconsin for her cooperation and teamwork. An announcement of the program for the 2004 seminar appears in this issue of the Bulletin.

*Daniel S. Mattern
Astrid M. Eckert*

Participants and Their Projects

CHRISTOPHER W. CLOSE, History, University of Pennsylvania; dissertation project: "Judicial Persecution and Practiced Tolerance of Religious Dissent in Sixteenth-Century Kaufbeuren."

AMY K. HAMLIN, Art History, New York University; dissertation project: "Between Allegory and Symbol: Max Beckmann and the Crisis of Expressionism."

DANIEL KREBS, History, Emory University; dissertation project: "German Prisoners of War in the American War of Independence."

JANA MEASELLS, History, Northwestern University; dissertation project: "The Economic Subject and the Subject of Economics: Individuality, Society, and the Role of the German Historical School of Economics in Late-Nineteenth-Century Social Science."

AMIR MINSKY, History, University of Pennsylvania; dissertation project: "Freedom Trees Do Not Thrive on German Soil: 'German Jacobins' Face the French Revolution, 1792–1815."

MICHAEL O'SULLIVAN, History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; dissertation project: "Persevering Piety: Popular Catholicism and the Transformation of a Religious Community in the Rhineland and Westphalia, 1910–1960."

STEVEN M. SCHROEDER, History, University of Notre Dame; dissertation project: "Religion, Morality, and the German Encounter with the Occupying Powers, 1944–1955."

CONNIE MOON SEHAT, History, Rice University; dissertation project: "Engineering German Policy: Democratic and Socialist Values in Twentieth-Century Technology Museums."

SHAWN SEVERSON, German, University of Wisconsin, Madison; dissertation project: "A Sociohistorical Perspective on German in the Early Modern Period."

JENNIFER L. WELSH, History, Duke University; dissertation project: "Mother, Matron, Matriarch: The Cult of St. Anne in Late Medieval and Early Modern Germany."



Seminar participants at the Bundesarchiv Koblenz, June 2003

GHI FELLOWS SEMINARS SPRING AND SUMMER 2003

The GHI's Fellow Seminars are a forum in which recipients of fellowships and other visiting scholars present their research to the research fellows of the Institute and interested scholars from local academic institutions. The Fellows Seminars are organized by Deputy Director Dirk Schumann.

The GHI awards doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships for the duration of one to six months. These fellowships are designed for doctoral candidates and postdoctoral scholars whose research deals with a topic in one of the following fields: German history, the history of German-American relations, the role of Germany and the United States in international relations, and American history. For the application process, see the "Announcements" section of this *Bulletin*.

- January 16 Martha Norton, Brandeis University
Cosmopolitan Patriots: German Conservatism and the French Avantgarde
Dr. Robert G. Livingston, German Historical Institute
America's Germany 1945-1990: Encounters and Episodes
- February 13 Stefan Mörchen, Universität Bremen
"Krebsschaden am Volkskörper": Schwarzer Markt und Kriminalitätsdiskurs in der Nachkriegszeit am Beispiel Bremen
- March 6 Dr. Jana Wüstenhagen, Universität Halle
Deutschland und die USA in Lateinamerika. Die deutsche und US-amerikanische Pharmaindustrie, 1918-1988
Oliver Gnad, Universität Frankfurt
Parties Under Guardianship. Allied Policies and the Reemergence of the German Party System 1942-1957
Anke Hildebrandt-Mirtschink, Universität Halle
Die Geschichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Amerikastudien
- March 13 Dr. Isabel Heinemann, Universität Freiburg
"From Affluence to Anxiety"? Gesellschaftliche Wandlungsprozesse in den USA der 1950er und 1960er Jahre
- March 20 Dr. Hildegard Frübis, Humboldt-Universität Berlin
Images of Jewish Modernity: Between the "Jewish Question," Gender Difference, and Art History
Silvia Daniel, Universität Bonn
Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und der Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges. Das Urteil amerikanischer Politiker und Intellektueller

- Daniel Maul, Universität München
Die Internationale Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) und die Dekolonisation 1944–1965
- April 24 Andreas Fleiter, Universität Bochum
Straf- und Gefängnisreformen in Deutschland und den USA: Preußen und Maryland, 1870–1935
- Uta Fenske, Universität Köln
Männlichkeitsentwürfe im westdeutschen und US-amerikanischen Spielfilm zwischen 1945 und 1960
- May 8 Christian Nünlist, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich
Alliance and Détente: The Evolution of Political Consultation in NATO, 1955–63
- Dr. Keith Allen, Woodrow Wilson Center
Nuclear Armageddon as Roadside Attraction. Cold War Afterlives, Made in America
- June 6 Alexander Missal, Universität Hamburg
“In Perfect Operation”: Social Visions and the Building of the Panama Canal, 1900–1915
- Elisabeth M. Yavnai, London School of Economics and Political Science
The U.S. Army’s Investigation and Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals in Germany, 1944–1948
- June 19 Alexander Pyrges, Universität Trier
“Kulturtransfer” und “Assimilation”: Einwanderung aus dem Alten Reich nach Georgia, 1730–1825
- Valerie Hebert, University of Toronto
The High Command Case in View of the Myth of the Clean Hands of the Wehrmacht
- Stefanie Baumann, Universität München
Entschädigung für Opfer von pseudomedizinischen Experimenten
- July 31 Holger Klitzing, Universität Heidelberg
Henry A. Kissinger and Germany: Perceptions, Networks, and Policies from a Transatlantic Perspective
- Dr. Stefan Zahlmann, Universität Münster
Scheitern in gesellschaftlichen Transformationsprozessen: Lebenserinnerungen von Eliten aus den Südstaaten der USA nach 1863 und aus Ostdeutschland nach 1989

August 28 Dr. Joern Leonhard, Wadham College, Oxford
*Nationalisierung des Krieges und Bellizierung der Nation: Die
Diskussion um Volks- und Nationalkrieg in Deutschland,
Großbritannien und den Vereinigten Staaten seit den 1860er
Jahren*

Dr. Ulf Schmidt, University of Kent, Canterbury
Hitler's Doctor: The Life of Karl Brandt

Dr. Kathrin Meyer, TU Berlin
*Rehabilitation, Democracy and Security: U.S. Internment
Policy in Germany, 1945–1952*

EVENTS

FALL 2003 LECTURE SERIES

NARRATING HISTORY – MEMOIRS & MEMORIES

This lecture series will explore individual memoirs and memories and their place in historical study. Georg and Wilma Iggers, Peter Gay, and Steven Muller will share their memories of coming to America from Germany. Martina Wagner-Egelhaaf, Johannes Fried, and Raphael Gross will examine the role of memory in history as well as autobiography as a literary genre. The lecture series is generously supported by the German Marshall Fund of the United States

Please note: The lectures will begin at 6:30 p.m. The reception will begin at 6:00 p.m.

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| October 2 | Georg and Wilma Iggers, State University of New York at Buffalo/Canisius College at Buffalo
<i>Two Sides of History—Two Lives in Dialogue</i> |
| October 9 | Martina Wagner-Egelhaaf, Münster University
<i>Memory and Memories: The Art of Autobiography</i> |
| October 23 | Johannes Fried, Frankfurt University
<i>Remembered Facts: Bohr and Heisenberg in Copenhagen</i> |
| November 6 | Peter Gay, Yale University
<i>A Personal German Question</i> |
| November 13 | Raphael Gross, Leo Baeck Institute, London
<i>Memory—Morality—Guilt: Relegating Nazism to the Past in Postwar Germany</i> |
| December 11 | Steven Muller, The Johns Hopkins University
<i>My Journey from Hamburg to Hollywood: A Peripatetic Youth</i> |

EVENTS SPONSORED BY THE GHI

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org.

2003

- August 16–18 “Nazi Crimes and the Law.” Conference at the University of Amsterdam. Conveners: Nathan Stoltzfus (Florida State University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
- August 21–23 “Great Expectations—John F. Kennedy and the ‘Thousand Days.’” Conference at the Free University Berlin. Conveners: Andreas Etges (Free University Berlin) and Bernd Schäfer
- September 8–10 “Cold War Memory: Interpreting the Physical Legacy of the Cold War.” Conference at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC. Conveners: Keith Allen (Woodrow Wilson Center), Christian Ostermann (Woodrow Wilson Center), and Bernd Schäfer (GHI)
- September 17 “The Global Situation: A European Point of View.” Fourth Gerd Bucerius Lecture, at the Westin Embassy Row Hotel, Washington, DC. Speaker: Former Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Conveners: Michael Göring (ZEIT Foundation) and Christof Mauch (GHI)
- September 18–20 “Soziale Wohlfahrt zwischen privater und staatlicher Verantwortung.” Panel at the Annual Meeting of the German Studies Association, New Orleans. Convener: Simone Lässig (GHI).
- October 3 “My Germany: Reflections on my Country Before and After 1989.” German Unification Symposium at the GHI. Convener: Christof Mauch (GHI). Speakers: Prof. Jens Reich (Max Delbrück Center, Berlin) and Bernd Schäfer (GHI)
- October 16 “Reflecting on the Past, Envisioning the Future: New Perspectives in German-Jewish

- Studies." Joint Lecture of the Leo Baeck Institute, New York, and the GHI. Convener: Simone Lässig. Speakers: Liliane Weissberg (University of Pennsylvania) and Jeffrey Peck (AICGS/ Johns Hopkins University)
- October 17–18 "Transatlantic Crossings? Transcultural Relations and Political Protest in Germany and the U.S., 1958–1977." Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Astrid Eckert (GHI) and Wilfried Mausbach (Free University Berlin)
- October 20 "Is the EU Complete Without Turkey? Opportunities and Challenges for Europe's Identity and the Foreign and Security Policy of the EU and the USA." Symposium at the GHI. Conveners: Sören Haffer (Heinrich-Böll-Foundation) and Dirk Schumann (GHI)
- October 23–26 "Creating Religious Communities in Modern Society." Conference at the University of Chicago. Conveners: Michael Geyer (University of Chicago), Lucian Hölscher (Universität Bochum), Simone Lässig (GHI), and Hartmut Lehmann (MPI Göttingen)
- October 23–26 Medieval History Seminar, at the GHI. Convener: Christoph Strupp (GHI)
- November 3, 2003 "How Valid Are Comparisons? The American Occupation of Germany Revisited." Symposium at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. Conveners: Rebecca Boehling (University of Maryland, Baltimore County), Dieter Dettke (Friedrich Ebert Foundation), and R. Gerald Livingston (GHI)
- November 7 First Edmund Spevack Memorial Lecture, at Adams House, Harvard University. Speaker: Kathleen Neils Conzen (University of Chicago)
- November 7–9 "Death in Germany." Conference at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville. Conveners: Alon Confino (UVA), Paul Betts (University of Sussex), and Dirk Schumann (GHI)

- November 12–13 “American Museums—Putting Visitors First.” ICOM-Germany Annual Meeting, at the GHI. Conveners: Hans-Martin Hinz (ICOM) and Christof Mauch (GHI)
- November 20 “Freedom in American History.” 17th Annual Lecture at the GHI. Speakers: Eric Foner (Columbia University) and Jürgen Kocka (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin)
- November 21 Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute and Fritz Stern Dissertation Award Ceremony at the GHI. Conveners: Gerald D. Feldman (Friends of the GHI, University of California, Berkeley) and Christof Mauch (GHI)
- December 5–7 “Rivers in History: Transatlantic Perspectives.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Thomas Zeller (GHI/University of Maryland)

2004

- January 9 “Reconstituting Public Realms: Archivists, Librarians, and Journalists in Postwar Germany.” Panel at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Washington, DC. Conveners: Astrid Eckert (GHI) and Christof Mauch (GHI)
- February 19 “The Spatial Turn in History.” Symposium at the GHI. Convener: Thomas Zeller (GHI/University of Maryland)
- February 19–22 “Natural Catastrophes in Global Perspective.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Christian Pfister (University of Bern)
- Spring “German-American Economic Relations.” Symposium at the GHI. Convener: Dirk Schumann (GHI)
- Spring “Environment-Politics-Culture: Transatlantic Perspectives.” Young Scholars Forum at the GHI. Convener: Frank Zelko (GHI)

- Spring "Green Parties in Global Perspective." Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Frank Zelko (GHI), Helga Flores-Trejo (Heinrich Böll Foundation)
- March 4–7 "Pietism in Two Worlds: Transmissions of Dissent in Germany and North America, 1680–1820." Conference at Emory University. Conveners: James Melton (Department of History, Emory University), Dirk Schumann (GHI), and Jonathan Strom (Candler School of Theology, Emory University)
- March 18–21 "Taxation, State, and Civil Society in Germany and the United States, 1750–1950." Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Alexander Nützenadel (Cologne University) and Christoph Strupp (GHI)
- March 25–27 "Toward a Biographical Turn? Biography in Modern Historiography—Modern Historiography in Biography." Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Volker Berghahn (Columbia University) and Simone Lässig (GHI)
- March 27 "Criminal Justice in Times of Political Crisis: Central Europe 1920–1950." Panel at the European Social Science History Conference, Humboldt University, Berlin. Convener: Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
- April 28 –May 1 "German History in the Short Nineteenth Century, 1790–1890." Tenth Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History, at the University of Tübingen. Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
- May "Environment and War: Contexts and Consequences of Military Destruction." Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Charles E. Closmann (GHI) and Christof Mauch (GHI)
- Summer Summer Seminar in U.S. Archives. Conveners: Kathleen Conzen (University of Chicago), Andreas Etges (Free University Berlin), and Christof Mauch (GHI)

- Summer "Alexander von Humboldt Revisited." Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Andreas Daum (SUNY Buffalo), Charles Closmann (GHI), and Simone Lässig (GHI)
- Fall "Competing Modernities: Germany and the United States, 1890–1960." Conference at the Humboldt University, Berlin. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Kiran Patel (Humboldt University)
- September 8–11 "Access—Presentation—Memory: The American Presidential Libraries and the Memorial Foundations of German Politicians." Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Astrid M. Eckert (GHI) and Christof Mauch (GHI)
- September 17–19 "The Seventies in Transatlantic Perspective: Money, Oil, Detente, and the Peace Movement." Conference at Vanderbilt University. Conveners: Thomas Schwartz (Vanderbilt University), Matthias Schulz (Vanderbilt University), and Bernd Schäfer (GHI)
- September 30–October 2 "Adolph Cluss: Architect and Engineer." Symposium at the GHI. Conveners: Cynthia Field (Smithsonian Institution), Barbara Franco (Historical Society of Washington DC), William Gilcher (Goethe Institute, Washington), and Christof Mauch (GHI)

2005

- March 3–6 "Teaching World History." Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Eckhardt Fuchs (University of Mannheim), Christof Mauch (GHI), and Benedikt Stuchtey (GHI London)
- Spring "Revolutionary Wars." Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Stig Förster (University of Bern), and Vera Lind (GHI)
- Spring "Turning Points in Environmental History." Conference at the University of Bielefeld. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Joachim Radkau (University of Bielefeld)